

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



INDEX

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*October 1963-July 1964*

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



OCTOBER 1963

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The Editors.

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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OCTOBER 1963

No. 1

## THE THIRD ROUND

*By W. W. Rostow*

WE are evidently at the beginning of the third major effort since 1945 to establish whether or not it is possible for the Soviet Union and the West to live together on this planet under conditions of tolerable stability and low tension. The first effort occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War; the second, in the years after Stalin's death; and historians may well date the third from the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of last October.

Sandwiched between these intervals of diplomatic exploration and negotiation were two massive, sustained Soviet offensives: Stalin's, of 1946-51; and Khrushchev's, of 1958-62. To understand where we are and what the prospects and conditions for success may be, it is, perhaps, worth recalling briefly this familiar sequence which takes on a certain shapeliness with the passage of time and the benefit of hindsight.

It starts, one might properly assume, with Stalingrad. From the time when victory appeared certain, Moscow prepared actively to exploit the confusion that the war itself and the postwar years would inevitably bring. Communist rule in Russia was born of such confusion; and, as the Second World War came to a close, it became increasingly clear that, despite vast destruction within Russia, its rulers looked to the postwar period as an interval of opportunity for expansion, based in part on the disposition of the Red Army and the leverage this provided.

How far expansion could go depended, of course, on how the then overwhelming power of the United States would be deployed. In 1945-46 Stalin evidently judged that the United States was, in fact, behaving as President Roosevelt told him it would

behave when he predicted the United States could not maintain troops abroad for more than two years after the war. We negotiated about Europe and China against a background of hasty, drastic, unilateral demobilization.

Assessing his opportunities hopefully, Stalin made clear in his tough speech of February 9, 1946, that he regarded the days ahead as a period for the extension of Communist power. And he mounted a sustained offensive, first in the West, then in the East. In the West, Stalin, although set back in Iran, increased Soviet pressure against Turkey by diplomacy and threat during the summer of 1946; in Greece by supporting substantial guerrilla warfare; and in Italy and France by vigorous Communist Party efforts to gain parliamentary power. In 1947 he accelerated the movement toward total control in Eastern Europe, symbolized by the creation of the Cominform in September 1947. He succeeded in Prague (February 1948), but failed in Belgrade where Tito's defection was announced in June 1948.

But from early 1947 the Western counterattack began with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The election in April 1948 saved Italy, and the Communist effort in Greece fell apart in the face of the Greek effort and Communist schisms. France found a group of center parties capable of governing, if uncertainly, and containing the domestic Communist menace.

Germany drifted, from the spring of 1946, toward a split; and the resulting deadlock in the Berlin Control Council was dramatized by the Soviet walkout on March 20, 1948, which set the stage for the full blockade on the ground three months later. The success of the airlift ended, in effect, Stalin's main thrust to the West. The interacting process set in motion by this offensive, however, had yielded not merely the Marshall Plan but the Brussels Pact (September 1948), NATO (March 1949), and the creation (May 1949) of the Federal Republic of Germany with its close ties to West Berlin.

As this duel in the West proceeded, Stalin launched an offensive in the East which can be roughly dated from the activist injunctions of Zhdanov to the Communist parties in Asia at the founding meeting of the Cominform in September 1947. Open guerrilla warfare began in Indochina as early as November 1946; in Burma, in April 1948; in Malaya, in June; and in Indonesia and the Philippines, in the autumn. The Indian and Japanese Communist parties, with less scope for guerrilla action, nevertheless sharply in-

creased their militancy in 1948. As victory was won in China in November 1949 (contrary to Stalin's earlier expectations), Mao's political-military strategy was openly commended by the Cominform to the Communist parties in those areas where guerrilla operations were under way. The meeting of Stalin and Mao early in 1950 undoubtedly confirmed the ambitious Asian strategy and planned its climax in the form of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, which took place at the end of June 1950.

The American and United Nations response to the invasion of South Korea, the landings at Inchon, the march to the Yalu, the Chinese Communist entrance into the war, and the successful United Nations defense against massive Chinese assault in April-May 1951 at the 38th parallel brought this phase of military and quasi-military Communist effort throughout Asia to a gradual end. Neither Moscow nor Peking was willing to undertake all-out war or even to accept the cost of a continued Korean offensive. And elsewhere the bright Communist hopes of 1946-47 had dimmed. Nowhere in Asia was Mao's success repeated. Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines largely overcame their guerrillas. At great cost to Britain, the Malayan guerrillas were contained and driven back. Only in Indochina did local conditions favor real Communist momentum; but Ho Chi Minh was finally forced to settle for half a victory (Geneva, 1954) in the wake of Stalin's death and in the shadow of possible United States intervention.

Where were we, then, when the truce negotiations on Korea began in the summer of 1951? Stalin had consolidated Eastern Europe; Mao, China. But the global balance of power still lay—even if precariously—with the free world. And the West, led by the United States, had answered three basic questions which underlay the hopes of Communist planners. First, it was demonstrated that the United States commitment to Europe had survived the war, belying Roosevelt's fears and his unfortunate prediction. Second, it was demonstrated that Western Europe had emerged from the Second World War with the capacity to find again its economic, social and political vigor and, with American aid, to fend off the Communist thrusts against the Eastern Mediterranean, Italy, France and, climactically, against Berlin. Third, it was demonstrated in Korea that the United States and the free world as a whole had the will and capacity to deal with an aggressive thrust with conventional forces across the truce lines of the cold war.

## II

Between the summer of 1951 and the launching of Sputnik in October 1957 there emerged a relatively quiet interval, interrupted by the Suez and Hungarian crises, which resulted directly less from the tensions of the cold war than from the dynamics of change within the free world and within the Communist bloc. It is likely Soviet planners recognized that the phase of exploitation of immediate postwar opportunities was over; and the positions taken at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 in Moscow reflected thoughts about a new, longer-run Communist strategy. Then Stalin's death intervened, yielding some four years of quiet struggle for power. It was only in 1957 that Khrushchev established unambiguous control over the machinery of the Soviet Government as well as over the Communist Party. There were also significant and absorbing changes in policy within the Soviet Union and adjustments within the satellite empire, yielding the Gomulka régime in Poland in October 1956 and the Hungarian revolution later in that year.

There evidently was also some thought given to the possibilities of accommodation with the West. As noted above, the Indo-chinese war was brought to a formal close, Moscow acquiesced in the Trieste settlement, and Austria was granted its freedom in neutrality (July 1955). But on the two great issues—arms control and Germany—no substantial progress was made. The summit meeting of 1955 yielded no important result; and the subsequent Foreign Ministers' discussion of Germany (October 1955) proved fruitless. A surface atmosphere of relative *détente* persisted, nevertheless, down to the summit meeting of May 1960, which was exploded by the U-2 incident. But in fact the sky had darkened at least two years earlier.

In retrospect, the reason for the failure of the *détente* of the 1950s is tolerably clear. Two major new factors had emerged on the world scene and Soviet policy-makers evidently came to the conclusion that they could be turned to major advantage.

First, there was the emergence in the 1950s of thermonuclear weapons and the possibility of their delivery over long distances by rockets. For the first time the Soviet Union was put in a position of being able to threaten the destruction of Western Europe and the imposition of massive direct damage on the United States. Contemplating these instruments, Moscow evidently judged it possible, in their shadow, to force the West to make limited diplo-

matic concessions. The theme of nuclear blackmail first emerged in Soviet policy in 1956, most notably during the Suez crisis.

The second great new factor on the world scene, which evidently inflamed Soviet hopes, was the marked acceleration in the revolutions of nationalism and modernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. There is no doubt that Moscow came to believe that it had deeply rooted advantages in seeking to expand Communist power and influence in these regions at the expense of the West by orchestrating flexibly the devices of subversion and guerrilla warfare; trade and aid; appeal to anti-colonialism and nationalist sentiments; and by the claim that Communism was not merely the fast-closing rival of the United States but the possessor of a method for the more efficient—even if ruthless—modernization of an underdeveloped region. The 1955 arms deal with Egypt and the agreement to build the Aswan Dam represented the first major efforts along these lines.

But it was only after the launching of Sputnik in October 1957 that the second great Communist offensive of the postwar years was fully launched. It was in 1958 that Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin. It was in 1958 that the Communist Party in Hanoi announced it would undertake a guerrilla war in South Viet Nam. Soon afterward the Pathet Lao, with the active help of Communist North Viet Nam, resumed their effort to take over Laos. It was in these first post-Sputnik years that the Soviets sought to exploit the potentialities for acquiring in the Congo a Communist base for operations in central Africa; it was then that they invested a billion dollars in military aid in an effort to induce friction, if not war, between Indonesia and The Netherlands over West New Guinea and also to strengthen Soviet influence and the Communist position in Indonesia. It was also, perhaps fortuitously, at the end of 1958 that Castro took over in Cuba.

At two points the forward momentum of the post-Sputnik Communist thrust was slowed down by major and successful United States actions: in the Lebanon-Jordan and Quemoy-Matsu crises of 1958. But, as of January 1961, Khrushchev's offensive had considerable momentum in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

### III

The first charge on the Kennedy Administration in 1961—somewhat like the challenge faced by the Truman Administration

early in 1947—was to turn back this Communist offensive by demonstrating that the two hypotheses on which it was built were not viable. Roughly speaking, between May 1961, when a precarious ceasefire in Laos was arranged, and the October 1962 missile crisis in Cuba, the task was substantially accomplished.

The answer to the first question posed by Soviet policy—our possible vulnerability to nuclear blackmail—was given by the whole course of the Berlin affair in 1961–62, including especially the President's July 1961 speech and the subsequent military build-up. After the failure of the Soviet effort in February–March 1962 to crack the unity of the Western Alliance by intruding into the Berlin air corridors, Moscow apparently judged the Berlin position of the West too difficult to undermine directly. The Cuban missile gambit was then mounted, and its denouement brought to an end, for the time being at least, the notion that vital interests of the free world would be surrendered under the threat of nuclear war.

The answer to the second question—concerning the ability of the West to avoid Communist takeover in the underdeveloped areas—had to be given at many points by many devices: in Laos, by an evident determination to frustrate a Communist takeover; in Viet Nam, by the mounting from December 1961 of a massively enlarged counter-insurgency program; in Indonesia, by the successful negotiation over West New Guinea by The Netherlands and Indonesian Governments; in Africa, by the whole cast of our approach to the new African nations—in particular, our support for the U.N. effort in the Congo; in Latin America, by the isolation of Communist Cuba, combined with the Alliance for Progress.

By the end of the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, the momentum had drained out of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive, despite the unresolved crises in Cuba and Southeast Asia.

In the course of this sequence, situations emerged which were bound to affect the future of Soviet policy. First, Western Europe continued to display an astonishing economic momentum, not matched since 1914; and it moved toward great-power status, with a strong likelihood of expansion, in one form or another, of its nuclear role.

Second, quite aside from the efforts of the United States to deal with the major dimensions of the Communist thrust into underdeveloped areas, those nations and peoples demonstrated a capac-

ity to defend their independence with increasing skill and determination and with an increased understanding of Communist objectives and methods. The over-all trend of recent events in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, while still marked by dangerous instability capable of Communist exploitation, made the notion of Moscow control over these areas an increasingly unrealistic prospect.

Third, within the Communist bloc the assertion of nationalist impulses—notably in the Sino-Soviet split, but elsewhere as well—shattered the intellectual unity and organizational discipline of the international Communist movement. The process also yielded the possibility that the Chinese Communists might emerge with some kind of independent nuclear capability within a time span relevant to current planning.

Fourth, quite aside from the chronic inability of Communist nations to grow food efficiently, a marked industrial deceleration began to take hold in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as the heavy-industry sectors on which postwar momentum was built ran their inevitable course. In 1962 the countries of NATO had an average growth rate of 4.8 percent of G.N.P.; the Communist bloc—leaving wallowing Communist China aside—of 3.6 percent. The effect of this deceleration, which has brought the over-all Soviet growth rate down in recent years from something like 7 percent to just about 4 percent, is to reduce the annual increment of Soviet resources available for allocation to military, foreign-policy and domestic purposes, although the declining industrial growth rate is still quite high. (The United States' over-all growth rate figure for 1962, as we continued to emerge from recession, was a better-than-average 5.4 percent.)

Finally, while Moscow's post-Sputnik offensive was being conducted with great *éclat* and considerable acceptance of risk, long-run trends operating in Russia and Eastern Europe tended to liberalize somewhat those societies as well as to strengthen nationalist strands within them and the popular will for peace.

This, as nearly as we can understand it, is the setting in which the third major round of postwar negotiations is being undertaken.

#### IV

There is a sense in which the fundamental diplomatic issues and problems involved remain precisely what they were in the imme-

diated postwar days. The fundamental issues are arms control and Germany. The fundamental problems are the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept the kind of inspection and international control required to get a serious grip on the arms race, and the Soviet unwillingness to accept a clear separation of its legitimate national security interests in Central Europe from its ideological commitment to hold East Germany as a Communist state against the will of its people.

In 1945-46 the diplomatic issues were dramatized by the Baruch proposal for international control of atomic energy and Secretary of State Byrnes' proposal for a 50-year German disarmament treaty to be applied to a German nation unified by free elections.

In the 1950s, in a world already complicated by nuclear weapons produced in three countries, the issues were embedded in complex arms-control negotiations designed to roll back the history of the arms race. But at their core was still the problem of inspection, dramatized by President Eisenhower's 1955 proposal for mutual aerial surveillance. Similarly, the German question assumed a different form with the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany fully a part of NATO, and with the emergence of the German Democratic Republic to the East. The required effort to reshape, if not to roll back, history was reflected in the package proposal for disarmament by stages that was presented in Geneva in May 1959. But the root of the matter remained the problem of free political choice by all the people of Germany and an even-handed European security system.

Neither in 1945-46 nor during the 1950s was the Soviet Union prepared to seek a higher degree of national security for Russia at the expense of effective international measures of inspection; nor was it prepared to accept a solution which would remove the dangerous tensions from Central Europe at the risk of even slowly staged corrosion of Communism in East Germany.

These two great unresolved issues pose for those responsible in Moscow the same question which the Chinese Communists have put to them in recent months with such brutal candor: Is the policy of the Soviet Union to be a policy rooted in the interests of the Russian nation and its people? Or is it to be a policy rooted in an abiding effort to spread the cause of Communism over the face of the earth? In the end, this remains the relevant question.

As of the present time no one can say with confidence whether the Soviet Union is prepared to move toward a definitive settlement of the critical issues of arms control and disarmament—which evidently require mutual inspection—or toward a system of mutual security combined with the right of self-determination in Central Europe.

The objective case for effectively controlling the arms race and easing the dangers to all represented by the Ulbricht régime is strong, even viewed from Moscow's perspective. The first steps resulting from the limited test ban could lead on, with patience, toward more solid results. But one cannot expect men of the age, history and commitment of Khrushchev and his colleagues suddenly to undertake the revolutionary transformations which a stable peace demands. We must allow time and the workings of process rather than *coups de théâtre*.

On the other hand, the whole of the story since Stalingrad has in it important lessons for the West.

First, we must reckon that the impulse in Moscow to seek the

proper desire for consultation and a voice in the outcome. Only over a very narrow range of issues, indeed, is this still, in fact, a bipolar world. The agreement of Washington and Moscow is necessary to make a framework for peace; but its substance must take into account the interests and engage the energies of many peoples.

Third, the solutions that we propose must encourage the Soviet Union—and, indeed, other nations with Communist governments—to perceive that the world we in the West are trying to create by our own efforts and by negotiation has a place of dignity for all nations which pursue their national interests with integrity, which respect the hard imperatives of interdependence and the rights of other nations and peoples.

Fourth, since what we are likely to see, at best, is a slow and protracted process, it is also essential, if this third round is to succeed, that there be no premature throwing of hats in the air. We deluded ourselves and tempted the Communist leadership by popular over-reaction in the West in 1945–46 and in the mid-1950s, two intervals of apparent *détente*. Very minor progress yielded a widespread sense that peace had broken out. We of the West ought to be mature enough and case-hardened enough now to permit our celebrations to match the actual performance in moving toward peace—whatever that performance may prove to be. We can well afford, at the present time, to attach to the test-ban agreement the importance it deserves as a major step forward, since we now are sufficiently experienced to know it is but one of a difficult series that must be taken for success.

The stakes for us all are so great that this sequence of negotiation must be approached—by ourselves and by our allies—with all the imagination and sincerity we can summon. It is unrealistic to assume that history is static and that we are doomed to repeat failures of the past. But the hard-won lesson of a generation's hazardous experience is that our powder should be kept dry. An awareness of the truly revolutionary character of the ultimate issues—and an awareness also of the undiminished, even gathering strength and vitality of the West and its values—should give us the poise to be patient. We should make the most of the third round, but not be afraid, if necessary, to await the fourth.

## THE CHINESE-SOVIET RIFT: ORIGINS AND PORTENTS

*By Philip E. Mosely*

THE long-heralded and twice-postponed conference between the Chinese and Soviet Communist spokesmen, held at Moscow in July, was overshadowed, at least for the outside world, by the dramatic publication of the exchange of letters between the two Central Committees. The breakup of the conference was hardly softened by halfhearted assertions of a mutual intention to continue the discussions. It is hard to discern any useful topics for new negotiations until one or another or both parties to the quarrel have made some rather drastic changes in their ideological claims or their practical policy aims. The two facets are inseparable, of course. Quarrels among Communists have been a recurring feature of a movement that claims political omniscience and a monopoly of messianic foresight, and are normally clothed in recondite scholastic terms. But their ideological disputes are always waged over real questions of power and policy.

From this latest phase of the Moscow-Peking conflict, what new can we learn of the nature of the rift? And, more dimly glimpsed, what does this clash portend for the future?

The exchange of charges has clarified in some respects, though obscured in others, the chronology of the conflict. Western analysts of the dispute have generally traced its devious course from the June 1960 congress of the Rumanian Party, or rather from the behind-the-scenes meetings held at that time in Bucharest, among representatives of some 50 Communist Parties, to discuss the clash of views that had arisen over the proper strategy of the international movement. The Soviet letter of July 14 assigns a somewhat earlier date. According to its account, the direct conflict began with the publication by the Chinese Party, in April 1960, of a collection called "Long Live Leninism!" This was, Moscow claims, a direct attack on several main points of the Moscow Declaration of 1957. In it Peking lashed out against the policy of coexistence, against the possibility of averting a world war, against the use of both peaceful and non-peaceful paths to the Communist achievement of power. Similarly, in June 1960, during the sessions at Peking of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade

Unions, the Chinese leaders held a number of separate meetings with representatives of various parties to attack Moscow's policies.

The Soviet letter likewise confirms the existence of bitter disputes, previously known in part to the outside world, which preceded the adoption of the Moscow statement of Communist Parties in November 1960. It also reports that secret negotiations were held at Moscow in September 1960 in a vain attempt to resolve the growing differences between the two parties in advance of the general conference of that November.

The exchanges confirm something that has been widely suspected, but not adequately documented—that resentment of each other's domestic policies has played a major part in the process of mutual estrangement. True, informal statements by Soviet leaders in 1958–59 expressed scorn and skepticism of Peking's "great leap forward" of mid-1958, with its communes and its backyard steel furnaces. The statements now make it clear why the Soviet leaders so suddenly fell silent on these matters in mid-1960, as they became more fully aware of Peking's resentment and its intransigence.

The partial breakdown in Sino-Soviet economic coöperation has also been clarified somewhat. The Chinese statement confirms that it was Moscow that took the initiative, in August 1960, of withdrawing its industrial and other experts. On the other hand, the Soviet statement assigns to Peking the initiative of cutting the volume of its trade with the U.S.S.R. by 67 percent and reducing the delivery of industrial plants by 40 times between 1960 and 1963. (If this statement is accurate, it means that deliveries of complete plants dropped by 97.5 percent, as compared with a much smaller decline in over-all trade.) The Chinese letter likewise repeats Peking's outspoken complaints against the large-scale credits and industrial assistance that the Soviet Union has provided for non-Communist countries, in contrast to the absence of any new Soviet credits to Communist China since 1957.

What is not spelled out in the exchanges is the degree to which the Soviet leaders were appalled by the "leap forward" of 1958. They clearly foresaw the serious disruption that it would and did inflict on the Chinese economy; this grave setback to Peking's ambitions has been confirmed by the instructions, recently acquired and published in Washington, which gave directions to the political administration of the Chinese army on how to cope

with the crisis of morale in 1960-61. In addition, Moscow must have assumed in 1960 that Peking would require far greater assistance, perhaps extensive long-term credits, from the Soviet Union and the European satellites, in order to make good the losses. For Khrushchev to compound the failure of the "leap forward," as he did in August 1960, by withdrawing the many Soviet experts and, presumably, by making it clear that Soviet credits were not available to tide Mao's régime over, would be sufficient grounds for explaining Peking's open hatred for the Moscow comrades.

The question of how much economic bargaining power the Soviet Union still retains for its future relations with Communist China may be crucial in the next few months or several years. China has long insisted on "going it alone" without Soviet credits, but it still draws the major part of its imports from the Communist bloc, even if on a "commercial basis," offsetting imports with exports under a clearing and rotating short-term credit arrangement. Even the slow but steady recovery of mainland China's industry since 1961 would have been extremely difficult without the supply of Soviet machinery to replace worn-out equipment and complete some of the new plants. And a large part of China's internal transportation, as well as the operation of its armed forces, is largely dependent on petroleum imports from the Soviet Union and Rumania.

If the Chinese leadership is fairly rational, it will want to avoid a complete break in economic relations, such as the Soviet Government carried out in 1961 against Albania—perhaps as a warning of the far more drastic consequences to China of a complete rupture. But it is impossible to say how far the Mao leadership is guided by rational considerations today.

## II

However far Mao may have retreated from the drastic "leap forward" of 1958, he cannot publicly cry *mea culpa* without also abandoning his claim to be pursuing the sole "correct" Communist policy, thereby surrendering his right to correct the mistakes of the Soviet leadership and to lead the forces of international Communism. The Chinese statement of June 14 sets forth two main grievances against Soviet domestic policy: the denunciation of Stalin, and the proclaiming of the "state of the whole people." Both policies are among Khrushchev's cherished

contributions to Communist theory and Soviet policy. In terms of Chinese necessities, these two charges are merely two sides of the same coin.

It is curious to see Mao in the role of Stalin's champion. Stalin the man was hardly gentle or flexible in his dealings with the Chinese Party. One of the first steps of his successors was to undo many of his policies, to abandon the unequal treaties he had imposed on China in 1950, to grant large-scale credits and industrial aid, and to elevate the Chinese Party to a position of outward parity with the Soviet Party. Indeed, it is ironical that these and other changes took place during Khrushchev's rise to power and that Khrushchev was the first important Soviet leader to pay a visit to Mao Tse-tung at Peking!

Mao's objections to the successive waves of de-Stalinization go deeper than personalities, of course. The Chinese statement says, "To raise the question of 'combatting the cult of personality' is actually to counterpose the leaders to the masses, undermine the party's unified leadership which is based on democratic centralism, dissipate its fighting strength and disintegrate its ranks." Thus as early as 1956, de-Stalinization in Russia had come to be regarded by Mao as a challenge to his own rule in China.

While the Chinese Party has shown a remarkable continuity and stability of leadership for more than 25 years, it seems hardly possible that it can have carried out so many profound changes of policy without vigorous arguments and perhaps disagreements within the central core of leadership. These disputes have been generally withheld from outside eyes as a result of several powerful factors: Mao's undisputed authority, the meager margin of resources available, the feeling of being in a beleaguered fortress challenged by the unfinished civil war with Chiang Kai-shek and hemmed in actively by American pressures, and, perhaps increasingly, by a fear that any visible fissures might be exploited by Moscow to subject the Chinese Party to its own domination.

This suspicion, plus the fear that Moscow may be preparing to take advantage of a succession crisis in Peking, may explain why Mao has reacted so bitterly to Moscow's insistence on de-Stalinization. In embarking on the violent reconstruction of mid-1958, and then in trying since mid-1960 to make good the ravages it inflicted, Mao could not welcome any drawing of a parallel—whether intended by Khrushchev or not—between his own policies and Stalin's rule. This was too dangerous, if not to him

personally, at least to the rigid discipline and unity which his policies required.

The forthright attack in the Peking statement against one of Khrushchev's favorite goals—the transformation of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” into a “state of the whole people”—reflects Mao's same concern for the absolute unity of his party, both against the tormented masses at home and against any attempts by Moscow to influence it in any of its segments. Of course, Mao deliberately ignores the universally guiding role that the Soviet program assigns to the C.P.S.U. and its unyielding monopoly over controls and decisions even within the future “all-people's state.” He shows no hesitation, however, in accusing “certain persons” in the Soviet leadership of “replacing the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state by the bourgeois theory of the state” and of thereby committing “a great historical retrogression.” Since Communist China is now involved in a very long period of Stalinist reconstruction—perhaps 20 or 30 years at a minimum—Mao can hardly be grateful to Khrushchev for holding out even the prospect of a less rigorous and hardship-laden rule in Soviet Russia. The example, in China, would be a serious challenge to Maoism.

### III

Three crucial elements in the Sino-Soviet clash relate to the choice of the correct policy toward movements of “national liberation” in newly independent and still dependent countries; the appraisal of the risks and consequences of nuclear war; and the question of who shall lead the Communist forces in world politics.

Unlike several other major points of controversy, which are set forth with eloquent directness in the two statements, the quarrel over the proper attitude of Communists, and especially of the Soviet Government, to movements of “national liberation” has been confused by overlapping and contradictory accusations and countercharges, and by the traditional “battle of quotations” selected from Marx and Lenin. Both sides declare, for example, that the best way to rid the world of “imperialism” is through coöperation between the “socialist bloc” of Communist-led countries and the “oppressed masses” of the former colonies. Both agree, in theory, that the path from “national liberation” to “socialism” can be either peaceful or non-peaceful. Both agree that each new “socialist” country must go through a stage of

Communist party dictatorship, or "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Despite this range of common doctrine and perspective, the practical conclusions each party draws are in deep though perhaps not irreconcilable disagreement. Moscow places great stress on the possibility of a "peaceful" path to "socialism," although it admits that no such example has occurred so far. The change in the strategic balance, the possibility of deterring the "imperialists" from armed intervention, the economic achievements and assistance of the Soviet Union, make the "peaceful" path possible. And the dangers of nuclear war make it preferable.

Peking, on the other hand, accuses Khrushchev of strengthening "bourgeois" elements in the newly independent countries, despite the certainty that in the end they will side with the "imperialists" and not with the "camp of socialism." Obviously, Mao is strongly opposed to, and perhaps envious of, the large-scale support and economic aid Moscow has been providing for Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, the late Colonel Kassem and others. This investment, he maintains, will turn out to the disadvantage of Communism. The "proletarian party," Mao insists, "must always draw a clear line of demarcation between itself and bourgeois nationalism, to which it must never fall captive."

Although the Soviet press and on occasion Khrushchev personally have protested strongly against the repression of Communists in Egypt, India, Iraq and elsewhere, the Soviet Government shows no signs of slackening its political and economic support for these and similar governments of "national liberation." Peking insists, on the contrary, that this policy delays, weakens and may destroy the revolutionary upsurge of genuinely "proletarian," *i.e.* Communist, forces. The Soviet statement, in turn, accuses Peking of supporting in practice only the non-peaceful path of all-out conflict, of continually preaching armed insurrection regardless of the concrete situation, and therefore, of "Trotskyism."

Certainly, the Soviet approach, more gradualist in temper if no less revolutionary in ultimate purpose, leaves the way open for many types of coöperation between Communists and other local parties, as in Chile and Brazil. The Chinese insistence that armed struggle, to be launched as soon as possible, is the only realistic path to victory, has strong appeal for more exposed parties, as in Albania and North Korea, and for more militant segments in

a number of other Communist parties. Indeed, both before and after his flattering reception in the Soviet Union and after signing on the dotted line in support of Khrushchev's policy of coexistence, Fidel Castro has continued to emphasize the crucial role of armed struggle and to point to the absence of any examples of the "peaceful" path to socialism.

The basic and central dispute between Peking and Moscow revolves around their differing appraisals of the present balance of strategic power in the world. In the week of the Cuban missile crisis, both Soviet Russia and America were looking squarely into the horror of a nuclear war. Both came to the conclusion, perhaps Moscow later than Washington, that some mutual accommodations would be far, far preferable to any "victory" that might be won at the price of an unparalleled holocaust. After further reflection, and after being allowed to reap an exaggerated share of the laurels for "saving the peace," Khrushchev decided that, if not much could be done to solve the basic conflicts of purpose, at least something should be done to improve the "atmospherics." One result has been his decision to accept the long-proffered agreement on a partial test ban.

According to Peking's outspoken denunciations of the past winter, on the other hand, Khrushchev was an "adventurer" when he put the 40-odd intermediate-range missiles into Cuba, and he was a "coward" when he decided to withdraw them. He should, as Mao saw it, have accepted the challenge and the reality of nuclear war.

Mao's attack goes beyond this specific case. It is "sheer illusion," the Chinese statement says, to assert (quoting Khrushchev) that "it is possible to bring about 'a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars' " so long as "the system of imperialism and the exploitation of man by man still exists." To advocate this policy is, Peking says, "deliberately to deceive the people of the world and help the imperialists in their policies of aggression and war." The Moscow rejoinder of July 14 naturally reacts strongly to this accusation and spells out again Khrushchev's countercharges. The Chinese comrades, he says, overestimate the forces of imperialism and have too little confidence in those of socialism. "Apparently," the Moscow statement continues, "the people who refer to the thermonuclear weapon as a 'paper tiger' are not fully aware of the destructive force of this weapon."

Turning the Chinese Communists' reasoning back on them, the Soviet statement goes on to put rather bluntly Moscow's "well-justified suspicion" that "this is no longer a class approach in the struggle for the abolition of capitalism but for some entirely different aims." "If both the exploiters and the exploited are buried under the ruins of the old world, who will build the 'bright future'?" Instead of the "class-internationalist approach expressed in the call 'Workers of the world, unite,' the Chinese comrades stubbornly propagate a slogan devoid of any class meaning: 'The wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West.'"

In conclusion, the Soviet statement rubs the salt of its scorn into the wound: "Is this the position of people who, encountering difficulties in the building of socialism, have become disappointed, do not see the possibility of exerting the main influence on the international revolutionary movement by their economic successes, by the example of the successful building of socialism in their countries?" "They want to achieve the revolution sooner, by other—what seem to them shorter—ways."

#### IV

The step-by-step rending of the veil of secrecy that usually conceals inter-party disputes, and especially the forthright and comprehensive exchange of charges in the June 14 and July 14 statements, have far-reaching implications for Communist politics and for the rest of the world. Both Moscow and Peking have, for a considerable time to come, given up any hope of reconciling their ambitions and their conflicting claims to leadership. The prospect has evaporated of holding a new "world Communist congress," which Moscow has held out to the Chinese as a reward for working out an agreed compromise in advance. Moscow will not be eager to hold a conference, even of those numerous parties that accept its leadership, because the absentees will be too conspicuous. Peking will hardly wish to organize its own international congress unless or until it has rallied a far wider range of party or factional support than it has so far. Instead of the emergence of two international Communist groupings, as many observers have predicted, it is more likely now that both Moscow and Peking will each pursue the gathering of allegiances through bilateral and factional contacts and visits.

But what are the implications, for Communists, of openly abandoning the traditional concept of a single "correct" policy

for all Communist régimes and parties? The idea of "polycentrism," which seemed so improbable in 1956 when it was first advanced and then partially retracted by Palmiro Togliatti, has already become a reality, at least in the ideological sphere. Those régimes, as in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, that are closely dependent on Soviet policy have rallied to the Moscow side. North Korea, which like Communist China desires urgently to unify the national territory under its own control, has plumped, after some hesitation, for Peking. Ho Chi Minh in North Viet Nam has tried to avoid choosing sides, for he needs the backing of both in the struggle to take over Laos and South Viet Nam.

Similarly, Aidit in Indonesia has been caught between Indonesian fears of China and admiration for its strength, between his ambition to inherit Sukarno's power and Moscow's channeling of its economic and military aid to Sukarno. The Italian Communist Party, borne high on the crest of electoral and political gains, is even more moderate and "gradualist" than Moscow. Castro and Che Guevara continue, on the other hand, to urge the more militant among the Latin American Communists forward to armed insurrection and terrorism, against the more moderate position taken by the older Communist parties and leaders. Is this "flexibility" or "disarray"?

The natural reaction of the weaker side is to recruit factions within the existing parties, and the Moscow statement accuses Peking of carrying on splitting activities within the Belgian, Brazilian, Ceylonese, Australian, Italian and American parties. It is only one step farther to the creation of separate parties, since Communist discipline is incompatible with the permanent toleration of organized dissident groups standing in opposition to the party leadership. The party that has been hit hardest is India's—not only by the split but by the open Chinese Communist attack of October 1962 on Indian territory. After a protracted struggle the majority came out strongly in defense of India's territorial integrity and against Peking's policy. The moderate Chairman, S. A. Dange, then traveled to Moscow and London to rally support for India's claims. Meanwhile, the pro-Chinese minority, which has been actively at work, accuses the official leadership of supplying Nehru's police with lists of pro-Chinese Communists, many of whom have been held in preventive detention for many months.

In rallying support to its cause, Peking has not hesitated to

appeal to racial prejudices, following its clear ambition to become the leader of Communism in Asia, Africa and Latin America (supposedly leaving Europe and North America to Soviet guidance). At the Third Solidarity Conference of the peoples of Asian and African countries held last spring at Moshi, in Tanganyika, the leader of the Chinese delegation, according to the July 14 statement, told the Soviet representatives that "Whites have nothing to do here." Against the great Soviet preponderance in political, strategic and economic influence, Peking, it is true, has very little to offer today except its racial appeal and its militant call to insurrection.

How far "polycentrism" will actually develop remains to be seen. The Communists' need for a center of political and ideological authority, the continuing preponderance of Moscow as a power center, the desire within each party to limit the effects of "splitting"—these and other factors may make the practical effects of schism much less far-reaching than many commentators have assumed. In theory, a Communist party may well have the opportunity, when the two giants have a falling-out, to gain its complete independence; in practice, it may not want to be independent.

Another factor of practical importance is the degree to which any given party is self-supported. A strong party, as in Italy, with well-organized and reliable sources of income under its own control, has much to lose if it turns to the militant Chinese pattern; therefore, it is more likely to bolster Moscow's authority than to challenge it. As in the Italian case, a strongly based party may even exert some influence on Soviet policy. When Khrushchev and Ilyichev swung, as they did last winter, into a campaign against the influence of "bourgeois" ideology within Soviet art and literature, the Italian leaders, by expressing their dismay, allegedly contributed to a milder turn in the Kremlin's policy. Such interaction, however slight, between a foreign party and the C.P.S.U.—unthinkable in Stalin's time—may become more frequent in the future.

One longer-range effect of "polycentrism" may be to strengthen the emphasis on gradualist and even reformist appeals in various Communist party programs. If the general movement to "socialism" is assured by the rapid economic growth and great strategic strength of the Soviet Union, the balance of decision in parties abroad may tip more easily toward more gradualism, more cau-

tion, less sacrifice and more coöperation with politically adjacent parties. Even in its more militant phases, Communism has tried to capture the "good words," such as "nationalism," "liberation," "peace" and "democracy," for its own advantage. The split between Moscow and Peking will lend greater strength to this effort of ideological aggrandizement than at any time since 1947 and the Cominform Declaration. In three key countries—Italy, India and Indonesia—Communist parties may make major gains during the new period of "coexistence."

To go on from this to assume that Communist parties can be permanently "domesticated" and won over to a genuine respect for parliamentary and free institutions would be a great mistake. Each Communist party retains in its central leadership a capacity for great elasticity of tactics. It can switch on signal from "peaceful" and parliamentary forms of "class struggle" to more militant forms, including sabotage and insurrection, even at the calculated cost of losing its less stable and less indoctrinated fringe membership or support.



A somewhat separate question concerns the ability of the Soviet and Chinese leaderships to exert pressure or influence within the rival party. Perhaps there are many Stalinists who are hostile to Khrushchev's numerous changes within the Soviet system and who might rally—possibly in a succession crisis—to Maoist militancy. And are there, behind the façade or reality of "unanimity" in the Chinese Party, Communists who question the wisdom of China's "going it alone"? Any suggested answers to these questions are and must remain highly speculative, of course.

Although the Soviet press and literature make it clear that the struggle between Stalinist and Khrushchevian styles of rule is continuing, it seems futile to pin a Stalinist label on any organized groups or factions. Many of the same people who served Stalin now serve Khrushchev, and tens of thousands of new administrators have been promoted and given greater initiative and responsibilities, always within the same general system of centralized party rule. Even if Khrushchev has not succeeded in carrying out all his promises, he has done a great deal to make the system work more flexibly and more efficiently, to raise the standard of living, to remove the deadly pall of terror and make life more interesting and rewarding for those tens of thousands of

upper-rank Communists and experts on whom the régime relies to achieve its ambitions. These people, new or somewhat reformed, find no attraction in Peking's scorn for their new-found comforts and for their strong desire to advance Russia's power and influence while avoiding a nuclear war. Mao's apocalyptic vision of a "final and definitive" nuclear showdown with "imperialism" leaves them shuddering, as it does all reasonable people.

No doubt, there are some secret Stalinists, people who think that Khrushchev has been twisting Leninist dogma a bit and that Mao sounds more like the Stalin they revered. However nostalgic they may be, such Stalinists will not be inclined to restore Communist unity at the price of transferring the leadership of international Communism to Peking. Stalin insisted, so far as possible, on the complete subservience of foreign Communist parties to Moscow, and for a Stalinist to surrender Russia's primacy is unthinkable. In fact, one of the main complaints of any secret Stalinists—in addition to the demotion of Stalin—would be that Khrushchev has allowed the Chinese Party to build up its power to the point of defying Moscow and claiming first an equal and then a superior right of over-all leadership in the politics of international Communism.

Outwardly, the Peking leadership is just as homogeneous and united as Moscow's and no one expects Mao's authority to be defied or even questioned publicly in his lifetime. Will he be able, however, to hand on his unified authority unimpaired to a single leader, presumably Liu Shao-chih? It may be that, once the founding father has passed from the scene, divergent views will demand a hearing. There may be Communists who disapproved or were disillusioned over the communes, and who agree privately with Moscow's criticism that one cannot force the pace of change too fast. Perhaps leaders in the industrial field would like again to import complete factories from the Soviet Union instead of scrabbling along at a level far below that of 1959. Perhaps some of the military planners believe that China needs the backing of Soviet nuclear-missile power, as well as new Soviet equipment, and understand that a small nuclear capability is of little importance in comparison with U.S. and Soviet stockpiles and advanced means of delivery.

Although so little is known to the West, and possibly also to the Soviet leaders, about potential or real groupings and con-

flicting viewpoints behind Peking's wall, we cannot dismiss the possibility that, once either or both of the two major figures in the contest has ceased to bestride the scene, their successors may adopt somewhat different policies on the questions that have led to the rift.

## VI

One final question. Is Moscow's deep concern over Peking's militancy mainly a reflection of accumulated grievances and quarrels, of disagreement over Russia's duty to "do or die" for China's ambitions? Or does it reflect a conflict over the future division of an expanding Communist sphere? As believing Communists, Moscow and Peking must hold that the area of Communist rule will expand, and therefore the assignment of future areas of preponderance is a matter of great practical concern. Or is Communist China on the verge of some new adventure, perhaps in Southeast Asia?

The Moscow statement of July 14 suggests at one point that practical and immediate questions of policy have been discussed in concrete terms. "The Chinese comrades have advanced the slogan of spearpoint against spearpoint, opposing it to the policy of other socialist countries aimed at relaxing the international situation and ending the cold war. In actual fact, this slogan adds grist to the imperialist policy of brinkmanship and helps the champions of the arms race." What can this passage mean except that Peking has been demanding Soviet backing for some new act of aggression?

The tone of grave and urgent anxiety that pervades recent Soviet statements and speeches may mean that, being more closely attuned than any non-Communist to Peking's ways of thinking, the Soviet leaders are aware that the Chinese leadership, exasperated by its relative failures at home and its actual failures abroad, has been engaged in a crucial debate, as it was in the summer of 1958. One alternative that it may be weighing is, conceivably, to plunge ahead, expand Communist and Chinese control, and challenge the United States to meet its commitments on the Asian mainland. Using its trained manpower, its locally produced conventional weapons and its special facilities for subversive warfare, Communist China could if it chose open a new front of political and military challenge.

Has Moscow perhaps dissociated itself from Peking's militant

stance in order to remain aloof from direct involvement in any such adventure? Has it, by helping establish a better atmosphere through joining in the partial test-ban treaty, thrown up an additional safeguard against being drawn into a Sino-American con-

flict in the hope of lessening the risk that such a war would escalate to a nuclear conflict? Has Moscow's shock-treatment of Peking been a last effort to restrain Mao from adventure? Or does Khrushchev feel that Mao has gone beyond reach of "rational" considerations?

Perhaps the policy debates in Peking have been influenced by Moscow's blunt warnings of the nature of nuclear war. Perhaps Communist China will withhold its hungry hands from the rich and weak lands to the south. One thing seems certain, however. If Mao decides to strike out on an independent and militant policy of his own, even against Moscow's clear warnings of the perils that lie ahead, his purpose will be to destroy the American position and influence in mainland Asia, the only strong barrier to his ambitions.

## THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: AIMS, DISTORTIONS, OBSTACLES

*By Alberto Lleras Camargo*

**T**HE documents that gave formal birth to the Alliance for Progress were signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on August 17, 1961. That date does not mark, however, the sudden commencement of a new stage in inter-American relations, but the culmination of a laborious process in which all the countries forming the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) took an active part.

Notwithstanding this, even today the multilateral character of the Alliance is not clearly perceived. Ask any American from, say, the Middle West what the Alliance is, and he will tell you, if he happens to be exceptionally well informed, that it is a policy of the United States toward Latin America which imposes new burdens on him as a taxpayer but which, properly handled, may serve to stop the Latin Americans from falling under the power of Communism, as Cuba fell. To what extent is this extraordinary distortion the work of those who have had an interest in making the movement attractive? To a great extent, certainly. The truth is that such misinterpretations and oversimplifications were powerful enough to make the very authors of the policy lose sight of its original meaning, its importance, its direction.

For, as should be known, the Alliance for Progress was the crowning confirmation of a Latin American policy seeking to effect a change in the traditional postures of the United States of America with regard to the southern portion of the hemisphere, and, in particular, with regard to the possibilities for the latter's development. It was, at the same time, the imposition of a new way of looking at the Latin American governments' obligations to their peoples. When it began to be disfigured, so that it appeared as merely another phase of the policy of the United States toward Latin America, the governments and peoples south of the Rio Grande felt that they were absolved from doing their share and that from then on they were to wait for the United States to carry out its part of the undertaking alone. So remarkable a change—which took place between the birth of the Alliance and a year and a half later—was facilitated and, I dare say, even characterized by North America's instruments of mass communication—press,

radio and television—and by the international news agencies that are fed from United States sources. A great deal of the responsibility for this distortion of the aims of the Alliance also lies at the door of government officials—not excluding those of the United States—charged with the duty of issuing information about it. Nor were matters mended by the attitude of the Latin American governments which found fault with the United States for being too slow in getting the Alliance under way, as if they themselves had no part in launching what might and did seem to be just another one-way apportionment of foreign aid.

But, happily, a few months ago an excellent reaction set in—a movement back toward the historical and, if you like, the philosophical origins of this multilateral policy. There are records of those origins. The documents which were signed two years ago have very few precedents in the history of international relations. The aims and purposes of the Alliance for Progress are so wide-reaching and complex, and penetrate so deeply into what the Charter of the United Nations terms the “domestic jurisdiction” of the states—beyond trespass by that organization or any other—that, as commitments between nations, they are exceptional if not unique.

Neither the Charter of Punta del Este nor the Declaration to the Peoples of America, which preceded it, nor any of the annexed resolutions, has the formal character of ordinary international agreements, covenants and treaties. Following the best tradition of inter-American diplomatic procedure, the whole of this process—which might well prove decisive for the history of the hemisphere—rests merely on a booklet of declarations and commitments which require no ratification and whose duration depends entirely on the good will of each state. The governments bind themselves, not so much to the other signatory nations as to their own peoples, to carry out a policy which will, in effect, be the product of the closest international collaboration. Any of the 20 states may, without previous notice, withdraw from the Alliance simply by communicating the fact. Any state, moreover, may renounce the economic, political and social principles agreed upon in the various documents. The Punta del Este agreements, then, are no mere diplomatic instruments, but the final adoption of a great conjoint policy which is itself the result of a deep collective conviction.

In the political field the first move in this new direction is rightly attributed to the President of Brazil, Juscelino Kubi-

tschek. In August 1958, in an aide-mémoire addressed to the other American presidents, he proposed that the governments should all pledge themselves to a joint effort to fight against Latin American underdevelopment. Kubitschek received from his colleagues the most stimulating response in favor of Operation Pan America. In September of the same year a new aide-mémoire defined in vigorous terms the probable objectives of the Operation. In this second memorandum one can already observe the influence of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) which, under the direction of the Argentinian economist, Raul Prebisch, had been trying to break the closed circle of underdevelopment with new ideas—ideas that were regarded with hostility or reserve by people in financial circles in the United States and in the World Bank. The second memorandum outlines the conception of development and underdevelopment and the possibilities of progressing from one to the other. It makes clear not only the advantage but also the method of estimating the growth of Latin American countries and of setting a specific goal for development in terms of a specified rate of growth. It asks for an indication of the probable fountainheads of international resources and the extent to which they would have to be drawn upon in order to complement national efforts. It considers it essential to examine the factors chiefly responsible for strangulations of the Latin American economy with a view to eliminating them by collective or individual action. Most important, the memorandum, besides accepting and expressing the spirit of the studies carried out by ECLA and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, uses even the ECLA technical terminology which is henceforward to predominate in all the inter-American resolutions on economic coöperation.

In that same month of September 1958, an informal meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, gathered in Washington on the invitation of the Secretary of State, gave rise to the creation of the fruitful Committee of Twenty-one, which was to have its first meeting in December of that year at the Pan American Union. The chairman was one of the greatest figures on the American scene, Colombia's former President Alfonso López, who, though sick, lent vigor and direction to undertakings which undoubtedly were decisive factors in the success of the Committee. Various task groups were formed, embodying what were to be the central themes decided on at the Punta del Este Conference almost three

years later. One of them worked on and finally drew up the initial statutes of the International Development Bank, previously rejected by the United States as an instrumentality of no value in promoting the economies of Latin America. Another group tackled the problem of basic products arising from the constant and disheartening imbalance in the terms of exchange between the United States and the Latin American nations—an imbalance aggravated just at that time by the striking fall in the prices of principal exports. Still another group examined the possibilities of regional markets, and pioneered in the creation both of the Central American Common Market and of the Latin American Association for Free Trade. And, finally, another team worked on the problems of technical coöperation.

The Committee of Twenty-one met again in April and May 1959. In January that year the Cuban Revolution had triumphed. Up to then the leader of the movement, Fidel Castro, seemed disposed to coöperate with the other Latin American countries and with the United States in the drive for development, which was already assuming a categorical definiteness with something of the same character and almost the identical terms that were finally to be adopted at Punta del Este. Castro was present at the 1959 meeting and delivered a speech which, though long and confused, was not more recriminatory than that of any of the more impatient delegates. It is said that, while speaking and on being asked to assess the amount the United States would have to contribute as foreign aid to the development program, Castro read aloud a figure which one of his economists had passed on to him—\$30,000,000,000. That was taken to be a *boutade* of the bearded chieftain. It turned out to be not very different from the figures that were finally arrived at and agreed on at Punta del Este.

But there is no truth in the rumor about the influence Castro is supposed to have exercised on the United States—through the excesses of his revolution—to change its policy toward Latin America. The fact is that the Government of the United States, as Dr. Milton Eisenhower has recently shown in his book, “The Wine Is Bitter,” had for some time been evolving a modification of the orthodox principles hitherto considered appropriate for the economic development of Latin America. It had come to the conclusion that only through unorthodox means and only through joint action—which would necessarily imply structural changes in the social and economic life of the southern republics—would it

be possible, if not indeed to achieve development, at least to prevent the disorganization and the economic and political collapse of that quarter of the world. The effect of events in Cuba, such as expropriation and the trend toward Communism, has been to give greater urgency to the intentions of the United States that led to the Charter of Bogotá and Punta del Este; it did not, however, engender a new policy, but was merely a factor in urging—chiefly on the Latin American governments—the adoption of such a policy.

The Committee of Twenty-one, known technically as the Commission for Studying the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Coöperation, had its last meeting in Bogotá, where the whole anterior process of study and discussion culminated in a series of resolutions which ought to be regarded as the basis of the policy that was to be subsequently incorporated into the Alliance for Progress. There now appeared, without any resistance from the United States, but rather with its unequivocal support, certain theses that had been impugned both there and in Latin America as excessively radical. Thus it was acknowledged that economic development could not by itself bring about the desired social welfare in time, and that it was necessary to engage simultaneously in a movement for the improvement of living conditions of the Latin American peoples in order to avert tremendous social upheavals among vast masses of the population sunk in misery.

The Act of Bogotá was, among documents of its kind, the first to proclaim the need for structural reforms—above all in the systems governing taxes, tenure and use of land, and education—in order to set on foot a great effort directed toward endowing the population of Latin America with shelter, schooling, employment and health, by means of the most wholehearted mobilization of domestic resources and a considerable contingent of foreign aid. In consequence of these declarations, the Act of Bogotá recommended the creation of a Special Fund for Social Development which should contribute, on flexible terms, to the exertions of such Latin American countries as might propose to undertake or amplify action in the fields mentioned. Later on, the United States gave the Fund \$500,000,000 of which \$394,000,000 was to be administered by the Bank for International Development, \$100,000,000 by the United States Government, and \$6,000,000 placed at the disposal of the Pan American Union for such research as the new policy might require.

## II

In the discussions on these matters the United States assumed an attitude of readiness to yield to Latin American pressure; it revealed its broad-mindedness and its increasing abandonment of its traditional policy; it sometimes even went so far as to urge the acceptance of certain bold schemes presented by others, and to insist, for example, on the advisability of carrying out agrarian and tax reforms. It was obvious that none of the Latin American countries—not even Mexico after 50 years in the climate of social revolution—could compare in social gains and just distribution of land and taxes with their powerful northern neighbor. But it was equally obvious that in order to promote similar conditions in the nations of the south the United States had to jettison a number of ideas which had traditionally weighed on its relationship with Latin America, and which had failed. Such was the idea that most important and decisive collaboration for the development of Latin America could and should proceed from North American private capital—an idea that was to be superseded by the conviction that such collaboration ought to come mainly from public funds. Such, too, was the notion that economic development would, unaided, produce social change quickly enough to satisfy the anxious masses of Latin America; this in turn gave way to a sense of the urgent need to undertake, again with public funds, campaigns for social welfare and even for human rehabilitation.

In place of another outworn conception it came to be recognized that any loans made to Latin American governments for the purposes of economic development and social welfare should be on easy and flexible terms, both as to time and as to interest, so as not to impose an intolerable burden on their already weakened position with respect to balance of payments. It was equally recognized that the law of demand and supply, in its application to Latin America's basic commodities, was causing an imbalance in the terms of exchange, which in turn was steadily impoverishing the nations of the south. But more than this, the United States recognized that it was necessary to come to the rescue, with such artificial measures as agreements on specific commodities, in order to avoid even more alarming consequences. The same spirit of comprehension led to the approval of existing regional common markets—or the creation of them—in an effort to accelerate the

economic advancement of the Latin American states. And, crowning all these heterodox initiatives was the fact—without which the new stage would have been impossible—that the American States endorsed the theory of planning.

All these new ideas and undertakings are the principal points that mark the radical change in the Latin American policy of the United States—a change effected by two Administrations, representing each of the two great parties. They were arrived at and carried out in a period extending from the last months of the Eisenhower Administration to the first two years of Mr. Kennedy's Presidency. A curious parallel is to be found in recent American history. It was President Hoover who initiated the policy of non-intervention and good neighborliness toward Latin America; yet it remained for Roosevelt to christen, launch and steer it with admirable decision and energy, to such a degree, indeed, that even in the memory of Latin Americans and, quite naturally, in the memory of his fellow citizens, the fact of continuity is lost sight of. It is forgotten that in this respect there was no distinction of substance, but merely of style, between the Roosevelt Administration and that of his predecessor.

Most of the initiative in the present policy has been due to certain persons in Latin America, nearly all of them belonging to a new school of economists. The governments, however, that set their seal on the policy at Punta del Este were not fully aware or convinced of its ultimate implications. In Latin America, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, political leaders have a habit of carrying revolutionary statements beyond the point to which they are really prepared to go. That practice does not generally have any serious effects on internal politics. But international politics is quite another thing, since every word is reckoned, or ought to be reckoned, at its face value. We can, then, be reasonably sure—as indeed the event has proved—that when the governments pledged themselves to change fundamentally certain traditional structures in the political, social and economic life of Latin America—as in the case of agrarian reform—they were not yet absolutely determined to carry all this out. The unwarrantable delays which later on took place, and which did not give the Alliance for Progress a chance to make the impact on the Latin American peoples that was hoped for, clearly indicate that when Punta del Este witnessed the signing of the most broadly sponsored and socially advanced document in the common history of

our hemisphere, not all the signers understood its scope or divined its depth and gravity.

The declarations and pledges of Punta del Este were profoundly logical and consistent. The structural reforms announced were strictly indispensable if the Latin American states seriously intended to pledge themselves simultaneously to economic development and immediate social rehabilitation; the latter implied in great measure not only an increase in consumption, but also a natural decline in the capacity to save money for the promotion of the former. The Soviet Union had lived through 40 long years of austerity, privation and even misery in order to push its economic development. However, we in the Western Hemisphere proposed to achieve a similar aim, while at the same time procuring better living conditions, though we knew this meant artificially enlarging our capacity to acquire good dwellings, get sufficient schooling, enjoy better health and increase earnings. All this could be accomplished because it would be possible to finance part of the enterprise with foreign aid.

The basic and almost elemental problem of Latin America is the vertiginous increase in population which threatens to drown any rhythm of economic growth and overflow any capacity to improve living conditions. This problem was examined with a certain tactful and calculating discretion at Punta del Este, and it figures implicitly or prominently in every study in which the future of these countries is considered. Here is the reason why agrarian reform is one of the vital needs in our development. For there is no sort of economic expansion, however swift or successful, that can assimilate both the rural masses who cease to live by agriculture and the new surplus hands, whether in the town or in the country, who come year by year to glut the labor market. Nor must we forget that agrarian reform is needed from the point of view of equity, as another means of distributing patrimony and income more justly among the Latin Americans. It is all the more necessary because up to now such distribution has been sought mainly through systems of taxation which bite hardly at all into capital and income associated with land.

We must likewise expect this reform to result in a greater productivity of property neglected by inactive landowners, who prefer to derive profit from appreciation of land values rather than wrest it from the raising of crops and cattle with considerable toil and risk. But agrarian reform also has to be a hope and incentive

for millions of peasants who are being displaced by the appearance of rural mechanization, and whose numbers in relation to the land are far in excess of what modern economics considers advisable. Those peasants, quite unprepared for industrial life, will become, if they go to the great towns, denizens of those hovels and slums which constitute a dismal but characteristic blot on the contemporary Latin American city—transformed, as it has been during the last 20 years, from a distinctive, progressive and inviting place into a sinister, proliferating farrago, hideous with sudden and uncontrolled contrast between old and new forms of wealth and with the blight and fester of rampant misery.

But among the conditions laid down by the Alliance for Progress, agrarian reform is not the only one that upsets people in Latin America. There is also tax reform. To indicate how outlandish this situation is, it is enough to say that not a single Latin American, whether of high standing or of the underworld, has ever been imprisoned for not paying his taxes or for sending in a fraudulent income tax report. In all that vast area it is unthinkable that deceiving or defrauding the state in this matter of taxes should be considered a crime, and what is more, the law does not consider it as such. As a result, tax evasion is widespread. But apart from this, symptomatic as it is, the systems of taxation are in themselves quite benevolent. In some countries taxes are very low or exemptions are large. Where tax collection is well organized, the brunt falls on the great industrial incomes—whether foreign-owned or national—and the earnings of employees, for these are precisely the sources which can most easily be checked. But there are many extremely well-to-do and even very rich people who pay no taxes; they have recourse to all sorts of anachronistic though still legal loopholes. For example, agriculturists and cattlemen are protected under the pretext that, if they were taxed, they would have to raise the prices of their produce and would thus cause an increase in the cost of living. A number of countries allow discounts on individual and mercantile incomes when these are accompanied by losses in farming activities; since this arrangement can hardly be controlled by the state, it easily lends itself to falsification of facts.

Now, if the countries that signed the Punta del Este agreement are to carry out what they said they were going to carry out—that is, an authentic revolution in their way of life and a sudden speeding up of economic expansion—they will need tax reforms, which

in some instances will have to be drastic. But the classes necessarily affected by such measures have offered and will continue to offer strong resistance, first to the reforms themselves, and afterwards—for obvious reasons—to the Alliance for Progress. Hence the echo of dissatisfaction which is now heard everywhere in Latin America, in congresses and assemblies where the cattleman, the landlord and the great evader of taxes abound and have been silently and effectively representing their interests all through the successive and superficial political changes that have occurred.

In general those voices are the very ones that have been clamoring, in a heart-rending nationalistic strain, against outside interference in the political life of each country, in order to defend the status quo in taxation and landownership. In the past no Latin American nation has effected or even attempted either of these reforms without having to face tremendous opposition and embroilment. To try to carry out the two at the same time, throughout the hemisphere, looks like madness. But whose madness? Let us remember that the governments themselves, seemingly of their own accord, yielded to the gentle suasion of the economists who had been advocating these measures as a prerequisite to improvement in Latin America's precarious situation. Where, then, the madness?—especially since the situation certainly cannot be remedied by less radical means.

But there is still another obstacle, and it is quite a big one, for it contributes to the *mañana* attitude commonly imputed to Latin America. This is the grievous lack of technical training for the preparation and accomplishment of the early stages of any project, whether of legislation, engineering or social betterment on any important scale. Several countries have no trustworthy statistics. When, as happens in planning, work is undertaken on schemes that attempt to assess the present with a view to a distant future, the results are uncertain and highly questionable. But even for such concrete projects as a dam, an industrial plant or a power station, the financial basis cannot be accurately calculated—for lack of special technical knowledge. Sometimes a project after having been accepted is held up because the detailed blueprints of the concrete work are not forthcoming. All of which does not prevent certain voices in Latin America from attributing the delay in Alliance projects wholly to the bureaucratic machinery of the United States.

For here indeed is the source of the Alliance's great error in pro-

cedure. Inter-American organs were set up to study and prepare plans for national development, but it was left entirely to the United States' initiative not only to find the way in which its contribution should be made available, but also to arrive at some standard of judgment as to how and when and to whom support should be apportioned for carrying out Alliance plans. The result was to create a pattern of bilateral operation which, on the one hand, set the tone of the discussions between the United States and each separate Latin American nation for each particular case; on the other hand it caused an unending series of misunderstandings, resentments, conflicts and—though quite exceptionally—opportunities for scoring in the political game. How distant and different from the spirit and intention of the Alliance for Progress! President Kubitschek and I, on being called in to furnish an opinion on the functioning of the Alliance, both agreed—which was hardly remarkable—that the Alliance must be given back its original character and that this should be accomplished by establishing an inter-American body to administer the Alliance. Such a body could really be entrusted with the responsibility of scrutinizing the extent to which each country, including the United States, fulfills the commitments it assumed at Punta del Este. But if a single nation, however rich or powerful, should try to take that responsibility on itself, its action would be interpreted as an attempt at unwarranted invasion of each state's internal jurisdiction—in short, as an instance of imperialism.

### III

It would not, then, be right nor in keeping with the spirit of Punta del Este for the United States to engage alone in the enterprise of Latin American development. The newly formed Inter-American Development Committee may be the means of solving the existing misunderstandings which harass and hinder the march of this policy and counteract its beneficial effects on the hemisphere. But it is not right, either, to place the whole burden of carrying out this great undertaking upon President Kennedy, who has had to assume responsibility for the Alliance whenever it has been abandoned by its Latin American partners, and has also had to join issue with his own compatriots who, though well aware that there is as yet no other way, strive to block the path of his policy.

The Congress of the United States approves of the Alliance and

extols it—mark you—as a *policy* of that nation. Individually, Senators and Representatives follow the same line, converted as they are into jealous guardians of the social and economic transformation of Latin America. On the other hand, their fault-finding, usually based on unsound information, can scarcely be said to help to make the program acceptable. But what is seriously harmful is their manifest itch to slash the figures of the budget when it is laid before them; and although they may later on repent of having yielded to the temptation, the wrong has been done, and the whole of Latin America has interpreted their action as a lack of good will on the part of the United States toward the Alliance. It is already being pointed out that when the moment came to give the Alliance the necessary financial support the United States failed in precisely that part of the joint undertaking which it pledged itself to perform. For of what use would the Alliance for Progress be if its only result were that United States Senators should tell Latin America when and how to enact its agrarian and tax reforms? It was understood from the very beginning that to carry out this gigantic enterprise would require sufficient foreign financing for Latin America to solve, above all, its balance-of-payments problem created by the incipient stages of industrialization. It would deform the great undertaking if that contribution were to be scrimped and instead we were offered counsel and warnings about the revolution that will break out in Latin America unless we hasten to effect the reforms called for by the Charter of Punta del Este.

President Kennedy has grasped the meaning of this policy far better than most of his fellow citizens. He knows it is necessary, and he knows why. He realizes all the dangers that exist for this part of the world if its governments do not enter upon a thorough and far-reaching social transformation. He understands also the difficulties they will come up against; politician that he is, inured to conflicts with the legislative branch, he knows quite well that there will be wrangles, delays and setbacks in many legislative bodies before all the countries embark, as is now inevitable, on a great reform.

On their side the Latin Americans, and especially their rulers, ought to comprehend and sympathize with the impediments President Kennedy often finds in dealing with a Congress that cannot or will not always follow a pure line of international politics, without deviating toward the tastes and misconceptions of

the electorate. Whenever the occasion arises to show the citizenry how advisable a policy like the Marshall Plan or the Alliance for Progress is, it seems necessary to explain it in extravagant terms and present it as if it could have been conceived only for the good and profit of the United States. The arguments thus employed are soon taken up and repeated by the Communists and the foreign beneficiaries—friendly governments and peoples to start with—who are then able to reason that there has been at bottom neither generosity nor disinterestedness, no real altruistic sentiment, no defense of common principles, but only an indirect pursuit of direct mercantile advantages for the United States.

Some day it will be necessary for a president of that country—it might well be Mr. Kennedy himself—to tell his people that foreign policy does not always have to produce direct material benefits, and that it is not manœuvred in the sole interest of merchants, industrialists and taxpayers; but that it may be conducted as a sort of long-term investment, extending perhaps through several generations, at great risk, without any guarantee of success, but serving in the long run, and in the widest and highest sense, the interest of the nation. It was in this spirit that the last three wars were fought. Did anybody explain then that the profits would be quick and solid on the money poured out to maintain American soldiers in France, afterwards throughout the world and later still in Korea? Seriously, nobody was demanding such an investment. And nobody in the United States, not even the greatest reactionary, would protest because now, at last, it is Latin America's turn to receive foreign aid, when it needs it most for its defense and development. What may be an error is to try to convince the people of the United States—quite unnecessarily—that the Alliance for Progress is a policy that really seeks to open markets for them and to get back the \$1 billion that were lost in Cuba.

## TOWARD A WORLD POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA

*By Patrick Duncan*

**I**N the Security Council on August 7 the United States voted for a ban on the shipment of arms to the South African Government, and in the course of the debate the American representative announced that the United States would suspend all arms shipments at the end of the year. Since South Africa has in the past found it difficult to obtain licenses for the purchase of American arms, this decision represented only a small shift in policy. But as the vote was taken under African pressure, and as it separated the United States from Britain and France (which abstained), the shift was significant; for it showed that when faced with a choice, the United States is more prepared than before to take a stand against apartheid.

The supporting speech defined American policies toward the South African Government with some precision: though hostile to apartheid, the United States is not yet convinced that force is a necessary ingredient in the solution of the problem, for "we cannot accept the conclusion that there is no way out, no direction to go except the present collision course toward ultimate disaster in South Africa." Rather, steps are envisaged "to induce that government to remove the evil business of apartheid . . . from the continent of Africa."

The American view that a clash is avoidable is not shared by most observers. It is certainly not shared by the Government of South Africa, nor the majority of its white citizens. Never has so much been spent on arms in South Africa; the figure is now running at a published rate of \$219,000,000 a year. Military service is bulking ever more prominently in the lives of the white people. And, apart from national armaments, the three million white people privately own two million firearms.

An ever-tightening code of security laws buttresses this armed oligarchy. There is, for example, a recent law which permits any police officer to detain anyone for successive periods of 90 days without limit and without warrant; such persons can be held incommunicado and the courts are prohibited from intervening. This is only the latest in a 15-year series of increasingly repressive laws which show a growing fear and hostility toward the Africans.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 took away the legal right of all black South Africans (68 percent of the population) to live anywhere outside the "Native Reserves" (13 percent of the land). Continued residence in the 87 percent of the land reserved for whites is a matter of privilege, and requires permits that can be administratively cancelled at any time. Freedom of movement for Africans has already dwindled until the majority of the population are not able to move from their places of work. One-third of the Africans live on white men's farms; they may not leave to look for work in the cities without the permission of their masters and of the government. The one-third who live in the cities generally dare not have a dispute with their employers for fear of being forced by the government to go to live in the decaying reserves. And for the remaining third who live in the reserves, it is illegal to move out unless they have work waiting for them. For most, this is an impossibility, unless they contract to work in the mines.

Strikes by Africans have been made illegal, and almost every act of their lives, including often the right to live with their spouses, and even the right to go to the church of their choice, has been made subject to official permits. Another law prohibits the courts, in certain matters, from issuing injunctions in favor of Africans. In mid-1963 over 5,000 persons were held as convicted political prisoners, and at least 2,800 members of one movement, the Pan-Africanist Congress, had been arrested and were awaiting trial.

Education for white children up to the eighth grade is compulsory and free, and the schools provide free meals. The government spends about \$170 on each white child in school, while the comparable figure for African children is \$17. But for African children education is not compulsory and most children of school age are not in school. The Bantu Education Act specifically designs education for Africans which shall fit them for an inferior place in life. One of the first acts of the Afrikaner Nationalists when they came to power was to cancel the existing schemes for free food for African school children—the very children who need it most.

These and other facts do not bear out the contention of apologists for apartheid that the African in the Union enjoys a standard of living unequalled in Africa. Despite the fact that South Africa is the richest country of the continent and has been enjoying great prosperity, an official study shows that the real wages of

Africans in the main urban centers generally declined in the 1950s. Moreover, the incidence of malnutrition and related diseases in parts of South Africa is the highest recorded in the world. The infant mortality rate in the Port Elizabeth divisional area in 1961 was 480 per thousand live births. African children die at 25 times the rate of white children. According to a survey carried out by the reputable *Rand Daily Mail*, 57 percent of African children die before they reach the age of five years. A University of Natal survey found signs of malnutrition in every one of 240 African workers visited: they were earning \$28 a month. A bus company gave out free meals and found that absenteeism among African workers dropped by half.<sup>1</sup>

This low standard of living is a reflection of the African's votelessness and his inability to influence political movements. Political rights, long enjoyed, have been reduced or abolished. In 1853 Britain gave the Cape a parliament, and gave the vote to all men earning \$140 a year. Many black and colored men qualified, and for most of the nineteenth century the Cape parliament was responsible to the aspirations of all races. But the white minority never accepted this situation, and in the hundred years after 1853—but most drastically in the last 15—managed to abolish all political and civic rights which the African people had enjoyed. (Vestigial rights are still enjoyed by some colored people.)

At the same time that the white minority has been reducing the political power of the non-whites, the Africans' ambitions and aspirations have been rising. In this fact lies the refutation both of those who plead for more time and of those who believe that a conflict is avoidable. The all-pervasive ideas of democracy have found ready acceptance among the non-white people of South Africa. Despite rigid censorship of books and films, and despite an ideological decision not to have television, there has never been so great a flood of modern ideas into the minds of the voteless South Africans. Another gauge of the situation is that some 100,000 non-whites own cars, and a rising class of business and professional men is inching its way upward against almost insuperable obstacles.

The Africans are determined to win full status and dignity and

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted for the above facts on malnutrition to "The Coming Struggle for South Africa," by Sandor (Fabian Society, London, 1963). "Sandor" is the pen name of a well known South African publicist specializing in research on labor conditions. For the wage study see the article by Professor W. R. J. Steenkamp, Chairman of the Wage Board, in the *South African Journal of Economics*, June 1962.

power. Their determination is reflected in a remarkable growth recently in militancy and political courage. Two principal organizations have emerged: the Pan-Africanist Congress (of which I am a member) and an earlier protest movement, the African National Congress. PAC was founded in 1959 by a university lecturer named Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who completed a three-year prison sentence on May 5 but is still detained. It was born out of the impatience of the younger and more ardent Africans with the A.N.C., which for some 40 years had voiced the protests of the Africans. Sobukwe and his followers claimed that the A.N.C. had failed too often in its ambitious protests and strikes, that it was dominated by Communists and whites, and that it paid too little regard to the African personality. He rapidly won the confidence of the masses and in March 1960 he launched the non-violent campaign of positive action that led to Sharpeville. Thereafter, both movements were outlawed, and the leaders of PAC were given heavy sentences. Both movements went underground, the PAC more effectively. Its committee functions in Basutoland, in the center of South Africa. There are about 100 cells, and at least one cell has 1,000 members. According to a recent public opinion survey conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Pan-Africanist Congress is the leading African party and has particular support among the more militant and the students.

Growing African militancy has bred and will continue to breed growing government oppression. The extremes are nourishing each other at the expense of the middle. It is this that makes the coming clash inevitable unless the white South Africans can be affected by external pressures. The first of these is already being mounted. In May of this year at the Addis Ababa Conference, free Africa declared war on apartheid. It was this issue that made it possible for the 32 independent states meeting there to overcome every other divisive factor. All agreed that the emancipation of Africa and of Negroes everywhere could not be regarded as complete while there subsisted in Africa's most wealthy state a constitution based on the proposition that men are incurably unequal, and that whites alone deserve the vote.

Subventions have already begun to flow into the Liberation Fund, a war chest for the extirpation of apartheid. Africa intends and is able to fight apartheid. Let those who doubt it, or who may underestimate the dimensions of such a war, bear in mind that

apartheid treats as inferior not only South Africans of African origin, but also those of Indian and Chinese origin, and that the theory of apartheid has already stirred to anger the representatives of nearly three billion people.

The danger of a world split on the basis of color has been feared for many years; it is a division that could destroy civilization and a great part of the human race. Already, if we are to attach weight to the July letter of the Russians to the Chinese Communists, the Chinese have used the racist argument to secure the expulsion of the Soviet Union from some organizations in the Afro-Asian world. As a result, some observers are predicting that the Chinese will attempt to build a Fifth International based on color. Such an attempt would be greatly assisted by the existence of a régime in South Africa which professes to be leading a crusade against Communism, but which, in the name of "Western civilization," oppresses the colored races. It is, moreover, a government that displays most of the weaknesses which Marx and Engels predicted for capitalism: increasing poverty for the workers, increasing wealth for the capitalists, and aggressiveness against the outside world.

## II

Hitherto American policy in Africa has tried to avoid making choices. Only in the Congo were choices made and strong policies executed. Elsewhere the Government of the United States has tried, and largely succeeded, in remaining friend to both the departing metropole powers and the emerging African nations. Wise though this may be when there is a continuing dialogue between contending parties, or when political movement is generally in the desired direction, or when either side is subject to persuasion, such a policy merely ensures the hostility of both sides when, as in the case of South Africa, none of these conditions applies.

Two facts are generally overlooked by those who hold that time should be afforded to the South African authorities to solve the problem themselves, and that interference from outside merely aggravates the situation by making the supporters of apartheid more militant and unified. The first is that developments in South Africa are going the wrong way: where there were rights, these have been taken away; where there was a little integration, it has been abolished; where there was some hope in the minds of the ruled, it has given way to despair. The second is that there is no

longer any effective opposition to apartheid within the South African electorate. Any legislation presented by the Nationalist Party can be passed in Parliament with almost no debate and but one or two dissenting votes. Indeed, it is probably no longer within the power of the government to reverse the trend toward increased oppression, for a fearful electorate would remove even Dr. Verwoerd's government if it showed a disposition to make concessions. Thus the initiative has already passed irrevocably away from the whites to the voteless, and to their friends and allies. For all these reasons, it is difficult to see how intervention can make matters worse than they are.

If this analysis is correct, what can America—if it so wills—do about it? The question is often asked in a tone of despair that is unjustified. There are two main kinds of action that can be taken: small-scale measures that can be taken quietly and immediately, and that require no major policy decisions; and more telling actions that require major decisions of state.

Having voted in favor of the arms embargo, the United States might use its influence to discourage its NATO allies from supplying arms of any kind to the South African Government. Under pressure from Africa, the British and French have announced that they will no longer supply arms that could be used to enforce apartheid. The United States tried this policy from 1961 to 1963, and could point out to the British and French that the distinction is unreal, as it found when it refused licenses to the South Africans for supersonic jet combat planes in 1961, yet allowed the export of Lockheed Hercules C-130 military transport planes in 1963. In any event, it is to be hoped that the recent undertakings by the British and French will be observed. The temptation to waver will be especially strong for the French, who have been the principal suppliers of helicopters and armored cars—weapons of particular value in the kind of war that is likely to occur in South Africa.

Mr. Stevenson told the U.N. that "we have utilized our diplomatic and consular establishments in South Africa to demonstrate by words and by deeds our official disapproval of apartheid." With a nation that has taken the bit between its teeth, words have limited value; of deeds, only one has been made public. Although individual Africans have previously been entertained at the American Embassy, only this year, for the first time, were non-whites invited to the Independence Day celebrations—a secondary party to which South African Government represent-

atives were not invited. While this partial desegregation of an official reception must be welcomed and applauded, one wonders why all entertainment at the embassy could not be integrated. To be sure, the last Soviet representative to South Africa was expelled from the country because he refused to accept apartheid in his consulate-general; but is this an argument for or against the proposition? Or again, might not a Negro foreign service officer be posted to the embassy? Is it necessary for American naval vessels visiting South Africa to have none but white officers? Might "awkward" social situations be reduced if the American Ambassador were replaced by a consul-general who might find it easier to establish contacts with all elements in the population?

Similarly, it might be appropriate to end grants, student exchanges and links of all kinds which involve the acceptance of segregation. Of the various schemes, both governmental and private, for the exchange of students and leaders, all involving South Africa are under the close control of the South African Government, for it exercises strict passport and visa control. It permits these schemes to continue, and uses them as propaganda to demonstrate its respectability in the eyes of the world. Strong opponents of the government are not allowed passports to travel, so the exchanges are limited to supporters of the government, to apolitical persons and sometimes to people who have become instruments of apartheid. In general, non-whites do not get passports for these exchanges unless they are regarded as politically safe. These schemes thus have value to the government, for they are regarded as plums to which supporters can aspire, as well as some innocuous opponents whose opposition is not embarrassing to the government. In the circumstances, it would not appear that the American dollars which so often finance these schemes are working in American interests.

As links with the white supremacist minority are attenuated, so links with the majority might be extended and strengthened. At this stage what is required is an increase in scholarship schemes for young people who manage to smuggle themselves out of the country. America's record in this field is good, but needs are growing fast. Such schemes could play an important part in strengthening democracy now and in assisting reconstruction later.

Another useful move would be to discourage American investment in South Africa. It is true that investors have a concern for

the country in which they have substantial economic interests, but understandably this concern is primarily to maintain the status quo, to avoid change which may adversely affect the climate for doing business. Moreover, each dollar that moves into the South African currency control area is, in effect, a vote of confidence in the system, and builds currency reserves which are being built up for military expenditure against the coming storm. Thus investment strengthens apartheid today and imperils the whole private-enterprise system tomorrow—for the African majority, when it votes, will vote against all who did business with apartheid.

In any case, since the Addis Conference it has become apparent that foreign businessmen will probably have to choose between South Africa and the rest of the continent. By trading and investing in South Africa businessmen stand to win a substantial (but brief) return at the cost of losing their whole position in a rapidly developing market of 250,000,000 people. American investment in all of southern Africa, from the Congo to the Cape, amounts to only \$413,000,000, compared with a British stake in South Africa alone of over \$2,800,000,000. The withdrawal of \$413 million would not hurt the United States, but would be likely to make a considerable impact on the South African Government.

### III

None of these recommendations could be called radical. It would be unreal, however, to expect that more far-reaching decisions leading to a world policy for South Africa can long be postponed. One of the first big questions which will come before the U.N. is that of South West Africa, on which the World Court is expected to render a judgment some time in 1964.

To summarize the case very briefly, the South West African question had its origin in the First World War, when the territory was taken from the defeated Germans and entrusted by the League of Nations as a mandate to the South African Government. The South Africans were permitted to administer the territory "as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa," but must "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory." Despite this injunction the South African Government has ruled the non-whites of South West Africa as they have ruled the non-whites in South Africa.

The basis of this rule was defined by Mr. J. G. Strijdom, the South African Prime Minister who preceded Dr. Verwoerd, as follows: "The European is the master in South Africa, quite apart from his economic hold on the country, and quite apart from his culture and civilization, because he is the ruler of the country. . . . The entire position of the European is based on discriminatory legislation in so far as the races in South Africa are concerned."<sup>2</sup> Since then Dr. Verwoerd has introduced apartheid more definitely into the mandate by placing the non-whites of the territory under the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and by creating segregated townships.

The South West African question has been debated at the United Nations annually since 1948 without any material results. Now the matter has been taken to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The plaintiff countries are Ethiopia and Liberia, which, having been members of the League of Nations as well as of the U.N., were felt to be the most suited for the role. They have asked the Court for a declaration that the introduction of the apartheid policy is inconsistent with the terms of the mandate. The Court has not been asked to issue any order, merely a declaration.

The judgment, when it is handed down, is expected to favor the plaintiffs, in which case an interesting and unprecedented situation will exist. One possibility is that the South African Government will then make a virtue of necessity by abandoning its mandate and transferring it to the Trusteeship Council. This may depend very much on whether the South African Government believes the United States is prepared—if the mandate is *not* surrendered—to support collective U.N. action against South Africa, with economic sanctions or force if necessary.

If South Africa does not respond favorably to the Court's judgment, the matter is almost certain to go to the Security Council where a resolution will probably be introduced to detach the mandate from South Africa. Then the position of the United States and the Council's other permanent members will be crucial. A veto in the Security Council would not necessarily affect the outcome, because action by the General Assembly would still be possible and probable. But it would remove American and European influence from the action; even to abstain would greatly reduce the capacity of the United States to influence events.

<sup>2</sup> Hansard, 1952, v. 77, col. 252.

It seems evident that the Soviet Union will strongly support a U.N. resolution on South West Africa. But the experience of the Congo should discourage both of the major powers from trying to frustrate United Nations action on this issue. In the Congo the United States supported, though with great difficulty, the majority of member states, and paid a large part of the costs. The Soviet Union tried to boycott the operation and has refused to pay its share of the costs. It is no coincidence that Russian policy in central Africa lies in ruins, whereas the United States attained its major objectives.

If sanctions are likely to be used, or threatened, over the South West African question, are they likely to be used or threatened over the question of apartheid? In the Security Council in August the United States opposed sanctions against South Africa, and Mr. Stevenson called for the examination of peaceful alternatives to the use of force. But Chapter VII of the Charter identifies sanctions as the principal alternative to the use of force. The continued call for sanctions by free Africa is not mere trouble-making, but is on the contrary a sincere attempt to handle—in a manner provided for by the U.N. Charter—a situation which the United States itself acknowledges is a threat to peace and security. In any case there is a ground swell running for sanctions, and spontaneous trade-union boycotts are growing in Britain and Scandinavia. It is thus reasonable to expect that, even apart from South West Africa, the world will shortly be seeking effective methods of penning up and weakening the apartheid system.

Of all possible trade embargoes, only one has any chance of being truly effective: a blockade of oil imports. South Africa is more than self-sufficient in foodstuffs and clothing, and can even make automobiles. But it has no petroleum, though an oil-from-coal industry supplies about 10 percent of its gasoline needs. Cutting off oil imports would have unpredictable results, but it may be said that it would make the continued administration of the country either extremely difficult or impossible.

There are of course many arguments against the use of sanctions. One of the most frequently heard is that “they will hurt the very people they are designed to help.” But there is not one African leader in South Africa who would not welcome effective action of this sort, and there are few non-whites who would not accept great inconvenience and suffering if apartheid could thereby be ended.

Another argument heard in America is that the United Nations should not call for sanctions against apartheid, because the resolution would be ignored. This prophecy is in some degree self-fulfilling. But if the United States were willing to adhere to an oil embargo, and assuming that the Communist countries followed suit, the pressures that could be mounted on the remaining oil producers would be overwhelming. What would particularly distinguish this effort to impose sanctions from earlier, unsuccessful efforts is the unusual degree of unanimity that exists throughout the world on the apartheid issue. And it is because intervention of some kind is almost inevitable—whether or not the West wills it—that controlled intervention under the aegis of the United Nations offers the best hope of the human race of escaping from the worst consequences of apartheid.

As the crisis grows one hears voices increasingly being raised in America in favor of a “just” partition. But there is no just partition, for any scheme would remove some innocent individuals from their homes and employment. In particular, there is no just partition that could leave the white territory with any sizable infrastructure. For it was the whites who unified a naturally partitioned South Africa in the nineteenth century, and who forced the non-whites to cooperate in building the industries, farms and mines. If now it is the whites who wish to destroy the partnership and undo the union, they could not reasonably expect to keep what was built in partnership. In any event, partition has no hope of being accepted by either side.

Mr. Stevenson ended his August 2 speech with a comparison between the South African question and the nuclear test-ban treaty. The comparison is just, for South Africa like the atom contains potentialities for great good or for great evil. A democratic and non-racial South Africa could do much to conquer the backwardness of the entire continent, and could ease the relationships between black and white everywhere. But if apartheid were to continue much longer, or if the world were to stand aside from South Africa while the races mutilated each other and ruined the land’s productive capacity, race relationships everywhere could be poisoned.

Between the possibility of great good and the possibility of great evil lies a field awaiting the exercise of creative world statesmanship. Here, as in so many other areas of world tension, nothing is possible without an American lead.

## TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

*By Robert R. Bowie*

THE discord among the Atlantic nations arises from a basic issue: how to organize the West. What form shall Europe take? How shall it be related to the United States? For a decade and a half, the shared goal has been to build a strong integrated Europe linked in partnership with the United States for the pursuit of common purposes. A great deal has been achieved; but deep cleavages now put the prospects in doubt.

Much hangs on the outcome. The security and prosperity of the Atlantic nations depend on working together. Their concerted help is essential to provide the capital and markets desperately needed by the modernizing societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. And only if faced with unified Western policies will Soviet coexistence gradually evolve into genuine efforts for secure peace.

The direct cause of existing divisions is mainly General de Gaulle and his actions. But he has also intensified and capitalized on serious strains arising from other sources within the Alliance and within Europe. For an adequate diagnosis, it is necessary to put these deeper causes into perspective before examining de Gaulle's impact. Within that framework, one can consider what to do.

The European Community developed from the conviction that only a new Europe could transcend the tragic past. The soil for it was prepared by despair. On the Continent, the ordeal of World War II and its aftermath undermined faith in the nation-state and nationalism, and nurtured the sense of common European destiny. But the Community was born of hope. Three aims inspired its creators: 1, to reconcile France and Germany and bury the past; 2, to open a wider market in Europe as a basis for rising living standards and growing industries; and 3, to restore Europe's role in a world of superstates.

This new Europe, they were convinced, could not rest merely on coöperation among sovereign states. That classic method was the basis of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation, of the Council of Europe and of NATO, with Ministerial Councils concerting national policy by unanimity. This pattern

was not sufficient for their more ambitious ends; these demanded a firmer base. Franco-German rivalry would be transcended only by joining in the creative task of building a united Europe, which would weave together their vital interests and provide a wide arena for the energies of their peoples. For the permanent benefits of an enlarged market, more was required than removal of trade barriers; there must be an economic union, with mobility for labor, capital and enterprise, and with common policies for agriculture, transport and other fields. To have a major voice in a world of superpowers, Europe would have to act as a unit in mobilizing its resources and using its influence in foreign affairs and defense.

So sweeping a vision clearly had its price. It would call ultimately for a European political entity with power to govern within a major but limited realm. The member nations need not be absorbed or disappear, but they would have to transfer substantial authority in selected fields to institutions of the Community. The founders also realized that so radical a break with the past could not be made all at once, but would take an extended time. Nationalism was by no means dead and parochial interests were strong. Their solution was to apply the basic conception and its principles in a specific sector (coal and steel), trusting that the experience of working together would lay the foundation for step-by-step progress toward a quasi-federal Europe. They fixed no initial timetable; but they openly proclaimed their ultimate goal and confined the original members to those willing to start toward it.

To a notable degree, the Community has followed the projected course. The European Defense Community, defeated in 1954, proved too big a leap too soon. But by 1957, the launching of the Economic Community and the Atomic Community showed the resilience of the conception. In its first decade, despite E.D.C., the Community has achieved many of the hopes which inspired it. By enabling Germany to rejoin the European family as a full member, it has contributed immeasurably to the stability and strength of postwar Europe. Economically, the Community has also made striking progress, though the impact is hard to measure. Its vitality has been manifested in the steady removal of trade barriers well ahead of the Treaty schedule, the actions of business firms in anticipating the wider market, and the British decision of 1961 to apply for entry.

In consequence, the citizens of the six member states, and especially those under 40 who have come to maturity since the war, more and more take the growth of the Community for granted and have a real sense of being "Europeans." De Gaulle's abrupt veto of British entry in January severely jolted the Community and put in jeopardy the confidence which underlay much of its progress. Yet his action does not seem to have destroyed this "European" feeling; indeed it capitalized on it.

Emerging Europe deeply wants a more self-respecting role in the world. This desire is already strong and will steadily become stronger. In particular, Europeans wish to redress the balance within the NATO Alliance. They are keenly aware how radically the situation of Europe relative to the United States has shifted since the postwar period of extreme disparity. In growth rates or levels of economic activity, the Community has far surpassed the United States over the last decade. With monetary reserves rivaling ours, its surpluses now contrast with our persistent deficits in the balance of payments. Its present role does not seem to reflect these changes or to be in keeping with relative strengths. The sense of being a ward of the United States is offensive to many Europeans, whatever their gratitude for past help.

While this pressure is expressed in various ways, much of it has centered on the nuclear field. With enhanced confidence, the European members want a larger share in the planning of NATO strategy and control over the forces for its defense, especially nuclear. The steady growth of Soviet nuclear weapons and missiles has brought the nuclear issue to the fore. Most Europeans, however, appear to realize that the United States would, if necessary, use its nuclear capacity for the defense of Europe. Indeed they seem so confident that the Soviets are and will be thereby deterred from any attack on Europe that they resist our proposals for modifying NATO strategy. But the issue of nuclear control is not primarily military; it has become symbolic of status.

The Europeans' aspiration for a larger role—for greater equality with the United States—has outrun their present capacity to fulfill it. Despite its potential, Europe cannot now act as a "great power." No European entity can yet act on their behalf in most fields, including defense and foreign policy. Thus the new self-confidence and sense of growing power cannot find an effective outlet; they therefore are often expressed in resistance to United States leadership. Moreover, only as the Community takes on

more cohesion and scope will the Europeans increase their capabilities for effective action and equality. Meanwhile tensions seem likely to persist, though it should be feasible to mitigate them in various ways.

## II

In the efforts to organize the West, the position of Britain and its policy since 1950 have, on the whole, been a disruptive factor. Britain did not share the concept of an integrated Europe. From 1950 on, under Labor and the Tories, she consistently rejected any part in the European Community. Instead, she sought to retain an independent position in world affairs. As the hub of the Commonwealth, she stressed her special relation with the United States and preferred looser links with the Europe of O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe, a framework which, she felt, allowed her considerable freedom of action and independent influence, despite her steady retreat in power. But in fact the foundations of this policy were not solid enough to support it.

Many reasons combined to foster British illusions about her position. The wartime victory won by sacrifice and courage had revived a sense of British identity and purpose; she did not undergo the humiliation of defeat or occupation. The "special relation" with the United States which had had a firm basis during the war was prolonged into the postwar period, which was not really the same at all. The Commonwealth seemed to many a substitute for the dismantled Empire; in fact, while useful, it was not a comparable source of strength. But again a façade hid the reality. Moreover, Britain expected the European Community to fail; its long-term purposes seemed grandiose. Thus, the United Kingdom misjudged its real alternatives.

During the 1950s, British policy hindered the movement toward European integration. The European Defense Community might have been approved by France if Britain had been a full member, or even if she had made to E.D.C. the commitments she made later to the Western European Union. In 1956-57, Britain would have been glad for the Common Market negotiations to fail, and she greatly complicated them by her proposals for a European Free Trade Association. In 1959, she formed EFTA largely to bring pressure on the European Community. And to bolster her independent role, Britain developed her national nuclear capabilities.

The European Community went forward despite British policy. Indeed, its growing success was the main factor in the British decision to enter. Economically, Britain was concerned with being outside the Common Market. And politically the Community threatened to dwarf any separate role for Britain, especially as the Commonwealth and the "special relation" came to be seen with greater realism.

Britain's slowness in changing her policy, however, made the efforts for her entry far more complex. Many of the problems were inherently hard to solve. But the formation of EFTA had added complications, as did the fact that the timing forced the Six to face some of the most delicate issues involved in carrying out their Treaty. On both sides, negotiating positions tended to be rigid: for the Six, because they had to be reached by compromises among themselves; for Britain, because any concession was likely to offend some segment of the Cabinet or the party or the electorate just when the Government's popular standing was declining.

Indeed, even after 1961, the basic policy of Britain was confusing. The Government apparently wanted to enter the Community, but did not carry on an active campaign for public support to do so nor admit the political implications of her entry. During the negotiations, the Labor Party decided in effect to oppose entry and to make the issue a party one. Even so, leaders in business, the press and government had apparently become convinced that Britain must take an active role in Europe, join the Community and adjust her other relations accordingly.

Yet the handling of the nuclear issue at Nassau and after showed that the British Government still hankered for an independent role. Just as in the 1950s, it justified its nuclear force as the means to independent influence in world affairs. The debate in the Commons highlighted the ambiguous attitude of Macmillan and many of his ministers as to the future of Britain.

The efforts for British entry also interfered with the evolution of the Community. While the negotiations were in progress, its members differed about further steps toward political integration. De Gaulle's extremely limited proposals were opposed by the Dutch lest they impede British entry. De Gaulle's abrupt breaking-off of negotiations has raised other problems which will be discussed later. While the present predicament of Britain will cause some awkward problems, the effects should not be dis-

astrous, even if her entry is delayed for several years. But the situation highlights the necessity for Britain to clarify her own aims and priorities.

### III

From the time of the Marshall Plan, the United States has given steady, bipartisan support to European unity. Both the aims and methods of the movement appealed to the American temper and experience. As President Kennedy said in his speech at Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, "the basic objective of our foreign policy for 17 years" has been to aid the progress toward a strong and united Europe. "We see in such a Europe," he said, "a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations."

This speech also indicated, however, that such a partnership would have to await the formation of a United Europe, and in his Paulskirche speech in Frankfurt last June, the President stressed the point more clearly: "Only such a [fully cohesive] Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice."

Here is the crux of the problem faced by American policy at this stage: the Europe which would be a full partner is only emergent, yet the Europeans want and expect to be treated as equal partners already. The dilemma arises in many guises.

Almost any major issue affecting the Alliance or its members highlights the disparity. Thus, when NATO tries to cope with strategy, the other members feel overwhelmed; and lacking data or background to take an effective part, they resist initiatives of the United States, and, in some cases, interpret them in a way to impugn the resolve of the United States to carry out its commitments. When the United States exercises its inevitably central role in negotiating with the Soviet Union, or at the United Nations, its best efforts to consult its allies or keep them informed cannot wholly compensate for the feeling that their interests are in the hands of others.

Moreover, some courses taken by the United States, especially as regards Britain, have blurred the real choices facing the European nations. During the 1950s, it would have been inappropriate

to pressure Britain into casting her lot with an integrated Europe. But was it wise or helpful to allow the "special relation" to bolster an outdated image of her influence and options? Doing so surely delayed her in reappraising her situation. Doubtless the adjustment would have been painfully slow in any case; but so much the more reason for not retarding it. In this light, the decision to renew assistance for a British atomic force in 1958 was unfortunate; and so was the Nassau Agreement to prolong the British national deterrent with Polaris. Both decisions cut directly across the more basic objective of fostering a united Europe, so necessary for an effective partnership.

No alchemy can make the separate nations of Europe—with their individually limited resources—into equal partners with us. The great disservice of our treatment of Britain has been to nurture the illusion that somehow it could be done. Until Europe is more of an entity, no devices will resolve the stresses resulting from the disparity. But if there is no cure for these tensions, more can be done to alleviate them. The NATO machinery for concerting policy, developing strategy and combining the two could be improved materially. And the United States could be more alert to allied sensibilities than it has been sometimes in the past. Before turning to these questions let us consider the effects of General de Gaulle and his policies.

#### IV

Whereas the strains which we have been discussing are largely inherent in the attempt to construct an integrated Europe and an Atlantic partnership, General de Gaulle's policies challenge the very concept itself.

Since the war, de Gaulle's primary aim has been to achieve greater status and independence for a France overshadowed by the United States and the Soviet Union. His restless search for the means has led him down many paths. Since 1944, he has, in the words of one writer, "envisaged the following alliances: with the British in order to create an independent bloc vis-à-vis the Russians and the Americans; with the Soviet Union in order to maintain an independent France; with all against the revival of a unified, militarized and strong Germany; with West Germany and the West European states in order to create an independent bloc—a Third Force in Europe."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Roy C. Macridis, *Yale Review*, Winter 1961.

General de Gaulle's attitude toward the European Community flows from his concepts as to the role of France. For him, the ultimate reality is the sovereign nation-state—and above all France. His vision of European unity is based on coördinating policies among sovereign states—a “Europe of nations.” The idea of transferring authority to European institutions is anathema to him, as he has made clear many times. In his television address of April 19, 1963, for example, he said: “If the union of Western Europe . . . is a capital aim in our action outside, we have no desire to be dissolved within it. Any system that would consist of handing over our sovereignty to supernational assemblies would be incompatible with rights and duties of the French Republic.” Initially, he sought to revise the existing Community treaties to reduce the authority of the independent Commissions, and he suspended the effort only when the other members strongly opposed it.

De Gaulle wants a Europe organized under French leadership and without sacrificing the relative independence of France. Basically, he aspires to use Europe's revived strength to foster and expand French influence. Similarly, he rejects the idea of Atlantic partnership, which he depicts as a device for perpetuating American hegemony over Europe. His goal is an independent Europe dealing at arm's length with the United States and the Soviet Union. While accepting the NATO umbrella, he opposes integration of defense forces under SHAPE and other NATO commands. The undermining of American influence in Europe will make it easier to substitute French leadership for it. That is why, *inter alia*, he must create distrust of the American deterrent as well as of broader American purposes.

The General can hardly have assumed that other Europeans would embrace his concept of Europe eagerly. But his hope is to exploit the situation to erect a sort of pyramid of power, with France at the top. Its base is a Franco-German relationship designed to yield the German proxy needed for his strategy. To get it, he has played upon the natural yearning on both sides for reconciliation, by means of the recent Franco-German treaty and symbolic exchanges of visits. And he has played on Adenauer's suspicions, by using the issues of Berlin and NATO strategy to cast doubts on the reliability of the United States for the protection of German interests and the defense of Europe.

Second, de Gaulle clearly intends to utilize the European Com-

munity for his purposes. The Community offers real benefits to France, in wider markets for French farmers and in aid to the associated African states, mainly former French colonies, where France retains major commercial and other interests. The others of the Six are firmly committed to the Community for both economic and political reasons. De Gaulle is counting on their desire to preserve the Community, to keep them in line despite his unilateral actions. In his eyes the E.E.C., linking the members together in interdependence, is an instrument for French leverage.

Third, de Gaulle hopes to turn to his account Europe's revived self-confidence. In effect, he seeks to capitalize on the European desire to play a larger role and adjust the balance between the United States and Europe. In "standing up to the United States" he expects to arouse and appeal to an incipient European nationalism and to enhance the influence of France.

The position of de Gaulle on nuclear issues is related to this strategy. The French national nuclear force has been justified as necessary to protect France and Europe from Soviet threats or attack as the United States becomes more vulnerable. With approaching nuclear balance, the French force, though tiny, is to deter the Soviets when the United States would not. The case does not seem convincing, even for France. If France needs her national force because allies cannot be trusted, logic would require each European nation to provide its own nuclear strike force. The French, however, do not carry the argument to its logical end.

The reason, I think, is clear. For de Gaulle, the French nuclear force is primarily a political instrument. Indeed, his independent course reflects his confidence that American nuclear strength guarantees European security. His nuclear force is designed to justify the French claim to be the leader in Europe. This symbol of primacy is to distinguish her from Germany, which undertook in 1954 not to produce such weapons, and Italy, which can hardly spare the resources. Hence arguments about the military weakness or futility of the French nuclear force, however well founded, are not likely to modify de Gaulle's program.

It is also apparent why de Gaulle blocked British entry into the Community. The main reason for his veto was to prevent Britain from competing with France for the leadership of Europe. And he also recognized that Britain would oppose his efforts to divide Europe from the United States.

The most immediate question is: How will de Gaulle's policy affect the European Community and the Alliance?

The unilateral action of de Gaulle in January has checked the momentum of the Community. Its progress had been speeded by mutual confidence that the Community was genuinely a common enterprise with shared aims. On that basis, sacrifices of local or parochial interests, required for each new step, could be justified in domestic politics as serving the larger political purposes of ending rivalries in Europe, creating a prosperous economy and enhancing Europe's influence on its own destiny. De Gaulle's action impaired this attitude.

The impartial Commission of the Community, in its first statement to the European Assembly after the breakdown of negotiations, made this point quite explicitly. It said: ". . . our Community has been faced with its first real crisis. . . . The crisis is one of confidence, and that is what makes it so serious. The life of our Community depends upon everyone looking upon and treating Community matters as matters of real joint responsibility. . . . It is also necessary to avoid creating the impression that the Community and its aims, the Community institutions, and the Community procedure are merely instruments of one country's diplomacy."

Will this crisis of confidence affect the future of the Community? On its agenda are many difficult problems such as the common agricultural program and positions in the GATT trade negotiations. Any feeling that the Community is being twisted into an instrument of one member would seriously impair the ability to resolve such issues. And if the Community should falter, business firms which have been investing and planning on the premise that the Community would become effective, probably ahead of schedule, would at least postpone action, with profound effects on the momentum of the Community.

In view of de Gaulle's attitude, the revival of confidence may come extremely slowly. While doubt remains, the other members will at least insist that in any new steps, benefits and burdens be balanced—or "synchronized," in the words of Foreign Minister Schröder at the meeting of the Community Ministers on April 27. But a shift merely to a "trading" basis, normal in relations among states, could gradually erode and destroy the Community approach which has been the unique feature of progress thus far.

De Gaulle's basic outlook poses an even graver danger to the

new edifice in Europe. His deep faith in the nation-state as the ultimate reality could lead to undoing all that has been achieved since 1950. After Adenauer, the other members of the European Community, including Germany, will not accept French predominance of the sort de Gaulle has in mind. If he persists in his course, however, he may well revive the nationalism and outmoded rivalries which so many have dedicated themselves to wipe out. If Europe reverts to its historic pattern of nation-states competing for primacy, it cannot be considered inevitable that France would prevail. What is certain is that the result for Europe and the West would be a tragic betrayal of the most creative enterprise since World War II. The outcome of de Gaulle's policy could be to demonstrate once more the bitter consequences of a misguided reversion to the past.

De Gaulle could also do grave damage to the Alliance. The French, under de Gaulle, appear to be engaged in a systematic effort to throw suspicion on American reliability. Every action of the United States to modify NATO strategy, to assure closer control of nuclear weapons, to provide a wider range of responses, has been depicted as designed to disengage the United States from the defense of Europe. This campaign has had some effects already and may have more as time goes on. It is far easier to erode the cement of confidence among allies than it is to repair the damage. And distrust could later weaken the ability of the Alliance to withstand Soviet threats or blackmail.

## v

The design of General de Gaulle would therefore negate the long-term goal of a unified Europe acting as a partner of the United States for constructive purposes. His Europe would not be an integrated community but a coalition of nations led by France. His Europe would not be a partner of the United States but as independent and separate as possible. Thus de Gaulle's policy demands a clear answer.

Not to oppose his aims would be to abandon our main postwar goals. This would be folly. The needs which have prompted the devoted efforts for a European Community and an Atlantic partnership have not changed. De Gaulle is, in reality, clinging to the nationalism which the Community aims to transcend. That is the fatal flaw in his program. His French nationalism excludes the integrated Europe which would be essential for the independ-

ent role he desires. His real power is negative—the ability to veto, to block and to destroy. Given the dependence among the Atlantic nations, this provides considerable leverage if used as ruthlessly as de Gaulle seems ready to do. Our aim must therefore be to make sure that his concepts do not prevail: that the European Community is not subverted into an instrument of French predominance, and that a split of Europe and the United States does not jeopardize the interests of both. It would serve no useful purpose to gloss over this basic clash of aims.

Some seem to cherish the hope that the General can be wheedled into compromising his objectives or weaned away from them by concessions. That view hardly does justice to de Gaulle. He is not a man who can be coaxed or bribed to change his policies. Concessions to that end would be most ill-advised. He will only use them to advance his own purposes.

But this does not mean that his objectives cannot be changed. Algeria showed that he can recognize brute facts and modify his plans accordingly. The problem is to make sure that events convince him that his plans will not succeed. The United States and its European partners are not without means to influence the environment of General de Gaulle. The course he has embarked upon seems out of keeping with the basic forces of our time. The independent role he seeks will not serve the interests of Europe. Nor do the other European nations want French hegemony. Hence strong bases exist for concerted action to lead de Gaulle to recognize the necessity to revise his plans.

Whether this can be done will depend at least as much on the Europeans as on ourselves. In the European Community, only the other members, together with the Commission, can assure that France does not succeed in twisting the Community to its parochial purposes. Only the United Kingdom can ultimately decide whether to work imaginatively for future admission to Europe.

Much turns on the attitude of the Federal Republic. Without German support, the position of de Gaulle would be drastically changed. De Gaulle has no interest in going it alone. As he recognizes, France by itself simply does not have the power to conduct a policy such as he envisages. Everything depends on being able to speak in the name of Europe, and for that he needs the firm backing of the Federal Republic in order to pull along the other members of the Six.

As Adenauer's tenure comes to a close, de Gaulle's influence on German policy is likely to decline; the successors of the Chancellor, while anxious for French friendship, do not seem inclined to lend themselves to de Gaulle's purposes. Their handling of the Franco-German treaty is an encouraging sign. By adding the preamble, the Bundestag and the major parties recorded their insistence that German-French relations be managed so as to reinforce the European Community, NATO and Atlantic partnership, and to facilitate ultimate British entry into the Community. Of course, their attitude could change, especially if German concerns or interests should be disregarded or treated casually in Western negotiations with the Soviets. This factor certainly weighed heavily with Adenauer and could even drive his successors into de Gaulle's arms.

The policies and actions of the United States will also be crucial, especially in the coming period with the Adenauer era ending in Germany, the Italian Government unsteady and British policy in flux. The vital thing is to see that our actions do not enhance, but erode, the leverage of de Gaulle. We must fully recognize the reality of the European feelings which he seeks to exploit and the effect of our attitude on his ability to do so.

The United States will have to do more to show its readiness to work with Europe as a partner. Admittedly, as I have said, this is not easy to do while an effective European entity does not exist to deal with foreign affairs, defense and other fields. But the creation of the partnership cannot await a completed European Community. Like the Community, the partnership will have to develop by stages and evolve in step with it. In this process the United States will have to adjust its thinking as to the import of a real partnership. Our attitude still reflects much of the heritage of Europe's postwar dependence. We have not fully understood what it must mean to share responsibility in monetary and economic policy, in defense, in agricultural programs and in many other fields. In short, interdependence, while talked about, is not yet grasped as a practical restraint on our own freedom of action. In the period ahead, it would contribute to the prospects for both the European Community and Atlantic partnership if American actions could convey a greater awareness of what sharing responsibility with Europe will imply for both sides. As I will suggest, joint policy-making and nuclear control seem appropriate fields for such an effort.

## VI

Within the European Community, the primary effort of the other Five should be to reassert and reinforce the concept of a truly integrated Europe. In going forward with the Common Market, they should require the French to reciprocate for benefits received at each stage. Thus the Five may well try to use agriculture as a lever for getting French coöperation in the 1964 GATT trade negotiations arising from the Trade Expansion Act. The agriculture program is of special interest to the French, who hope to expand their output and markets within the Community. At his July press conference, de Gaulle virtually threatened to stall the Common Market unless the farm program was worked out by a December 31 deadline. This program will impose serious burdens on the high-cost German farmers.

The Germans, however, are more eager than the French for success in the trade negotiations in GATT, which will, of course, depend heavily on the positions taken by the Community. Progress in the trade field would have wide benefits. It would be evidence that the European Community really wanted to develop closer working relations with the United States. Tariff cuts can also ease the difficulties resulting from the common external tariff of the Community for nations around its rim. By jointly reducing their trade barriers, the Atlantic nations can open markets for the developing countries more readily than they could do separately. In addition, the trade negotiations could help smooth the way for future British entry into the Community, by anticipating some of the dislocations in trading patterns and facilitating adjustments in advance.

Thus, there may be the makings of a constructive "package deal," with the French agreeing to coöperate on the GATT negotiations in return for acceptable Community solutions for agriculture. Such an outcome may be encouraged by the fact that after 1966 no member of the Community will be able, under the Treaty, to block tariff cuts desired by the other members.

For the GATT negotiations to succeed, however, the United States may have to adopt a more flexible attitude on some issues. In agriculture, for example, excessive American pressure could drive the Germans into the arms of the French. And the United States must at least examine closely the European suggestions of ways to provide future stability for reciprocal tariff concessions

—for example, by limiting subsequent escape-clause actions and by dealing with significant obstacles to trade other than tariffs.

As a second course, the Five could well launch a new initiative for political integration. Various steps proposed earlier might be revived. The separate Commissions for Coal and Steel, the Common Market and Euratom could well be merged into a single Commission for the Community, exercising the existing powers under the various treaties. The Fouchet plan for a political community could be revived as a basis for concerting action in foreign affairs and later in defense. The members of the European Parliament, now appointed from national parliaments, could be elected by popular franchise, as the Treaties envision. The revenues from the agricultural levies, and perhaps from the common external tariff, might be allocated to the Community, with authority being given the European Parliament to appropriate them for Community purposes.

All of these, and similar measures, would require French approval to become effective. It may well be refused, but this is not certain. The Five have real leverage on de Gaulle if they stand together. But even if France blocks action, it is highly desirable to define the issue clearly as to what is to be the nature of the Community.

## VII

The machinery for concerting Atlantic policy in foreign affairs, defense and economic matters has been badly in need of strengthening for some time. The current Soviet line makes improvement urgent in order to safeguard against fissures in the West. If negotiations with the Soviets should impair Western cohesion, any agreements will be bought at prohibitive cost. The best way to mitigate this danger is to improve the channels for serious discussion, at least among the major allies. Of the many proposals, several commend themselves as feasible and useful.

(1) Key officials from NATO capitals should come together regularly to consult on specific issues. The foreign policy of each NATO member is made at home by officials responsible for decisions and action. The members of the NATO Permanent Council are not directly in this stream of policy-making. Hence on the most crucial issues, the Council is at best only a pale substitute for meetings directly among the key officials who will be deciding or advising on these issues.

The O.E.C.D. has recognized this basic fact and adapted its methods to reflect it. Within the O.E.C.D. framework, such key officials meet together on fiscal, economic and monetary policy. They can discuss their views with each other in detail and informally, and either obtain a consensus or at least explore frankly their divergences so as to minimize damage to their working relations. Back at home, they provide a direct link between national decisions and a concerted course. There is no reason why these methods should not work in NATO; indeed they have been used on a small scale among the planning officials of the key countries. They could readily be extended to Assistant Secretaries and others for a wide range of policies and problems.

(2) The idea of a small steering committee for NATO should be candidly examined. On it would be the major members (Britain, the Federal Republic, France, Italy and the United States), the Secretary General, and perhaps a rotating member to represent the smaller countries.

Such a group would partly meet the pressure for a larger European voice in Alliance affairs. The experience with the restricted Berlin working party indicates that this could offer an effective and practical way to confront problems in common. In the past, such proposals have been opposed by the smaller members. Actually the crucial issues do not involve divergences between large and small, and their interests and views could in any case be reflected through the rotating member and the Secretary General. If such a group could improve the cohesion of the Alliance, the smaller members would share the benefits.

(3) NATO should create a Defense Minister to assist in developing the strategy and forces of the Alliance. With a qualified staff of military and civilian experts, he could greatly facilitate more serious discussions between the United States and the European members on the strategic issues and the composition and equipment of forces. Such an international official, if he were a respected figure, could help bridge the existing gulf in analysis and conclusions.

(4) The joint efforts in the economic and monetary fields which have been under way in O.E.C.D. should be carried forward. The President's message to Congress on the balance of payments, which suggested greater readiness to consider joint measures, could lead to new steps in the monetary field.

Obviously France should be encouraged to take part in all these

measures, if she is willing to do so. And strong common interests may in fact induce her to participate in some, especially if her abstention is not to be allowed to block action.

## VIII

The nuclear issue has become a sort of touchstone in the relations between the United States and the European members of NATO. The NATO actions at Ottawa were a sign of the ferment within the Alliance. The various measures—the SHAPE deputy for nuclear matters, the NATO liaison group at SAC headquarters to plan targeting, even the so-called inter-allied force (though largely a formality)—should be useful in drawing other NATO members into nuclear planning. These steps should be pursued and developed.

But they do not get to the heart of the matter. Europeans feel increasingly that sharing in nuclear control is the mark of first-class status. Most recognize that the defense of the Atlantic area is a single problem, that a strategic nuclear war would involve both Europe and the United States. But until the Atlantic area is a single political unit, there is a dilemma. Europeans are not likely to be satisfied for the long run with a solution leaving all decisions to the President. They are not willing to remain indefinitely as wards of the United States. If they are to be partners in defense, they expect to share an ultimate right to utilize such weapons for their defense. In practice, it is very hard to envisage a case where the Europeans would wish to use such weapons when the United States would not be ready to do so. But the right to do so may well be highly important in terms of self-respect. The United States, for many good reasons, might prefer to keep unified control of these weapons. But in practice that does not seem a genuine option.

The critical question is how to handle this issue so that it will contribute to European unity and Atlantic partnership and not fragment them. Fortunately, the American nuclear umbrella allows plenty of time for working out a constructive answer. Among many variants, the ultimate choice is between national nuclear forces in Europe and some form of integrated force—either European or Atlantic.

National European forces seriously jeopardize the more basic objectives. They are bound to be wasteful of resources, ineffective as deterrents and politically divisive of Europe and the Alliance.

Of these, the political damage seems most serious. In justifying their national forces, both British and French leaders have insisted that they are necessary for the ultimate security of the nation and to avoid becoming a satellite of the United States. If that is constantly asserted, one can hardly assume that German leaders will not sooner or later be driven to seek similar forces for the Federal Republic. Many Germans say frankly that they cannot accept a second-class status within the Alliance indefinitely. The objections to national forces apply to the British force as well as to the French. We have been right in not helping the French force, and should continue to refrain from assisting. But it was a mistake at Nassau to give a new lease on life to the British nuclear force.

In their handling of the nuclear issue, the British have so far missed a unique chance to convert their nuclear capabilities into a real asset. Instead of pursuing the mirage of an independent force, they could have offered to join the other members of the Community in building an integrated joint force, which could have been targeted or operated together with American forces. Such a proposal would have shown clearly that Britain had cast her lot with the Community and that de Gaulle's "European" claims were hollow if he would not take part.

But the British leadership has not been capable of imaginative action of this order. In its place they suggested the inter-allied force which merely puts national forces behind a NATO façade, leaving them operationally under national command and control. This has none of the advantages of a genuine integrated force. The national components can always be pulled out, as France pulled out of the Mediterranean fleet. And it seems to legitimize the national forces without solving the problem of discrimination or duplication.

Similar defects invalidate the proposal that the United States should aid the French and British forces as a means to a European force. How it would do so is not explained. Aiding the French and British forces will only underscore and justify their asserted rationale. De Gaulle will use such help to advance his own aims, which could readily undermine the Alliance and the European Community. If French and British forces are supported, the Germans and others will be driven to seek them, which will impose severe political strains on the Alliance. This course would defeat its announced objective.

For these and other reasons, a policy of aiding national nuclear forces, especially on the theory of thereby leading to a joint European force, should be firmly rejected. Without defaulting on the Nassau commitment to Britain, the United States should make clear why it considers national forces damaging to the Alliance, and should foster conditions which might encourage a change in British policy.

This leaves the possibility of a genuinely integrated force. The creation of such a force seems to me the most constructive way of proceeding. It should be truly integrated, with mixed-manning and joint control by the participants. For many reasons a seaborne force seems desirable. Unlike national forces, such a force would not fragment the Alliance but tend to pull it together. By joint effort the members can create a respectable force without unduly diverting resources from conventional capabilities. And such a force would enable the Federal Republic to have a proper part in the control of nuclear defense without raising the spectre of separate German strategic forces.

Undoubtedly such a force would pose some hard practical problems, but those connected with manning, training and operating are not so difficult as they first appear. Competent naval experts who have studied these problems seriously are confident that they can be solved for surface ships or submarines. They consider that a force manned by mixed crews can be fully effective as a fighting instrument.

The problem of control is inevitably complex as long as Europe is not a political entity. The solution will have to be geared to an evolving context extending over eight or ten years during which Europe may progress in cohesiveness, and in closer relations with the United States. Some four or five years at least would be required to create an integrated force and to put it into operation. Initially, control can be handled by some form of committee, with advance decisions about the use of the force in the most obvious cases. Thus it seems feasible to start toward the creation of an integrated force without waiting to settle finally the form of control; we may have a decade or more to work out that issue in the light of developing conditions.

This does not, however, justify us in evading the crucial question: Should the United States be prepared to accept a control system which could permit the use of the integrated force without its consent? In answering the question, we do not start from a

*tabula rasa*. The United States has no prospect of retaining a monopoly of the control of nuclear weapons. As now planned, the French force will be wholly under French control. In the Nassau Agreement, the United States recognized that Britain would be free to use her Polaris force in extreme national emergencies.

An integrated force offers the only alternative which avoids the expansion of national forces, with all its disadvantages. But if it were subject indefinitely to American veto, it could hardly achieve its political aim or encourage the future merger into it of separate national forces. In my view, therefore, the United States should be willing to concede to a European or NATO force the same degree of ultimate autonomy as it has already accepted in assisting the British force.

Thus, the effort to create a multilateral nuclear force seems to be one course of action that should be pursued with those European nations which profess interest in doing so. Under General de Gaulle, France will certainly not participate. But growing expense and delay in producing an independent deterrent may have its effect in France as in Britain. The British position is uncertain. The debates in the British Parliament after Nassau showed remarkably limited enthusiasm for the independent British deterrent. Labor is pledged to end it, though uncommitted as to its course on a multilateral force. The existence of such a force could, however, serve as a rallying point for those in France and Britain who oppose national forces.

At the start, the United States would be a member. But as the force evolves, and the veto on its use is ended in favor of some other control formula, the United States could either continue on as a member or allow the force to become purely European. In either case the aim should be to coördinate this force with United States forces in planning, targeting and in other ways.

This proposal has aroused sharp attack and even ridicule. It is certainly open to legitimate criticism on various grounds. But any course will have serious disadvantages and difficulties. This or any other proposal can be seriously evaluated only by comparing it with alternatives, using as criteria the long-range objectives for Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. By that test the integrated force, whether ultimately European or Atlantic, seems to me to offer the most constructive objective at which to aim.

## IX

The experience with Britain's attitude toward integration provides the guide for the present situation. In 1950, architects of the new Europe were aware that it might take a long time for Britain to revise her basic outlook. Undeterred, they went ahead with their program. It took ten years of experience to convince the British leaders and public that Britain should try to become a part of Europe. It seems clear that no other course would have succeeded in doing so.

The lesson is obvious. The most effective course is for the United States and the Europeans to persist in a course designed to build a strong Europe and a strong partnership between Europe and the United States. This effort should confront de Gaulle with conditions which will show that his policies are not attainable.

As has been suggested, various measures to this end can be taken both by the Europeans and the United States. No one can say with assurance whether such actions will change the outlook of General de Gaulle on the European Community or the Alliance. But if the other Five and the United States continue to stand for a strong Community and an Atlantic partnership, France could well be isolated. That is not an attractive prospect for de Gaulle. His purposes will be served only if France can speak for Europe and use Europe for her platform.

Once it became clear that the other Five were determined not to be dragged along, then de Gaulle would have to face those facts. It is true that he could destroy what has been created up to now. But in doing so, he would harm France more than other members of the Community. Strong French interests might well decide to block such self-defeating actions. Few Frenchmen wish to see a return to the national rivalries which wracked Europe in the past. And even if de Gaulle continues in opposition, as he may, a clear course by the other Five and the United States will at least have laid the basis for forward motion when de Gaulle no longer governs. Thus the outcome of the present stage may ultimately be decided as a test of conviction and perseverance.

## THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN DEFENSE

*By General Paul Stehlin*

STRATEGIC problems are no longer the exclusive province of the military; on the contrary, now that strategy has invaded politics and diplomacy, it is primarily the statesman who must analyze it down to its components. If this gives pause to a soldier who essays to write in a primarily political journal, a second consideration is that whatever a European or even a Frenchman (on the assumption that the French are the “hard core” of Europe) may have to say on the problems posed by the advent of thermonuclear weapons has already been said by Americans, who did not wait until 1963 to discuss frankly and objectively the problems of deterrence, the control of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of the world balance of power—in other words, peace. Indeed, the European point of view on all these subjects could be presented by putting together excerpts from Henry A. Kissinger, Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and less specialized authors such as Walter Lippmann and Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Thus Clemenceau’s famous quip that “war is too serious a matter to be left to the military” could be echoed even more strongly in our day by Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. But the converse is equally true, and matters of defense, despite and perhaps even because of their political and diplomatic implications, should be pondered jointly by the statesman and the soldier. Moreover, the fact that the European position on problems born of the nuclear era is implicitly expressed in a number of American studies does not mean that the innate originality and justice of that position are necessarily understood and accepted in the United States. I shall therefore try, though with many hesitations, to define briefly the problem which dominates our era and on the solution of which depends not only our freedom but our very existence.

I shall begin by attempting to place the problem in its proper context, in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding of the spirit in which some Europeans, and more particularly the French, have come to question the effectiveness of the system of

Western defense as we have known it for the past 15 years. It is a truism that defense must be adapted to the threat which has brought it into being. But our awareness of the most basic truths sometimes becomes blurred, and many years have now elapsed since the emergence of the political situation that gave rise to the threat confronting us. It should be taken for granted—and General de Gaulle's recent public statements prove that this is a basic component of French policy—that France regards its own defense as part of Western defense, and that its solidarity with the Atlantic nations is an actual fact. What is in question is the nature of France's participation in the common defense and the extent of the responsibility it wishes to assume. I believe that France's problem is, or one day certainly will be, the problem of all Western European nations.

The United States, which has made such great sacrifices for the common defense over the past 15 years, and has studied the requirements of the task with such painstaking care, ought not to take umbrage when an allied nation wishes, in its turn, to take an active part in an enterprise of which the United States has borne the burden virtually alone but on which depends the fate of all. The peace and prosperity enjoyed today by that part of the European Continent which remained free of the Soviet yoke after World War II are the best proof that the protection generously extended by the United States has been effective. But it would be neither reasonable nor fair to perpetuate a state of dependence which places a heavy burden on the United States, while representing for Europe a morally and politically unjustifiable repudiation of the fundamental duties of free and sovereign nations.

In making a brief survey of the protection extended to Western Europe since the imperialist ambitions of the Soviet Union first became manifest, I should like to show that although this state of dependence was justified in the beginning, it has given rise to increasing disadvantages as the over-all political and military situation evolved. In examining what weapons were employed to contain the Soviet drive, on what principles they were used and who controlled them, I shall attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the system from the military standpoint alone, its influence on the nature and extent of the threat, and its political advantages and drawbacks from both the American and the European points of view.

## II

From 1948—that grim year of the fall of Prague—until 1952, Western Europe, bled white by five years of war, could offer virtually no opposition to the powerful armies maintained by the Soviet Union. At that time, however, the Soviet Union had no nuclear weapons, so that from 1949 onward the United States was able to deter it from invading what was left of Europe by the threat of immediate massive retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons. The protection extended to Europe by the Strategic Air Command was all the more effective as SAC had very few bases in Europe, so that there was no pretext for a preventive attack or even a preëmptive strike by the Russians in that part of the world.

Naturally, the forces on which in the last analysis the security of the European nations depended were under the direct control of the President of the United States. Thus these nations, forgetting their former pride, came to rely on a powerful ally to preserve their liberty. Busy rebuilding their cities out of rubble, they were in no position to weigh the political or moral disadvantages of such a state of dependence. Even as a convalescent accepts without question the ministrations of his nurse, they accepted readily—and also, let me stress, with gratitude—the economic tonic of the Marshall Plan and the shelter offered by the American atomic shield. The economic and financial drawbacks of this arrangement, under which the United States alone ensured the security of all, seemed negligible, for the cost was no great burden to America's booming economy.

The period 1952 to 1958 was marked by the progressive appearance of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, while the United States was producing highly sophisticated tactical nuclear weapons in increasing quantities. These weapons were issued to the American troops stationed in Europe, but the United States retained strict control over them. The limited authority delegated by the President for the use of these weapons by SACEUR was in fact delegated to the Commander of the American Forces in Europe.

Although during this period NATO was able to maintain the territorial status quo, the margin of American superiority dwindled and the military and diplomatic effectiveness of the system diminished. The Soviet Union progressively developed intermediate-range strategic forces—aircraft and missiles—directly

threatening Europe, and long-range strategic forces—aircraft only—designed to threaten the United States. Thus a state of absolute unilateral deterrence directly benefiting the United States and indirectly benefiting Europe, was transformed into one of bilateral deterrence, in which the most serious and immediate threat hung over Europe, whose security was ensured by nuclear forces controlled by the United States and stationed for the most part outside the Continent. In fairness, it should be added that because of the presence of American troops in Europe and because of the relatively slight threat which the Soviet Union could pose against the United States, the Russians were forced to take seriously the American commitment to immediate massive retaliation if they should attack Europe. But it should also be remembered that the fact that American forces in Europe were supplied with nuclear weapons made Europe a primary target, thus offsetting the protection they afforded.

During these years the European nations, with United States aid, largely regained their former economic and monetary strength. But, having become accustomed to finding shelter behind American military might, they made no effort to develop their own defense machinery against the danger which still lurked on their frontiers. Britain alone began, with the help of the United States, to develop its own nuclear weapons and means of delivery. France, having to bear the burden of the costly war in Indochina, the slack of which was soon taken up by the Algerian revolt, was able only to conduct basic studies on the military uses of atomic energy. In any event, the ambiguities of the Western defense system persisted, and in the meantime the growth of Soviet nuclear power caused the Europeans to wonder how much the American guarantee of European security was worth. The situation which was to reach its full development in the next phase could already be glimpsed.

The progress made by the Russians from 1958 onward in evolving a modern military force placed them on a footing of virtual equality with the United States. They developed tactical nuclear weapons in great quantities and extremely powerful strategic nuclear weapons; most important, they built the necessary means of delivery permitting them to threaten every part of the Western world with instantaneous destruction. Besides innumerable aircraft and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads, they produced ballistic missiles which had both a long range and a

great carrying capacity. The process which had begun in the preceding phase was now complete: the United States was in its turn under the constant threat of total destruction, and the balance of mutual deterrence thus achieved gave rise to a widespread feeling that a nuclear stalemate had been reached.

The United States strengthened its nuclear potential in Europe still further. It entrusted tactical atomic weapons to the armed forces of its allies and it installed in England, Italy and Turkey launching pads for intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. It was felt in some quarters that these launching pads, instead of increasing Europe's security, made it more exposed to attack; the reasoning was that these missiles, being unprotected and requiring a long count-down, were offensive rather than retaliatory weapons and would therefore be singled out for special attention by the Russians in the event of an outbreak of hostilities—of whatever kind—or of a Russian pre-emptive strike.

As regards control of these weapons, nothing has changed: the President of the United States still bears alone the immense responsibility for setting in motion the mightiest machinery of destruction known to man. The partial and strictly limited delegation of authority to the American Command in Europe in no way alters this situation of concentrated control. The system of two keys is nothing but a polite fiction designed to soothe the increasingly tender susceptibilities of the Europeans.

Britain, for its part, maintains its nuclear capability at a modest level, but it has given up the idea of producing the means of delivery which would have extended the effectiveness of its nuclear force beyond the early 1960s. France, on the other hand, making use of its earlier studies and of the possibilities of its nuclear industry, has begun, with its own resources, to manufacture atomic weapons; it is preparing for the production of thermonuclear weapons; and it has built a piloted plane which will tide it over until its work on missiles has produced practical results.

The nations of Europe are more than ever aware that, given the imbalance in conventional forces, a Soviet attack against them could be stopped only with the aid of nuclear weapons. This is also openly admitted by the United States. But the European nations are equally aware that the Soviet Union possesses the means both of destroying them and of deterring the United States from a total engagement in their defense. The malaise,

indications of which appeared some time ago, spreads and grows stronger. Without in the least doubting the good faith of the United States—which would be manifestly unjust—many of us in that part of the old world which has not been engulfed by the Soviet tide wonder how much trust the Russians place in the American promises of commitment; for, in the last analysis, that is the angle from which the problem of deterrence must be viewed. Even on the other side of the Atlantic authoritative voices assert that it would be irrational to attempt to save Europe by massive reprisals which would have the inevitable consequence of destroying the United States.

### III

In this situation, what has the United States done in recent years to allay the justified anxiety of the European nations and to meet their desire for a new system of allied defense, one more consonant with their dignity and their security needs? And how has the United States reacted to the efforts of those nations which have attempted to get out of the rut?

One school of thought in the United States, basing itself on a restrictive and somewhat biased interpretation of the idea of “flexible response” put forward by General Taylor and developed by Mr. McNamara, has advocated the notion that the Europeans should forsake all nuclear ambitions and should devote all their efforts to conventional armaments in order to counterbalance the powerful Soviet forces encamped on the broad plain conquered by Stalin. But things are not as simple as that. Who can fail to see that, once Western conventional armies have been reinforced, the Russians, if they still cherish their aggressive aims, will be tempted, using their own armies as a shield, to employ their nuclear weapons in order to destroy or neutralize the machinery set up at great cost to oppose them? To deter them, one would need the threat of a strategic strike on their own territory, and today only the Americans can exercise such a threat. We are now back where we started from: What is the likelihood, from the Russian point of view, of the United States acting on Europe’s behalf in a manner which would almost certainly result in the total destruction of the United States itself?

Another school of thought, which concedes the European claim that Soviet superiority in conventional armaments can be counterbalanced only by the threat of tactical nuclear weapons,

nevertheless holds that in case of a Russian attack massive use could be made of those weapons while maintaining them under American control. The conflict would remain limited, regardless of the type and power of the weapons employed, in the sense that it would be localized.

Yet it is easy enough to visualize what would happen if we were forced to use tactical nuclear weapons—some of which are extremely powerful—in an attempt to halt a Russian advance. We would strike at Soviet troops in the Eastern European countries, or outside their own territory. They would retaliate with nuclear weapons launched at our own forces, in the depth of the theatre of operations—in other words, in the small and densely populated territory of continental Europe. Whatever the intentions of either side, the distinction between attacks on enemy units and attacks on cities would then be purely academic. This explains the reluctance of the Europeans, and more particularly the Germans, to accept a nuclear strategy which might result in the complete destruction of their country in a conflict which could be regarded as limited from the standpoint of the Atlantic Community but which would be total where they were concerned. They cannot reconcile themselves to a system of deterrence based entirely on the threat of a nuclear war by escalation.

With a view to giving at least partial satisfaction to the Europeans, who are anxious to have a voice in the plans for strategic defense on which their security depends, the United States Government has proposed a multilateral nuclear force. This system does not strike me as either rational or wise, since it would make no change in the present situation except that a large share of the costs would fall on the European countries. The use of nuclear weapons would still be subject to the American veto. That such use would require the unanimous consent of all members of the force makes no difference; on the contrary, that provision might well paralyze the force. Paradoxical as it may seem, the idea of a multilateral force would, in a sense, result in the denuclearization of Europe just as much as would the Rapacki Plan; and with a little ill will it could be regarded as an American contribution to the Soviet endeavor to maintain the bipolar structure of the present-day world, the pole opposed to the Soviet Union being not the West as a whole, but the United States alone.

Yet even if we reject this tendentious view, the fact remains that the proposed system does nothing to resolve the problem as

the European nations see it. It is—or soon will be—their ambition to participate to the full extent of their capabilities in the common defense, in which there can be no compartments specially reserved for one of the allies. In particular, they must participate in the production and control of the atomic weapons on which, to repeat, may depend their safety and their very survival.

The alternative proposed for the multilateral force—a multinational force comprising part of the American and the whole of the British and French strategic forces—has been equally unable to withstand criticism, since it too is based on the principle of integrated forces remaining wholly under American authority in all matters of control and decision.

Lastly, during this entire period the efforts of France to build up its own nuclear capability, and thus be in a position to take an effective part in Western defense, have met with no understanding and received no support. On the contrary, they have aroused the distrust of her American allies, who place more faith in the ability of the Russians to control their tremendous stockpiles of offensive weapons than they do in my country's capacity to use with wisdom and moderation the modest armaments it is working so hard to develop for purely deterrent purposes.

This is how we have arrived at the present situation—one marked by mutual dissatisfaction on the part of the allies and by a lessening of political effectiveness. Our Eastern adversary surely cannot believe that the Alliance has greater military cohesion than it has proved to have political and diplomatic unity; and, I repeat, in our confrontation with Communism we must always bear in mind its evaluation of our determination to resist it.

#### IV

What is the situation toward which we are now willy-nilly headed? The American military force will remain the central pivot of Western defense. If Mr. McNamara's theories are put into effect, the United States will reinforce its strategic nuclear capabilities, based in the main on I.C.B.M.s in underground silos and missiles carried by Polaris submarines. While this will not be publicly admitted, a smaller role will be assigned to tactical nuclear weapons. For, in what might be termed the game of rational poker which the American Secretary of Defense intends to play with his Soviet partner—whom he credits with as cool and well-organized a mind as his own—those weapons might, by mis-

chance, lead the players to raise the ante too high and, indeed, upset the rules of the game. In particular, there will be no question of decentralizing control over those weapons, and certainly no question of delegating authority to use them to non-American military commands, since it is presumed that they do *not* know the rules of the game.

The British strategic nuclear force will be tolerated, as proof that there is no American nuclear monopoly within the Alliance, but naturally on condition that it is integrated with the American retaliatory force. That should not be difficult to achieve since, as we have seen, the British have given up the construction of suitable means of delivery and are now technically dependent on the United States.

The French strategic nuclear force, isolated and quarantined, as it were, will have a small capability and will be further handicapped by the lack of broad research programs and technological advances, since France can rely only on her own human and budgetary resources. Militarily, its effectiveness will be limited, yet there is every likelihood that it will carry a weight in the diplomatic sphere out of all proportion to its size.

If we analyze this situation, using the same criteria that we have applied to earlier situations, we shall be forced to admit that it is not very favorable. On the credit side of the new situation, it must be noted that one more of the allies will have attained to its full share of defense responsibilities. Contrary to what many fear, this will not create additional risks of nuclear hostilities. It seems to me neither fair nor, above all, realistic, to continue to question, on the part of France, the sense of responsibility which is readily granted to Soviet Russia in the matter of control of its nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is doubtful that France's possession of a nuclear deterrent would incite the Soviet Union to heedless provocation. On the contrary, looking at the matter from the Russians' point of view, I am convinced that they would be more cautious when faced with two allied but independent centers of decision, one of which will evaluate any offense on the basis of geographic, economic and, above all, human considerations applying in the very area where such offenses are most likely to be committed. Furthermore, in the event that the allies respond with nuclear weapons to a mass attack by Soviet conventional forces; the Russians are more likely to refrain from responding in their turn with nuclear weapons against Western Europe if they know

this would mean that the French nuclear force, modest but real, would strike at their own country.

On the debit side, France will strain itself to the utmost, without any aid from the United States which, for its part, will continue to implement its armament program to the full. This burden on the French economy may well have serious repercussions on its social welfare, and everyone knows how important a nation's social well-being has become in our day.

From the military standpoint, the French effort will represent a negligible contribution to Western defense in the eventuality of a general war. Outside the case just mentioned, its value lies almost entirely in the diplomatic sphere.

Finally—and in my view this is the most serious objection of all—politically the Western Alliance will continue to be the heterogeneous organism it is today. Apart from France, subject to the qualifications I have mentioned, and Great Britain, to an extent so slight as to be almost illusory, the members of the Alliance will have no sense of participation in the defense of the West on an equal footing with the United States. The result will be that the present tensions will continue and that the danger of the Alliance falling apart will increase rather than diminish, thereby offering the Soviet Union its best chance of attaining its ends.

Let me add with complete frankness that if France devotes most of its efforts to atomic weapons and Germany concentrates entirely on conventional armaments, there will soon be a serious imbalance between the armed forces of the two countries. Such disparities in continental Europe could be fraught with serious consequences, and I feel that this aspect of the matter should be examined with all the attention and realism it deserves.

v

Thus we see that the situation toward which we are heading is not really satisfactory either to the United States or to Europe. The reason is, I believe, that the basic principles of defense in the nuclear age were forgotten or disregarded by both of them, in different degrees, as they took the successive positions which have led to the present state of affairs. Far be it from me deliberately to overlook 15 years of common achievements and successes—or at least half-successes; after all, NATO has thus far fulfilled its purpose, which is to halt the subjugation of Europe by the Soviet Union. But I believe it is essential, if we really want to achieve

better mutual understanding and a better common defense, to bear these principles in mind in evolving a modern and effective military alliance.

The appearance of nuclear weapons has introduced a radically new element into the idea of defense: when we speak of using them what we really mean is threatening to use them. Thus the potential risk of nuclear war is at least as important as its actual occurrence. The result is, to paraphrase Clausewitz's famous dictum, that nuclear war is a part of politics rather than a continuation of politics.

Since nuclear war has become a permanent element of politics, it will readily be seen that a given political entity cannot possibly ensure its own defense unless it is sufficiently homogeneous to withstand the internal tensions which are inherent in the game of deterrence. *A fortiori*, a group of nations can expect jointly to ensure their common defense only if there is no marked inequality among them, especially as regards nuclear capability. In short, a joint threat can be made only if each member of the group provides a significant share of the group's total strength, if all are agreed to take the supreme risk together and, what is perhaps even more important, if the adversary is convinced of the group's solidarity and determination.

Until now, the political entity comprising men resolved to throw in their lot together for better or for worse has been the nation-state. If the Atlantic Alliance were a political union of the national type, Europe could conceivably be regarded as an exposed frontier, protecting the union as a whole. But in that case the Europeans would have a say in the decision on which their fate as citizens of the Atlantic Nation would depend.

This is obviously not how matters stand, and there is absolutely no reason to suppose that the United States is ready to propose a union of all the nations on the two sides of the ocean which joins and divides us. Proposals of that kind, which blithely disregard various disparities and the heavy heritage of history, are usually made by idealists who are not concerned with facts. When statesmen make them, it is under the sway of an emotion produced by some great catastrophe. In such cases, either the worst occurs and the proposal becomes meaningless, or the danger recedes and the generous sentiment is soon forgotten in a return to the cool calculations of reason. That is what happened with the proposal for a Franco-British union made by Winston Churchill in 1940.

Besides, it must be recognized that while the Atlantic nations are united by their civilization and their ideas of freedom and democracy, they are divided by geography, at least when it comes to the reality of the threat from the East. The millions of Americans who have visited us in the past 20 years have generally been struck by the different scale of distances in the old continent, and have often been made uneasy by the improbable proximity of the Red Army, in combat readiness only 90 miles from Frankfurt. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that Europeans should attach far more importance to the idea of deterrence than to that of defense in the strictly technical sense, or should feel that life-and-death decisions should not be made 3,000 miles away on the other side of the ocean.

It is therefore essential that a center of power and decision should be created in Europe to give the Atlantic Alliance the features we have found it needs: homogeneity in its retaliatory capability, and equality in making decisions.

If the United States is irritated when Europeans question the sincerity of its commitment to their defense, the Europeans in turn feel that American doubts of their capacity to exercise a rational control over a nuclear force betray an underestimation—if not an outright denial—of their political wisdom. Does Europe have less political maturity than the Big Two credit each other with? And if “nuclear wisdom” comes with the possession of nuclear weapons, the Europeans are ready to let grace descend upon them. Besides, why should they have any special propensity for precipitating a holocaust of which they would be the first victims? On the contrary, they want to make responsibility within the Alliance match the threat, in order to guard more effectively against a conflict which to them would in any circumstances mean a dreadful catastrophe.

The French nuclear effort could, in my view, be a positive factor in this radical transformation of the Alliance, provided it does not meet with systematic and irrational hostility. It fulfills in advance a need which will become apparent as soon as a united Europe has progressed from the stage of ideas to that of political reality. The enterprise may seem premature to some, since that Europe has still to be born; but the difficulties and postponements in nuclear matters are such that to wait for the actual emergence of the new political entity before recognizing its right to concern itself with them would mean to penalize it heavily in the key

sector of defense. The unhappy experience of the European Defense Community, which failed about ten years ago, has demonstrated that political problems must be solved before military problems; but a projected solution of the military problems of the future Europe can only further its birth, especially if the United States takes a constructive attitude and agrees to act as a catalyst in the nuclear field, much as it did in promoting the formation of the European Economic Community.

By granting well-thought-out technical assistance, the United States would be able to encourage the nations of the old continent to turn to a constructive common enterprise instead of being satisfied with illusions, like that of a multilateral force without substance. European coöperation in the production of nuclear armaments would then no longer be a sin against the Alliance and would emerge from the realm of dreams to which it is being deliberately relegated.

The United States can and must aid Europe; but it is essential that Europe should attain major nuclear capability by its own efforts. Even as a mother fully experiences maternal feelings only because she has carried and given birth to her child in pain, so will the nations develop full responsibility in nuclear matters only if they themselves conceive and produce nuclear armaments. In a continent which is divided, but in which we can see glimpses of the united Europe we must aim at, France alone happened to be in a position to undertake this tremendous task.

Britain has not yet realized how close its links are with the Continent. Its eyes turned toward the United States, it sees the Atlantic as less broad than the English Channel. It will join a united Europe, but it will not help to build it. Germany has regained sufficient economic strength to conquer the atom, but is prevented by treaties from making the attempt. Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and the other European members of the Alliance cannot do so for obvious reasons.

France realizes that the smallness of its territory and its budgetary limitations preclude it from rising to the summit of nuclear power. But it is also aware that its enterprise is a guarantee that the emerging Europe, if it does emerge, will not lack weapons for its defense, and that these weapons will be, as they must be, the product of its own effort and its own industry.

It seems to me that it would be in keeping with the generous nature of the American people to promote without ulterior

motives the military development of their future European partner. To that end, they should accept the French strategic nuclear force promptly and without bitterness, and facilitate its coöperation with the British and American forces. At a later stage they could further the coördinated efforts of the nations of the old continent in the matter of nuclear armaments and thus hasten the appearance of a specifically European force. This could be done progressively. To begin with, the British and French nuclear forces might constitute the nucleus of a European multinational force based on the equality of the participants; and later, when Europe's state of unification permits, they could become part of a homogeneous force.

In this way, the United States would contribute to the realization of the grand design of the union of European nations, which represents a necessary stage on the way to a real association between the old and the new worlds, and would confer upon its allies the dignity that comes of sharing duties and responsibilities equally. Having gained the full confidence of its new partner by having confidence in it, the United States would then discover that by having dared to surrender its monopoly of nuclear arms control it had greatly enhanced its own security.

## THE BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP

*By Fritz Erler*

THE crisis in NATO and in the European Communities is not over. It has destroyed the chance for a Western diplomatic offensive following the firm reaction of the United States against the establishment of Soviet atomic weapons in Cuba. The only reason the damage has not been greater is that the Soviet Union has troubles of its own with China, a conflict which the West could have turned to advantage if the Soviet Union had not still hoped to exploit the differences within the Western Alliance. There is no use in trying to place responsibility for this on nations or personalities. The task is to strengthen Western unity, Atlantic solidarity and the European Community. What are the problems in these three fields?

The European Community must strengthen its inner structure, deal with the problems involved in enlarging its area and regulate its relationship to other countries and regions. The first was blocked by de Gaulle's opposition to further integration. He opposes the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational or community institutions; he calls them "Aeropegs" and says no nation could place confidence in them. The benefits produced by the Common Market, in which France has shared, have persuaded him to accept the existing institutions, but he remains opposed to any further integration.

A community of the sort now existing in Europe represents more than mere coöperation between governments, for along with community institutions it has developed a community interest and a community spirit. All this adds up to integration. Obviously, integration should not injure national interests but incorporate the interests of each in an over-all body. Since the European Council of Ministers is not a conference of governments but a community institution responsible to the Community as a whole, individual ministers must act in the interest of the Community and not as representatives of their own governments. This is even more true in the case of the European Commission, the members of which do not sit in national governments or other national institutions; their only responsibility is to the whole Community. The existing treaties do not need amendment; as

they stand, they provide numerous opportunities for making progress. What is necessary is that the Commission exercise its full powers to make proposals to the other institutions of the Community; the Council of Ministers, in turn, would deal with those proposals in a community spirit. The European Parliament is in favor of such action.

The Commission would be strengthened if the three European Executives (Coal and Steel Community, Common Market and Euratom) were merged into one; the seat of the new single executive would give Europe a capital, a political symbol of unity. The power of the European Parliament should be strengthened also, so as to prove that the European executive is controlled by a European electorate and is not just a bureaucracy without proper parliamentary control. Unfortunately, France opposes both the idea of strengthening the parliament and the proposal for direct elections to it. But the constitutional situation existing at present in France should not persuade the European Community to give up the ideal of parliamentary democracy. The history of Germany and Italy shows how dangerous that could be.

Proposals for a political union without further integration would make sense only if there is to be an opportunity for the discussion of additional questions over which the existing European institutions do not now have control. It would be entirely unacceptable for rights of existing Community institutions to be taken away in the name of political union and given back to a form of government coöperation handicapped by the unanimity rule. That is why the so-called Fouchet Plan was not accepted. But the discussion of these additional questions should at least provide for the participation of the European executive in order to bring the Community spirit into this field too.

The dynamism of the existing treaties points in the direction of certain political decisions. Thus the Common Market asks for a common foreign trade policy, and this leads inevitably to some degree of common foreign policy. The requirement regarding fair competition involves many decisions on common internal policy, from the harmonization of taxation and social legislation to closer coöperation on general economic and monetary policy. As the treaties are brought into operation, the torpidity which overcame the European Community after de Gaulle's press conference of January 14 and the subsequent breakdown of the Brussels negotiations will inevitably be brought to an end.

There are already signs that things are moving. France has agreed that the regular meetings of the Council of the Western European Union (which unites Great Britain with the continental Six) shall automatically discuss relations between the European institutions and Great Britain. The German Government seems to have become more flexible on the delicate problem of corn prices. The long-delayed agreement on the association of a number of African states with the Common Market was signed in July. Although there is still no indication that Great Britain will soon become a full member of the Common Market, it is to be kept informed of what is done on the Continent and the Six will have to avoid any move which might increase the difficulties of its future entry. The Six can even help to break down some barriers. The "Kennedy round" in the GATT negotiations could solve some problems involving the position of the Commonwealth countries, agricultural policy and industrial imports from low-price countries. Steps toward solving some of these problems might also be taken in O.E.C.D., which unites all the free countries of Europe, the United States and Canada. All this would ease the future negotiations with Britain.

The free world must also find a common approach on the political implications of East-West trade. The refusal to trade at all with the Soviet Union will not lead to the breakdown of Communism; nor should we trade without restrictions. The Soviet Union uses foreign trade as a political instrument, and we are acting against our own interests if we do not do the same. The free world is at a disadvantage if one side of the trading relationship is well organized and able to act as both seller and buyer, while the other is split by competition both between countries and between private firms. If Russia is really interested in certain economic activities, credits included, better coördination is necessary in the West if it is to secure the right political price.

## II

With the exception of France, the members of the Common Market aim to bring in Britain and the other candidates for full membership—Norway, Denmark and Ireland. They also consider that the European neutrals—Sweden, Switzerland and Austria—must be given fair terms for associate membership. Austria is an example of why this is so necessary. More than 56 percent of her trade is with the Common Market, and if she were cut off in that

direction she would be driven into greater dependence on trade with the East. The free world must recognize its interest in the independence and freedom of the European neutrals.

France's partners also advocate a liberal foreign trade policy for the Community, as laid down in the Rome Treaty. Of course a community gives its members some privileges, for otherwise there is no community; and this creates a certain amount of discrimination against others. But the European Community should not develop a policy of self-sufficiency, as de Gaulle has advocated in some of his speeches. A liberal trade policy is not only necessary in view of the Common Market's responsibility for maintaining a high level of world trade; it is also of vital interest to its member states. Every year Germany exports more than 50 billion marks worth of goods. Obviously she must allow her customers the chance to earn that same amount of money by their exports to Germany. If this liberal trade policy is carried out by all members of the Common Market, a considerable contribution to the solution of the American balance-of-payments problem will result. Last year Germany imported 6.1 billion marks worth of goods from the United States, and exported only 3.86 billion marks in return. This already helps. But just as we must understand that the United States has a problem, so the United States must see that this problem is not created only by its military presence in Europe but in part by its large capital investment in Europe and in the developing countries.

De Gaulle is somewhat opposed to further American investment, but for another reason: he fears American influence on the French economy. To my mind, mutual capital investments strengthen the economic links between countries and therefore interdependence and solidarity. The presence of American troops is a safeguard for Europe against aggression from without, but the presence of American capital is an added reason to defend it. These problems can best be settled by common action, and here President Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act has already provided a useful framework. But it needs the coöperation of the Common Market to achieve its aim.

Agriculture poses another difficult problem. Maintaining high prices for larger production is no solution. The only solution is to subsidize the changes in the European agricultural structure so that European agriculture will become competitive with others and give a fair income to the people who work in it.

The enlarged Common Market would be the world's largest import area, and it could be advantageous to outside countries by increasing their opportunities for export. It could be a powerful partner with the United States in developing their mutual trade as well as world trade, and in coöperating in the monetary field and in development aid. This last task is of primary importance if a social explosion is to be avoided in the developing areas.

In this partnership Europe should not limit her efforts mainly to Africa, as France tries to do. And while we must coördinate our efforts with America and others, we must keep in mind that in some areas, because of traditional relationships and present political conditions, help from European countries is more advisable than help from the United States.

As far as French policy is concerned, Germany may be able to exert some influence, but the possibility should not be overestimated; what the old allies of France have not achieved can hardly be expected of a former enemy and new friend. The German-French Treaty has sealed a reconciliation which began a long time before de Gaulle came to power. For Germany, friendship with France is not a combination against anybody; it is part and parcel of the European Community and Atlantic solidarity, as our Parliament made clear in the preamble to the treaty. Germany cannot and will not make a choice between Paris and Washington. There is no European Community without France, but there also is no European security without the United States.

### III

What is the proper basis for European security? Obviously the French decision to build a national atomic force, the withdrawal of the French fleet from the NATO command and the fact that France is far behind on her conventional commitments to NATO are blows to the Western Alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany is not in agreement with this French military policy and specifically is not in favor of national atomic forces. If certain French statesmen hoped for German solidarity in this field, the vote of our Parliament, the participation of the Federal Republic in the negotiations on a multilateral force, the impressive reception given President Kennedy by the German people and the first consultations within the framework of the German-French Treaty will by now have made the German position clear. We know that Berlin, for example, is mainly protected by the

presence of American troops in Berlin, in Germany and on the Continent. President Kennedy went to Berlin to make this plain. For this presence there is no substitute, even in hard speeches.

The discussion of European security has become more intense as a result of changes in the strategic situation since 1955. The threat of massive retaliation was credible when the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons and strategic air forces. I personally regret that in those years the Soviet fear of this American monopoly, combined with the fear of German militarism, was not utilized in order to see whether security arrangements in the heart of Europe based on *one* Germany could not have been achieved; now the two parts of Germany have been rearmed in the framework of two opposing military alliances, and the monopoly too is gone. The threat of massive retaliation has become incredible, whether invoked by the United States or by Europe; execution of it would mean terrible losses for the United States, certain extinction for Europe. The belief of some Europeans that Europe has become invulnerable since the United States has become vulnerable is terribly mistaken.

The whole Alliance must free itself from the thought that in case of aggression the only alternatives are suicide and capitulation. The strategy of a controlled flexible response, a graduated deterrence, is not only in the American interest; it is in ours also. Since reliance only on atomic weapons leaves one defenseless against certain forms of aggression, we must strengthen the non-nuclear component of our defense. There are obvious limits, however, to the military effort that Europe can make. Military expenditures and the employment of human resources for military purposes have to take into account the need of maintaining economic health, social security and political stability in areas near the Iron Curtain and more exposed to Communist propaganda than the United States. The Federal Republic's large financial expenditure for the economic, social and cultural life of Berlin must be credited to her as part of the general burden of defense. In the political and psychological competition between East and West, Berlin is the equivalent of several divisions.

The general rule that a certain percentage of the national income should be devoted to defense has to be adapted to the special conditions of each country. A progressive income tax on individuals is generally regarded as more justified than an equal tax rate for everyone, and one can say the same of nations. It is impor-

tant to know what an individual's per capita income is after taxes have been paid; and so for a nation, one must calculate what its net income is after deduction of military and similar expenditures. When this is done, we see that the United States, even with the high burden it bears for our common defense, still remains the wealthiest country of the Alliance.

The atomic component of defense must exist too, but for use only as a last resort. The Western strategy is to deter aggression and therefore avoid war, but this will be successful only if an aggressor knows that he will meet resistance. The danger that a conflict would, by escalation, develop into atomic war is part of the deterrent. However, a threat to use atomic weapons to deal with any and every form of aggression is not credible; it would be regarded as a bluff and therefore would not deter. We must be able to stop an aggressor immediately, without having to destroy whole nations. Only if our forces were unable to stop the aggressor at the point of attack would it become necessary to have recourse to atomic weapons. Europe cannot be defeated, occupied and then liberated; it must be defended on its present frontiers, the frontiers of liberty. This is the meaning of NATO's "forward strategy." But this modern strategy has to follow the old rule that no military action should be more destructive than is strictly required by the circumstances.

President de Gaulle and some others in Europe do not accept this strategy. They believe in the earliest possible use of atomic weapons. The disposition of French troops shows that for the most part France reserves her forces for her own defense and does not make her full contribution to NATO, which is designed to counter any Soviet move against any Western nation.

The nuclear component of European defense consists of warheads under American or British custody and means of delivery that are in the hands of various military units. In view of this, the European members of the Alliance ask what influence they have on an eventual decision to use these warheads. They have a double fear: that America might destroy Europe by using them when it was *not* necessary and that it might not use them when it *was* necessary. The best solution of this problem would be for Europeans to participate in the over-all strategic planning, not only as regards the use of the nuclear potential in Europe but for the whole potential of the Alliance, including the decisive part of it in America.

This would require an upgrading of the NATO Council, which is the central political body of the Alliance, in order to give it greater political authority. The military adviser of the Council should not be a regional commander as at present but a military personality or a military body with competence as regards the whole military potential of the Alliance.

The present military committee does not entirely fulfill this requirement. In an emergency, the President of the United States should make his decision on the basis of a commonly agreed strategy which covers the security requirements not only of the United States but of all the other members of NATO. He would thus become a kind of trustee of the Alliance, without changing the American Constitution. Such a procedure would make his decision a far more credible deterrent than any that might emerge from clumsy bodies that have to act unanimously or even by a majority vote. In either case, of course, the Soviet Union could gamble on the likelihood that there would be no decision at all. However, the fact that the NATO allies participated in the decision-making machinery used by the President would give Europeans the assurance that their contribution in conventional forces gave them a comparable influence on strategy and on future decisions, without making a futile and expensive effort to duplicate the American effort in the atomic field. The United States spends more annually on its atomic arsenal and means of delivery than all the European members of NATO spend on their entire defense budgets.

A start in the right direction was made at Athens. The decision at Ottawa to send European officers to the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command at Omaha was a further step, but only a step. The new command structure, bringing the British Bomber Command and three American Polaris submarines under the command of SACEUR, does not increase NATO's military strength; nevertheless it is a useful regrouping of forces. It is better to prepare sea-based I.R.B.M.s than to place those weapons on the European Continent, where they expose the host countries to Soviet atomic blackmail.

This is one of the merits of the multilateral force now under discussion, if it can be made to include more participants than just Germany and the United States. Italy went so far as to join the discussion; but what would be essential is a British contribution, for both political and military reasons. Negotiations will

take time, for operational and political control, finances and integration into the NATO command structure all pose difficult problems. As suggested above, I prefer a looser form of European influence on the whole of the American potential to the appearance of physical control over a very small part of it. But the formation of a multilateral force might be a beginning.

The project may undergo many changes, but we should not give it up as long as we have nothing better. It would diminish the risk of the proliferation of national atomic weapons; further the integration of American and European forces; give Europe a share in strategic planning; add to Europe's technical experience in the atomic field, and therefore contribute toward her education in the strategic concepts based on these weapons and her sense of responsibility in dealing with them. This education should be accompanied by greater training in modern technology, in view especially of the important impact that arms technology has on the non-military economy. Europe, with her dense population, is a great industrial workshop in which the highest standards of quality must be maintained if she is to provide a decent standard of living for the population. If the American monopoly in atomic weapons meant that Europe was excluded from the technological benefits that might be applied to non-military uses, the pressure for developing an independent European nuclear arsenal would become overwhelming.

For all these reasons a multilateral force is better than de Gaulle's policy of developing a national *force de frappe*, which cannot defend Europe and which leads to neglect of conventional forces. Europe's geographical position and size do not permit the dispersement of the deterrent. And the dangerous conception that a little force like that in view for France will be a credible deterrent, because it can force the United States to enter an atomic war even if it does not want to, destroys the spirit of coöperation in the Alliance and risks driving the United States into isolation.

The French force is national, not European, a fact which sometimes is underestimated. It is a force in Europe; but we already have another atomic force in Europe—the American one—which differs in three ways from the French force: The American one exists; the French one is a hope. The American force will always be more important than the French one. And finally, the other European nations will undoubtedly have more influence on the

American force than on the French. By de Gaulle's definition, any foreign influence on the French atomic force is excluded. France is willing, perhaps, to use it in the interest of Europe, but reserves an unlimited right to decide when and how. In this way, France would acquire the position of European leadership. The other European nations recognize the present differences in power between them and the United States and hence accept the difference in influence between each of them individually and the United States, but I doubt that any of them would accept a similar relationship to France, which is one European state among other European states. Not even Great Britain could in the long run hope for a special status.

## IV

If Europe wants to bring the alliance with the United States into a better equilibrium it has to unite and it has to accept Great Britain, for only so can it approach equality in partnership. Then it also will play something more like an equal role in the atomic field. The interdependence of Europe and the United States will remain, but decision-making would be by a sort of two-key system, in which the ability to make a decision remains credible and yet gives the two partners equal rights of co-decision.

But we cannot start at the wrong end. Not only will the development of national atomic forces in Europe create new dangers through proliferation; it also will run counter to European unity, for each nation so equipped tends to resist integration. After long years of nationalism and strife the states of Europe are growing together. They should not let integration become a mere pooling of nationalisms, but make it strengthen group responsibility for affairs outside of Europe. If we ask for more influence on the military potential of the United States, we must accept a share in its political responsibilities. A grown-up Europe cannot ask for weapons and reject responsibilities in other fields.

America's policy is to remain strong until there is progress in disarmament under proper inspection, but meanwhile to negotiate seriously on the basis of its present military power. Europe can make a political and intellectual contribution to this process. Every step toward the limitation and control of armaments creates a better climate for the discussion of political problems, and every time political problems are approached in a better spirit the chances for progress toward disarmament are improved.

The German problem stands only to profit from progress in other fields of controversy and negotiation—as, for example, the test-ban agreement. Its main importance is not as a disarmament measure, for it limits activity in only one specific area of the arms race. Nor does it seem likely to make either China or France abandon its plans for nuclear weapons. But world public opinion seems sure to deter others from a similar line and in the end may perhaps even influence those two countries. Thus the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons has been limited even if it has not been stopped.

The fact that pollution of our atmosphere by hundreds of nuclear explosions has probably been brought to an end is certainly a considerable advantage. A further agreement covering similar explosions for peaceful purposes is now necessary; the limitation of nuclear military explosions should not hamper scientific and technological progress. Here a timely announcement of programs and proper international inspection of their execution can preclude military abuses.

There are some military disadvantages in the Moscow agreement, but they will exist in any proposal for limiting the arms race and they seem to be equalized between the two sides. Certainly the disadvantages are outweighed by the political advantage. In any case, escape clauses provide ultimate protection. The greatest risk by far lies in an unlimited atomic arms race.

The arms race continues in all fields not affected by the prohibition of certain types of atomic explosions. The relationship of the nuclear powers to each other and to the non-nuclear ones also continues. The full value of the agreements therefore can be judged only in the light of future developments. Will there be agreement on the means of delivery too? With adequate inspection? Will research be internationalized? Will the nuclear powers develop a partnership with their allies or use their stabilized atomic monopoly as an instrument of power politics?

Another prime question is whether measures against surprise attack are to create better protection against aggression by conventional means. This brings us face to face with the German problem, for if such measures are to have any meaning at all they must give better safeguards to Berlin.

The Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the Moscow agreement. Alone for her it does not require any new commitment. She regrets that the Communist régime in Eastern Ger-

many appears as a signatory, but even if this was unavoidable, it must be made quite plain that this signature does not carry recognition of a "second German state," hence of partition.

The Soviet Union's aim in asking now for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries can only be to legalize its conquests in Central and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union knows perfectly well that NATO will not attack it. If there is really a need for declarations of intent, all that is necessary is for each side to declare that it will not further its political aims by force or the threat of force. The Federal Republic has made such statements already.

We Germans cannot force the Soviet Union to give up the part of our country which it occupies. But the Soviet Union cannot force the West to accept the partition of Germany and recognize the colonial régime which exists in the Sovietized part of it. Nor can we Germans be forced to give up the political fight for the right of self-determination for our whole people. We therefore have to keep the door open until better conditions for a solution of the problem exist. This means specifically that the West has to remain in Berlin; any other policy would produce a world-wide reaction against the West. Fortunately, President Kennedy fully understands the human problem of the Berliners, especially after having visited them. Berlin is a standing symbol for the entire German problem which awaits a fair solution.

That solution will become possible only when Soviet interests as a whole, which are so much more important than those of the Ulbricht régime, can be brought into play in the combined areas of security, economics and politics. This will happen only if we do not allow the Soviet Union to think that it can exploit differences in the West; if we maintain the social, economic and political stability of the Federal Republic, thus definitely destroying the Communist hope of taking over the whole country; if we maintain the belief of the Germans in the Soviet zone that one day they will recover their freedom (which means we have to avoid upgrading the Communist colonial régime internationally); and if we continue to move toward fuller European integration.

Europe has recovered her economic health and strength. It is from a position of increased importance, then, that she is being called upon to contribute to world policy in partnership with her great ally on the other side of the Atlantic. Europe will arrive at this partnership not by aspirations, but only by performance.

## CONTROL OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

*By Air Marshal Sir John Slessor*

IT is hardly too much to say that the future not only of NATO but of the Atlantic Community as a whole depends today on the ability of Western statesmanship to find a politically acceptable and militarily sensible solution to the problem of how to give all the NATO allies a share in a common responsibility for defense of the West in the nuclear age. This is not merely a question of satisfying the *amour propre* of General de Gaulle; nor of whether or not a future government in Bonn will remain satisfied with the present limited status of Germany in the nuclear field—a question on which some divergence of views in Washington and London is relevant but not critical. It is a problem simple in conception but infinitely complex in definition, which has been stated succinctly by M. Jean Monnet. “. . . the United States,” he said in New York on January 23, “must realize that the claims of Europe to share common responsibility and authority for decision on defense, including nuclear weapons, is natural, since any decision involves the very existence of the European peoples. On the other hand . . . Europeans must understand that the nuclear terror is indivisible and that they too must shoulder an adequate share of the common defense.”

Note this great European's repeated use of the word “common.” He does not say that since our national survival is at stake none but our own governments can assume responsibility for our own national defense. On the contrary, he knows that is impossible—knows that today the only defense policy that makes any sense whatever is an Atlantic defense policy. And he goes on to say that “Europe and America must both acknowledge that neither of us is defending a particular country, that we are all defending our common civilization.”

“Common responsibility and authority for decision on defense, including nuclear weapons”—that is the problem of control. But, of course, in those words it is oversimplified. One of our troubles today is that for the first time in history we are having to form judgments about a kind of war of which no one has any experience whatever, and about problems of strategic policy—close to, but short of, nuclear war—of which our experience is very limited,

virtually to the single instance of Cuba. It is therefore all the more important that we should clarify our definitions and be quite clear in our minds as to the precise meaning of the words we use.

The object of this article is to attempt such a definition of what we mean—or should mean—when we talk about control of nuclear strategy. But it is necessary first to define what I believe are the only rational meanings of two other terms which are bandied about, often without any clear conception of what they really mean—namely the word *Deterrent*, and the word *Independent* in connection with the policy of deterrence.

The first—except when it is used so loosely that, like the word Sin, it means anything or nothing (and that is far too often)—is commonly taken to mean the long-range forces capable of inflicting nuclear catastrophe on the Soviet Union if the Kremlin attempts to inflict any kind of catastrophe on others. General de Gaulle has defined France as a country “that could be destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor were turned from the attack by the certainty that he also would suffer destruction;” and he has implied that the certainty must exist that “a riposte of the same kind and the same degree would be immediately released.” How—or indeed whether—he reconciles that with his reliance on 50 medium nuclear bombers to protect France if the Americans were to default on their NATO obligations is a secret which reposes in his own bosom. The point is that that is his idea of a deterrent—and it is far from being only his idea. Actually he does not really believe in the possibility of war in the nuclear age. In spite of his dislike and distrust of America (not altogether unnatural in the light of his treatment by Roosevelt during the war), he obviously believes that the massive American nuclear capacity by itself will prevent war; he even said at his famous press conference that “naturally American arms remain the essential guarantee of world peace”—and he does not believe that anything more is really required for the protection of France against Russia. His *force de frappe* is really a political stage in his conception of the rearmament of the soul of France and of her world influence.

De Gaulle is a great man in any company, but in this he is profoundly wrong. He used in old days to be a realistic and forward-looking military thinker but today he makes no military sense—partly perhaps because of his years in retreat at Colombey, but partly also because since his return to power he will not listen to anybody or anything but his own “voices.” In this context, alas,

he makes no political sense either; if the capacity of NATO to defend Europe itself against invasion were still what it was in, say, 1950, it would be an utter fallacy to imagine that American long-range nuclear capacity alone could prevent Soviet domination extending to the Atlantic and Channel coasts.

This is the point. The Deterrent is not merely our capacity to bring destruction upon the heartland of Russia; that is only one of its components. The other, which is of equal importance, is our capacity to present a credible and formidable direct defense of Europe against invasion. It is essential to understand—in fact half our troubles arise from failure, especially in the Elysée, to understand—that the second component of the Deterrent is every bit as important as the first; indeed to an increasing degree every day the credibility and effectiveness of the first component depend more on the credibility and effectiveness of the second.

In short, the only valid definition of the Deterrent is the military means by which the Western Alliance can pursue its own international policies, free from the fear of external attack or internal subversion by Russia—in other words, the military posture and total armed strength of the NATO powers. There seems no reason to imagine that this principle will change with altered circumstances—for instance, if in perhaps 20 years' time China replaces Russia as the major potential enemy.

The second term—Independence in connection with the policy of Deterrence—is more easy to define since, if it means anything, it means exactly what it says. What is disturbing is that so many politicians (and, to be fair, not only politicians) apparently fail to understand that to talk of an independent national nuclear deterrent implies the belief that circumstances could arise in which it would be politically and militarily practicable to involve their country in a bilateral nuclear exchange with Russia, independent of, and by implication even against the wishes of, their allies and especially the United States. That assumption might be valid for the United States—though even that is open to serious doubt when all the implications are considered; it certainly is not valid for Britain or France.

This definition is often rejected by advocates of independent national deterrents on the ground that the object is to deter and not to fight, that it is necessary only to have the capacity to inflict “unacceptable” damage on the aggressor. It is claimed that the Kremlin would never persist in aggressive intentions in the face of

a genuine risk of destruction of even half a dozen major Russian cities. This may be so; no one can ever be certain, even when the moment arrives, if it ever does—and that is the point. Those who base their policy on an assumption like that must recognize that the deterrent *might* fail to deter, and that in such case the forces which they had hoped would be a deterrent would in fact be used for the military purpose for which they are equipped and trained. No deterrent can be effective unless it is credible—unless a potential aggressor were at least in serious doubt whether or not it would in fact be used.

This is not to suggest that every Russian nuclear threat, such as those at the time of Suez and our later intervention in the Levant, should be taken at its face value. On the contrary, it is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would risk nuclear war on any issue short of a direct threat to Russia herself. But the British Government's theory that some "supreme national interest" might necessitate the withdrawal of British nuclear forces from NATO and compel it to act independently implies the emergence of some unspecified circumstances in which a Russian nuclear threat to Britain might be genuine. In such circumstances Lord Home's contention, in his speech at Ottawa on May 21, would be unanswerable—that the Soviet missile threat to the United Kingdom is so colossal that it could be deterred only by the combination of United States and British nuclear power; and the same would apply, of course, with equal force to France.

Even de Gaulle seems to recognize that there must be something like parity of penalty in this grim context. Neither Britain nor France, nor the two in combination, could face Russia with anything even remotely like equivalent nuclear power. There is such a thing as being too logical. As an academic exercise it might be possible to make a computer come up with the answer that the Kremlin would not risk the destruction of even six cities on some hypothetical issue. But war is still a human activity. And if the chips were down, with America standing aside, and Britain or France alone against Russia, it would not be a computer which would assess whether or not the Kremlin thought the risk of damage was "unacceptable," or decide whether or not the British or French people are to accept the genuine possibility of extermination; it would be a man or a small group of men—almost certainly tired and rather frightened men—with the appalling responsibility for the lives of scores of millions of their compatriots.

In a gamble on that scale it is literally vital to hold the strongest possible cards, and for the stake to be no less than national life or death. October 1962 surely proved—to the eternal credit of Mr. Macmillan—that as an ally of the United States a British government will face up in the last resort to the possibility of nuclear war rather than surrender. The one really supreme national interest is national survival, and no British government will believe that this can be secured by contracting out of the Alliance in a world emergency. But short of that it seems to me equally certain—against a background of personal experience with British and French governments in the infinitely less terrifying circumstances of 1939-40—that no British or French government would in fact be able to take its country into single-handed nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

That means that an independent national deterrent is meaningless; that, as Jean Monnet has said, nuclear terror is indivisible; and consequently that the less powerful allies must use the machinery of the Alliance to ensure—no doubt at some sacrifice of national sovereignty—that they do not get themselves into a position where they find themselves standing alone. They may find that unpalatable, but they can take comfort from the probability (to put it mildly) that on almost any conceivable issue the United States would also be subject to the same compulsion.

If the foregoing arguments are accepted, they lead inescapably to certain conclusions about control of nuclear strategy. They underline, in the first place, the validity of Jean Monnet's conception of the problem of control: "*common* responsibility and authority for decision on defense." The first thing to understand here is that the crowning decision on defense is, in the last resort, whether or not to go to war. Involved with that overwhelmingly important decision are certain others, notably of course, what sort of war we should be committed to wage and, above all, when nuclear weapons are first to be used. The word "when" is used advisedly. If or when it really comes to the point of war—major war between great nations as opposed to a situation like that in Cuba week or even the hypothetical period of what Norstad used to call the "pause" following a limited aggression in Europe—it is surely only realistic in this nuclear age to recognize that the question inevitably will be when and not whether nuclear weapons are to be used. The real, breath-taking decision will be that which President Kennedy would have had

to make in October 1962 if Khrushchev had not bowed to the inevitable when he did—namely, when and in what way to break off negotiations and accept the inevitability of war.

Surely we create unnecessary difficulties for ourselves and build up unnecessary strains and resistances within the Alliance by trying to draw detailed blueprints in advance of just how decisions would be made or control exercised in circumstances about which the only reasonable certainty is that they would be quite different from anything we now envisage. This is far from saying we should not improve the machinery of decision-making, or that we should not frankly accept certain limitations on our national sovereignty in the interests of the Alliance. It is to say that our system must above all be flexible, that we must not take a stand on rigid national positions in advance. It means we must understand that the solidity of the Alliance and the willing loyalty of all its members are far more important for all of us, including the United States, than any constitutional arrangement for command and control in conditions which, if the Alliance remains solid and strong, will never arise. It involves also the realistic acceptance by the less powerful allies of the truth that, while there may be certain disadvantages purely from the point of view of national sovereignty in being a member of a great coalition like NATO, they are far outweighed by the security which membership in the Alliance and partnership with the most powerful nation on earth alone can provide.

My own experience in the operation of the Anglo-American alliance from 1942 to 1945 convinces me that in an alliance command and control can in fact be exercised only on a basis of willing coöperation. Free nations cannot be coerced. This, of course, must be qualified by the need for some deference to the views of the most powerful partner who is bearing the greater part of the burden. He who pays most of the piper's wages must inescapably be able in some degree to call the tune; if we do not accept that fact of life, there will be no tune. But experience has shown that almost any system of allied command organization will work—however untidy it looks on paper—if we are really allies and interested first and foremost in our joint success; it is equally true that no system, however theoretically perfect, will work if we are not.

The major practical issue in relation to control of nuclear strategy and the one which has caused and is causing strains within the Alliance is the American insistence that the decision

as to the use of nuclear weapons, which basically means the decision whether or not to go to war, must rest with the President of the United States, subject only to a somewhat tenuous agreement with the British Government. It is, of course, perfectly understandable that the American Government should decline to accept a position in which the enormous proportion of allied nuclear capacity that is in American hands could be committed against its will by the action of its less powerful allies. In this connection the extraordinary idea of the British Labor Party that Britain should acquire some right to a share in the control of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, in return for contracting out of the nuclear business altogether, is only a degree less unrealistic than the theory in some French quarters that the *force de frappe* could be used to "trigger off" American nuclear power.

This brings us to a consideration of whether in fact any ally could in the last resort commit the others to war against their wills. Let us first ask ourselves the question which American insistence on its own control of all nuclear weapons makes particularly relevant: namely, could the United States be committed to nuclear war against its will by the action of an ally? And for the sake of example let us assume that the ally might be France—an assumption which de Gaulle's attitude makes less improbable than some. Suppose in the preliminary discussions the United States had made it clear that it did not regard the issue as one justifying nuclear war, and had no intention of unleashing its own nuclear power. Is it really conceivable that even de Gaulle would find himself able to say, in effect, "All right—then I shall go it alone and attack Russia with the *force de frappe*?" Would he be supported by Britain or Germany or Italy? Would the Americans bow to the inevitable and submit to joining him or following him against their own convictions? These questions, admittedly oversimplified, surely have only to be asked for it to be obvious that anything but a negative answer would be fantastic.

Would the converse be true? Supposing America's allies were unwilling to go to war on any particular issue, could they be committed against their will by the action of the United States? Curiously enough, this is a question which has seemed in recent years, from the discussions in the Atlantic Congress of 1959 to the present day, to cause less concern to America's allies than the first. It is not so easy to answer with the same confidence. It might be argued that if the Americans were bent on going to war any-

way, regardless of allied opinion, they could do so, and that there is very little the allies could do about it; their only course would be to make the best of it and go along with America, since they would inevitably be involved sooner or later. But is that necessarily true? It is far from certain even on the Cuba issue whether the President would have been able to maintain his courageous resolution to the point of nuclear war but for the support of his allies in NATO and the Organization of American States. Surely it is much less certain that any American president could do so on a European issue in the face of opposition from his European allies. To insist in advance that the power of decision on these issues must remain in Washington alone only inhibits willing co-operation in the Alliance, without serving any compensating practical purpose.

Although it is highly desirable that control of the actual nuclear weapons should be centralized, from the point of view of allied unity it is politically and psychologically undesirable that such control should remain as it is now, solely in American hands—except for the relatively few British-made weapons under British control and, in future, the fewer French-made weapons in French hands. There seems no reason why the custody of warheads and control of the permissive electronic link should not be transferred to a corps of specially recruited inter-allied personnel of a NATO Control Commission answerable to the Atlantic Council. Ideally this should be extended to all American weapons including those in the continental United States; but that is too much to expect in present circumstances. It should certainly apply to all weapons, including American, in Europe (including Great Britain); and the British would do well to give a lead by submitting their own weapons to NATO control. It seems unlikely that the French could stand out alone indefinitely, nor—looked at practically—would it really matter much if they did.

It will be observed that all this assumes that there would be time and opportunity for discussion between the allies, even when war appeared imminent. The idea of what has been called a “bolt from the blue”—a sudden, massive threat out of a clear sky in a time of normal international relations—makes no sense, and the popular conception of a few frightened men going into a huddle over the scrambler telephones at the 59th minute of the 11th hour is wholly unrealistic. Indeed if the “bolt from the blue” were to materialize, the situation would be terribly, but almost

completely, simplified; no one would then be disposed to argue about the niceties of control and whether this or that weapon should be used to save us from certain destruction.

In reality the situation would surely develop on lines much more like those of Cuba week, and there would be far more time than commonly imagined for discussion and consultation within the Atlantic Alliance. The first essential is that the machinery for consultation, the communications systems and so on, should be as perfect and accident-proof as they can be made. And politicians in the free countries must be educated to understand that a time may come when, in the interest of national survival, normal democratic processes must be temporarily suspended. Cabinets, and especially prime ministers and foreign secretaries, will have to accept an appalling but inescapable burden of responsibility. Parliaments must recognize that, having kept themselves up to date on the developments of policy through the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, and having made sure that they have the right men at the right time as prime ministers and foreign secretaries, they cannot expect to enjoy the luxury of public discussion or parliamentary decision when the chips are really down. It was different in the old leisurely days, when it took weeks to mobilize an army and concentrate it in a theater of war; then there was plenty of time to debate and vote upon the issue of war or peace. Those days are gone forever, and it is paradoxical but unhappily true that in an age when the effects of war upon the people would be unthinkably more catastrophic than ever before, the elected representatives of the people are inevitably bound to have to delegate responsibility in a real crisis to so few of their number.

This is the more unavoidable since the actual negotiation with the potential enemy in a period of crisis can be conducted only from one center—really by one man; and by the nature of things today he can hardly be anyone but the President of the United States. It is vital that he should act in constant, close consultation with his allies, and theoretically this should be done through the Atlantic Council. Actually it seems inevitable that it will have to be done directly with his opposite numbers, and no president would feel able to speak frankly in these circumstances with a prime minister who he knew was bound to reveal to his parliament in public debate, or even in secret session, the day-to-day progress of the negotiations.

It would be quite unrealistic to imagine that the final irrevocable decision to go to war could necessarily be made unanimously by 15 chief ministers or the Atlantic Council. Control in the English sense of actual operation orders and pushing buttons can in the last resort be exercised only by a much smaller group, representing the major allies on whose strength the fate of the minor ones in any event depends. There is no practicable alternative and, if any small nation does not like that, its only course is to leave NATO and find what comfort it may in neutrality. In actuality, however, a decision to go to war would in all probability make itself; that is, it would become virtually inevitable, whether or not the enemy attacked first. And the consequential decision on the first use of nuclear weapons, which must remain with the highest political authority, would depend on the course of events in the opening stages of hostilities.

In the extreme and very unlikely case of a war beginning by a massive nuclear attack on the United States or Europe, there would be no problem. But short of that it is surely vain to imagine that any one partner in the Alliance could claim any special position for itself once hostilities had begun—could, for instance, as sometimes suggested, retain the right to decide whether or not nuclear weapons are to be used on or from its own soil. Britain, for example, could not veto their use from her bases any more than could Germany. Jean Monnet is obviously right in saying that we should none of us be defending any particular country, but all defending our common civilization. It is because this may seem a contradiction in terms in the nuclear age that we must stress the prevention of war—not by running away from it as Britain and France tried to do before 1939, thereby making it more certain, but by being so strong and unified that no enemy will risk it.

Once we are at war, we are all in the same boat. The fact that Germany would probably suffer first and most from the initiation of nuclear action is inherent in her geographical position in the front line of NATO. Her main hope of survival, other than as a Soviet satellite, must depend on the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the knowledge that the Germans, with their allies, are prepared to accept the implications of nuclear action, including the grave risk of escalation, rather than capitulate.

Clearly, the problem of control calls urgently for remolding the machinery by which NATO strategy is formulated and di-

rected. Various suggestions have been fully discussed elsewhere and need not be elaborated here. The real point is this: "Common responsibility and authority" does not and cannot mean 15 fingers on the trigger—or, for that matter, on the safety catch—in the last stages of a critical emergency when the dreadful issue of survival of our civilization is actually at stake. It can and must mean that the man or few men who must decide to pull the trigger or snap on the safety catch are able to do so on a clear basis of agreed policy. It means that all the allies whose lives depend on their action must have a common knowledge of all the factors that should determine their decision if and when the time ever comes; they must have a share in the formulation of the strategic policy to govern that decision, and in the broad planning of the action to follow it.

It would be silly to pretend that all this is simple or straightforward; of course it is not. But a useful start has been made in that direction as a result of decisions at the NATO meetings in Athens and Ottawa, and the task now is to develop those initiatives. This common responsibility and authority no doubt has its disadvantages and difficulties, but the case for it is inescapable in a community of free nations. It is no good objecting on the grounds that it involves the risk of security leaks, and that the enemy will get to know what to expect and be able to circumvent or frustrate it. He probably will get to know a great deal. But the really important thing for him to get to know is that we have a firm agreed policy, the strength to back it and the machinery to put it smoothly into effect if ever he provokes us to that point.

A final conclusion is unavoidable. Strategic policy must be the handmaid of international political policy if either is to make sense. That means that NATO must develop into a formal Atlantic Community with its own institutions, on the lines unanimously recommended by the representatives of the NATO nations assembled at the Atlantic Convention in Paris in January 1962. The first object of that organization must be—in the words of the Declaration of Paris—"to harmonize political, military and economic policy on matters affecting the Community as a whole." Let no one brush that aside as utopian idealism. Some kind of confederation of the Western nations is ultimately as inevitable as tomorrow's dawn. Many things that are commonplace today—the Common Market, O.E.C.D., the I.M.F., NATO itself—would have been dismissed as utopian only a quarter of a century ago.

# REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

*By Robert V. Roosa*

SINCE the return of convertibility among the currencies of most major industrial countries at the beginning of 1959, a crisis affecting at least one major currency has threatened each year; the U.S. balance of payments has been in continuous large deficit; and the stability of the convertible gold-dollar and sterling system has been increasingly questioned. With the transition to convertibility proving to be so turbulent, doubts have arisen over the adequacy of liquidity arrangements for the future and calls for a great reform of the international monetary system have quite understandably been intensified.

For most of the first five years of convertibility, the financial officials of the leading industrial countries have necessarily concentrated their efforts on developing, through increasingly close and harmonious coöperation, one facility after another that was adapted to the immediate needs created by the new circumstances. To have turned aside for protracted discussion of vast ideas for major reform, before the outline of the new convertible system itself had become scarcely visible, might have invited each incipient disturbance affecting any currency to become a disaster for all.

But most of the foundations for a new system of defenses have now been put in place and effectively tested in the joint action that has been taken to contain the heavy pressures on sterling in the spring of 1961 and at the beginning of 1963; to neutralize the monetary impact of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961; to halt the run on the Canadian dollar in May-June 1962; and to avert any monetary repercussions of the stock market collapse in May, or of the Cuban crisis in October 1962.

Several different groupings have also evolved among governments for carrying forward the consultation and coöperation that have proved so useful during these early years of convertibility. While the further use and improvement of the present combination of new and old arrangements may well prove fully adequate, the stage has clearly been reached, both in terms of facilities and of mutual understanding, when governments can in prudence

examine together two profound questions: Does a reasonable projection of the present course of the growth of monetary reserves point toward a possible inadequacy of international liquidity over the years ahead? And if such an inadequacy should appear possible, what steps can usefully be considered now to provide for the nature and dimensions of future needs that can be foreseen or foreshadowed?

One other major obstacle might still impede a frank and searching appraisal of these questions by the various governments—concern that the large deficit which the United States is still running in its balance of payments would distort any consideration of longer-run problems. That deficit has, to be sure, been the major cause of imbalance in the international payments system for nearly six years. But the President's program, presented on July 18 of this year, demonstrates emphatically the determination of the United States to correct its own deficit, and to keep a sharp separation between that effort and any inter-governmental review of the prospects and arrangements for international liquidity in the future.

This article does not attempt an evaluation, even in miniature, of all of the imaginative proposals that have been made for reform. It does attempt an introduction to such an evaluation by distinguishing three quite different conceptions of the nature of the monetary system which run through various proposals; by stressing the differences in significance among three different meanings of liquidity; by indicating the possible relevance of the various innovations of the past few years for the liquidity needs of the future; and finally, by briefly cataloguing in four main groupings the proposals on which governments might most usefully proceed toward a clarification of views among themselves. Most of these proposals differ so widely, and views on each are so deeply held that no consensus on a major change, nor even a consensus as to whether or not some kind of major change is needed, can be expected to develop among the nations of the world without a long period of exploratory discussion, followed by extended negotiation.

## II

Some of the reform proposals would turn back from the dual system of monetary reserves—gold and foreign exchange—that has characterized much of this century. They would return to a

“full” gold standard by doubling or tripling the price of gold and then removing dollar or sterling or other foreign exchange from the world’s monetary reserves. Proposals of this kind presume a fixed price for gold after a one-time drastic change has been made in that price.

Another set of proposals moves off in a quite different direction, giving up a fixed price of gold entirely and providing that each currency fluctuate in price against others. With a country free to allow its exchange rate to drop whenever it might lose reserves, proponents argue that there would be an economizing of reserves and the world would presumably no longer need to be as concerned as it has been over the composition or the total of the monetary reserves themselves.

Other proposals—both evolutionary and revolutionary—move in still a different direction. This third approach would include in reserves a more flexible and larger volume of foreign exchange or internationalized credit than is used today, superimposing this upon the slow accretion of gold that reaches the world’s monetary reserves. In most cases, proposals of this character would continue the present settled gold price of \$35 per ounce.

In effect, these are three fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of the monetary system that is needed: a full gold standard with fixed parities among currencies; no parities and reliance on fluctuating rates; and gold supplemented by various forms of credit—a gold-exchange standard with fixed parities. The first is discussed somewhat further in the next section; variable exchange rates, briefly, in the section following; but for reasons which will then appear, the United States considers only the third to be a promising avenue for constructive advance in the future.

### III

The return to a full gold standard has a distinguished spokesman, M. Jacques Rueff. In “L’Age d’Inflation,” he has recently restated his view that the “gold-exchange” standard has failed; that the time has come to start over, revaluing gold once and for all, and then reestablishing the disciplines of a system in which only gold is held in monetary reserves, and only gold is used in settling the net differences in the balance-of-payments accounts among nations. The rigid certainty of “gold points” would be reestablished for every solid currency. But the attractive simplicity

of this approach is marred by the knowledge that it was a close facsimile of such a system which broke down after World War I and led to the currency chaos of the thirties.

To avoid a repetition of the thirties, some of the advocates of a return to gold have suggested that reliance now could be placed upon the increasingly intimate and effective coöperation that has been developed among the financial authorities of the leading countries. But that would seem to beg the question. For the coöperation consists, essentially, in reconciling economic policies among countries so that the pattern followed by the internal growth of each country can be fitted into the pattern of external transactions that will support balance-of-payments equilibrium. National policies for incomes, as well as for interest rates and credit availabilities, seem to be, or to be becoming, a normal part of the responsibilities which all governments now acknowledge in varying degrees for promoting growth, avoiding instability and achieving external balance.

Many countries may, with the United States, eschew reliance on a national plan, but nearly all, regardless of their approach to planning as such, rely on government to condition and influence their over-all economic environment—to counteract deflation, to check inflation and otherwise to interfere, as it were, with the adjustment processes characteristic of the firm but arbitrary disciplines of the full gold standard.

Without pausing longer to air the debate here, it may perhaps be fair to note that there is much still to be done by the proponents of the full gold standard if they are to reconcile the advantages claimed for it with the facts of present-day government in economic life. There is, to be sure, a trace of nostalgia for the days of complete *laissez faire* in much that is written on the return to a full gold standard. Yet in the present complex of economic relations among nations, it is difficult to imagine any gold standard at work without being rather extensively managed. And, if managed, it would be little different from the procedures of today, except that a gigantic devaluation would have intervened and confidence in the dollar or any other currency as a supplementary part of the management process would, as a consequence, have been largely destroyed. It would seem difficult indeed to build a system that depends on periodic repudiation of a government's firm undertaking to maintain the fixed price of gold.

## IV

Variable exchange rates—at the opposite end of the scale from fixed gold parities—also seem to have an elegant simplicity. Whenever a country has a balance-of-payments deficit and reserves are flowing out, the authorities can simply move down the price of their currency until the outflow stops. At that level, imports will presumably decline, exports will rise and capital will flow in, thereby restoring balance in the external accounts. Even better, it is suggested, when rates are free to move, the external depreciation or appreciation of a currency can occur so quickly that the unsettling fluctuations of imports, exports or capital flows need never occur. They will be averted by the prompt movement of the exchange rate to a level that assures an approximate balance among the outpayments made for, and the inpayments received from, everything that has continued to move, quite uninterruptedly, while the price tag on the currency was changing. Moreover, with exchange rates absorbing the impact of most changes, actual flows of reserves among countries would be very small, and the need for reserves of international liquidity quite modest.

Despite a long succession of neatly argued academic demonstrations of this case for more than half a century, hard experience has persuaded the financial officials of most countries that flexible exchange rates—outside the narrow margins for day-to-day fluctuation that are sanctioned by the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.)—are neither desirable nor practical. For fluctuations in the price of a country's currency create costly uncertainties for the pricing of its exports and imports by the people who actually sell and buy them, and make more complex the investment decisions that ultimately determine how and where the goods will be produced. To be sure, efficient futures markets can provide some hedge against these exchange risks, but the cost of such protection might well be expected to become excessively burdensome in a world in which the exchange rates for all principal currencies were free to move widely against each other. Moreover, depreciation of the currency as a method of adjusting deficits in the balance of payments of any one country may be resisted by competing countries, leading to protective trade restrictions, or a series of competitive depreciations through official actions, to preserve national export markets.

Certainly the judgment of the world in 1944, when the International Monetary Fund was founded, was that the resulting impairment of trade and investment flows would more than offset any possible gain from a reduction of dependence on official reserves of international liquidity. That conclusion would be reinforced now by those who would see in such heightened uncertainties in the exchange markets a potentially disruptive influence on much that has been achieved since World War II in international monetary coöperation. To be sure, fluctuating rates are sometimes unavoidable in the developing countries, if their economies are being wracked with the distortions of serious inflation and no fixed parity can be effectively maintained until other causes of economic disorder can become more nearly settled. But even in those cases, the final objective, none the less, is a stable rate.

In short, the concept of fixed parities has become so much a part of the thinking and practice of most members of the I.M.F. that there seems little or no prospect for a consensus in favor of flexible exchange rates.

## v

Most financial officials are agreed—as the ministers of the ten countries which have pledged supplementary resources to the International Monetary Fund declared at their meeting of September 1962—that there is no over-all shortage of international liquidity at present. There are much wider differences of opinion on whether or not there is likely to be a shortage of international liquidity in five, ten or fifteen years. If the total of gold and official foreign exchange reserves (or their equivalent) were to rise as much over the next fifteen years as during the 1948–62 period, the world would need at least \$15 billion in new reserves, and there may be reasons for considering that an inadequate criterion. In view of the limited flow of newly produced gold into monetary reserves and the recent overstrain of the dollar, there is certainly enough basis for doubt concerning these future prospects to warrant much more thorough study of various possible projections of future availabilities and requirements.

Even before such studies are completed, however, the concept or meaning of international liquidity needs clarification. For there are three different meanings, and much unnecessary and unintentional disputation arises from confusion among them. One mean-

ing is related to the needs of trade; it refers to the availability of credit facilities for the financing of a growing volume of transactions among growing economies. In this sense, there clearly is not now, and is not likely to be over any foreseeable future period, a shortage of international liquidity. Exporter and importer credits are amply available in the national currencies of most of the large trading nations, and will be provided in dollars by many of them. Nor is there, because of the elasticity of these credit facilities, any close connection between the growth of reserves and the growth of world trade. It is notable that over the 1948-62 period, while known monetary reserves increased by about one-third, the known value of world trade more than doubled.

Thus, so far as commercial requirements are concerned, as the late Per Jacobsson pointed out often and forcefully, the expanding capabilities of the great banks of the principal trading nations, and the keen competition among them, assure that international trade will never languish for lack of credit. But underlying the flows of trade and capital are the national reserves of each country—reserves that must be drawn upon if seasonal or cyclical or accidental or structural and sustained factors bring about a cumulative total of outpayments that exceeds the total of inpayments received by the country as a whole. And these resources for settling the residual balances among countries represent the two other kinds of liquidity—the stock of actual reserves and the availability of borrowed reserves.

The “owned reserves” are customarily held by treasuries and central banks, which keep them in the form of gold or dollars or sterling, and to a limited extent in other convertible currencies. These reserves are acquired, of course, when a country runs an over-all balance-of-payments surplus. The total supply for the world as a whole is determined by the flow of new and dishoarded gold into monetary reserves and the amount of their currencies which the reserve-currency countries issue—either through acquiring gold and each other’s currencies or through running a balance-of-payments deficit. Because the dollar, while still generally a preferred medium of exchange and of settlement, has been paid out to foreign holders in unusually large amounts for the past five years and more, the world as a whole has found itself abundantly supplied with dollar liquidity. In this sense, too, there is no present shortage of international liquidity, although the longer-run prospects are not as clear.

Monetary authorities also may count in their reserves a part of their drawing (or borrowing) rights at the International Monetary Fund. And every member of the Fund reckons explicitly or implicitly on the further support given its own reserve position by the prospect of being able to draw on the Fund—though increasing constraint is imposed by the Fund as the amount drawn by a member rises relative to its quota. Outside the Fund itself, each country may, of course, develop any number of other borrowing relationships with other countries to obtain dollars or other currencies that could be used in case of need in settling its net deficit. For the most part, such arrangements have been short-term, for use in meeting immediate and sudden reserve losses, and, until recently, have been negotiated only at the time of need; they are subject to whatever conditions the creditor might wish to impose at that time.

It is the magnitude and conditions on which reserves may be borrowed which give rise to a great part of the concern that is expressed about the future adequacy of liquidity arrangements. Without implying any criticism of the way in which the International Monetary Fund is performing its presently agreed role, most of the critics center their suggestions on ways in which that role might be expanded. But before governments begin detailed study of other steps that might be considered for expanding liquidity in the future, it will be helpful to review some of the kinds of innovations that have already been introduced over the past two or three years for conserving or swapping or borrowing reserves. And before attempting that review, one other area of misunderstanding concerning international liquidity and its potentialities needs attention.

This is the relation, already mentioned, between the deficits which the United States itself is still incurring and the possibility of early relief through quick adoption of new arrangements for international liquidity. Much has been said and written to imply that a simple turning of wills toward the task could rather promptly produce a new system of credits that would free the United States from the balance-of-payments disciplines under which it is presently struggling. That is a mistaken impression. The United States has already, in its role as banker supplying dollars for the known official reserves of other countries, received some \$9 billion of financing for its deficits over the period 1948–62. In addition, some \$6 billion has been added to the working bal-

ances of foreign banks, business enterprises and individuals. The rest of the world has thus already provided in this way an impressive amount of automatic credit to the United States. No future arrangement is likely to grant more, any more readily, for a single period of sustained deficits. And while the current deficits continue, much of the remaining transitional financing of those deficits will probably have to be negotiated directly with the various countries whose payments positions are strong. That is why it is not possible under the pretext of any new kind of approach to international liquidity to escape the real necessity for balancing the United States' own accounts, as soon as that can practicably be done.

Clearly, if more reserves were available to finance deficits in the over-all balance of payments of countries whose economies may in the future be temporarily out of phase with other economies, the restorative processes of marketplace adjustment could have the time they need to bring the patterns of internal expansion into an orderly alignment with foreign markets, and reestablish a sustainable balance in international accounts. Without that time—that is, without larger reserves or reasonably sure access to borrowed reserves—it may persuasively be argued that some countries must proceed toward their own growth objectives in fits and starts—periodically halting or inhibiting domestic change by taking temporary measures to cut the balance-of-payments deficit.

This is, indeed, the basic case for assuring ample growth not only in the supply of actual reserves, but also in the facilities for borrowing them in relatively large amounts when needed. But there is another side of this picture which cannot be ignored. Added reserves may, to be sure, be used to purchase the time needed for a major internal readjustment that would, when completed, also restore international balance. But the same added reserves might, without some element of restraint or discipline, be used to finance a period of increasing internal inflation, during which the country might move even further away from a balance between its inpayments and outpayments with the outside world, and in the end face conditions of virtual bankruptcy.

The problems of nations are, in this general sense, little different from the familiar problems of individuals in the credit process. Too little credit (*i.e.* reserves or borrowing capacity) prevents the full development of an economically sound potential; ample credit

can make that potential a reality; but the mere assurance of credit does not guarantee such a result and abundant credit can indeed create an overextended position and lead to collapse. This is why, in any concept of the needs for liquidity, allowance must also be made for the need to preserve some check—some degree of creditor surveillance—in the allocating of reserves and the extension of facilities for borrowing them.

## VI

During the recent period of excessive deficits in the United States' balance of payments, the resulting large outflow of dollars has minimized any immediate pressure to enlarge further the aggregate supply of reserves becoming available for other countries. But there has been genuine concern over the desirability of adding to the gold component of monetary reserves, and active interest in promoting various kinds of facilities for borrowing reserves. As a result, effective joint operations have evolved in the London gold market; the United States has begun to hold other currencies alongside gold in its own reserves; the United States has undertaken forward operations in several leading currencies in collaboration with the central bank responsible for each; ten countries and the Bank for International Settlements have joined with the United States in establishing and using reciprocal currency arrangements (swaps); the United States, while borrowing dollars under special arrangements with three leading countries, has also borrowed from five in their own currencies; and a special arrangement has been made for adding up to \$6 billion of additional resources, in ten currencies, to the holdings of the International Monetary Fund, in case of need.

The operations in the London gold market, all conducted by the Bank of England, have been a model of informal coöperation, renewed through frequent consultation. Over nearly two years of these operations the speculative fever has largely been removed from transactions in gold and one international incident after another has brought only the moderate upswings in price that deter capricious speculation. And modest flows of gold have been resumed into the world's monetary reserves.

In beginning to hold other currencies in its own reserves, the United States has widened its capacity for versatile defense of the dollar, as well as opening one new way toward an expansion of liquidity during any future period of balance or surplus in the ex-

ternal accounts of the United States. The holding of foreign exchange balances is, of course, a prerequisite for the forward, swap and borrowing operations that will be described shortly. Each of them forms a part of the strengthened dollar defense system which is now capable of assuring adequate liquidity, and resisting speculative disturbance, during any forthcoming period of inter-governmental study of the international liquidity system as a whole. While outright acquisitions of other currencies will necessarily remain small as long as the United States continues in substantial deficit, these holdings may be relevant to the further evolution of the liquidity system. For if the United States' balance of payments should move into balance, or surplus, before a consensus should have formed around other arrangements for assuring the growth of usable reserves, then the readiness of the United States to acquire and hold other currencies will break through what might otherwise have seemed an impasse.

The United States must, of course, reestablish balance-of-payments equilibrium to maintain confidence in the strength of the dollar. Yet it is quite possible, once the flow of new dollars into monetary reserves ceases, that the present excess of dollars will be quickly absorbed and that the prospects of an imminent shortage of international liquidity will appear. With the United States then standing ready to add to the supply of dollars by purchasing other currencies in controlled amounts, there will be assurance of a way out if other sources of added liquidity should prove inadequate and if extensive use of facilities for the borrowing of reserves should prove unsuitable for the then existing needs. If inter-governmental studies of the liquidity system are actively spurred, general agreement on the outlines of future arrangements for liquidity should in any event have been reached before any such impasse materialized. It is important, none the less, to make clear that provision has been made for that contingency.

The clearest day-to-day use of United States holdings of any given currency is to enable us to join other monetary authorities in maintaining orderly conditions in the foreign exchange markets—a function formerly left to foreign authorities, but one which is now seen to be as much a part of the defense of the dollar as it is of protection for the other leading currencies. And for those currencies in which active forward markets exist, vis-à-vis the dollar, the more effective steadying influence may often be exerted through official transactions in these markets.

These operations are being described at regular intervals in articles written by Charles A. Coombs, the Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who has done more than any other person in establishing and employing all of the new monetary arrangements. He and three of his colleagues in the central banks of Germany, Italy and Switzerland have also published in the August issue of the New York Federal Reserve Bank's *Monthly Review* a thoughtful survey of the possibilities which they see in these various new arrangements for the further strengthening of the international monetary system.

From the point of view of the functioning of the system as a whole, perhaps the most significant aspect of forward operations is the way in which they can be used to minimize flows into and out of reserves. They can make sheer speculation in currencies less rewarding, while making trade financing or short-term investment abroad less hazardous for the banks and businesses of countries in a strong balance-of-payments position. In this fundamental sense, the growing network of international forward operations by the central banks or treasuries of the leading countries is itself adding another dimension to the world's liquidity system.

The new ring of reciprocal currency arrangements, or swaps, can also provide useful backstopping both for "spot" and for "forward" operations in other countries. Under these arrangements, the United States agrees with other countries, on a stand-by basis, that each will make available its own currency up to a specified amount on the request of the other. The requesting country puts a corresponding amount of its currency to the credit of the other country as well. And both enter, simultaneously, on activation of the swap, into forward contracts to assure the reversal of the transaction at agreed rates of exchange in 90 days, or some other convenient period, unless renewed. No activated swaps have been renewed for a cumulative outstanding period exceeding one year; most have been reversed much sooner. But they do provide either country, in case of need, with quick and virtually automatic access to previously agreed amounts of the other's currency.

It is these arrangements, and a comparable lending of dollars to the United Kingdom by continental central banks when the pound was under pressure, that have formed the strong center of the coöperative actions that have withstood every outbreak of potential monetary disorder for more than two years. They may not in the end be found to provide an adequate answer to the

world's long-run need for liquidity, but they are a powerful bulwark today—making borrowed reserves available to supplement the owned reserves of the leading industrial countries which have joined the ring.

In addition, an outer ring of borrowings has been established for the further defense of the dollar, thus reinforcing the existing monetary system. This is the latest in the sequence of innovations evolved out of experience through the joint efforts of other leading countries and the United States. Borrowings by the Treasury over the past year have been made in foreign currencies from foreign governments for terms generally of 15 months or longer. Borrowings from central banks have been made (subject to special conditions) both in dollars and in foreign currencies and, though varying in maturity, these now also generally exceed 15 months, with most clustering around two years, and one case for unusual reasons extending to five years. Three important aspects of this innovation have particular relevance to any further evolution of the present monetary system.

One is that these arrangements permit a surplus country, in effect, to lend its excessive accruals of reserves to a debtor country. This means that, with the characteristically wider reserve swings to be expected among many countries under conditions of convertibility, a partial substitute has been found for the maintenance of proportionally much larger reserve balances over the years ahead. To be sure, there has been no effort to generalize this approach as between other countries, and there may even be reservations by some countries over lending reserves in this way to the United States. But since several countries have made such arrangements with the United States, with satisfaction thus far, it is clear that a tested facility exists, as a supplement to the borrowing provided for through the I.M.F., for adding to effective liquidity by lending and borrowing existing reserves between creditor and debtor countries. Of course, this is not automatically available credit, so far as the deficit country is concerned, but it has been and can be obtained if the program for restoring balance in the deficit country is considered reasonably promising.

A second significant feature is the denomination of borrowings by the United States Treasury in the other currency. To be offered a medium-term debt instrument by a responsible government, with the obligation denominated in the creditor country's own currency, provides a unique attraction for any creditor country that

may be reluctant to go on accruing dollars. And to the United States, the acquisition of other currencies through borrowing has been a logical supplement to the use of swaps, for meeting situations that are not expected to be reversible within one year.

The third feature of particular relevance is the special design used for central banks. The central bank holder of one of these United States' obligations receives interest at the rate appropriate to its full maturity, and would expect to hold it for that term. But to provide for extraordinary developments that might impose an unexpected drain on the central bank's reserves, and also to satisfy the conventional liquidity requirements of some central banks, the instrument can, at the option of the central bank holder, be converted on notice into a 90-day certificate, and that in turn, on two days' notice, into cash—the central bank's own currency. Thus, by creating a new secondary reserve instrument for the central banks of countries in a strong balance-of-payments position, the United States has made it possible for them to put some of their current reserve accruals into a form of cold storage. They are distinct from the active reserves of dollars held for possible current use. They are available as a possible source of additional dollars, at some time in the future, when the particular country or the world at large has again encountered a "dollar" or "liquidity" shortage.

It is but a logical extension of the borrowing concept that the United States should, within the existing procedures of the International Monetary Fund, have requested and received, effective July 22, 1963, a one-year stand-by authorization to borrow from the Fund, as needed, up to \$500,000,000, in other convertible currencies. This will enlarge the scope within which the Fund can in effect absorb dollars corresponding to repayments of obligations to the Fund by its members, and in this way avoid additions to the large dollar holdings of surplus countries.

In addition to all these innovations, there has, of course, been the remarkable agreement of the ten leading countries to supplement the I.M.F.'s resources with up to \$6 billion in their own currencies. The unifying experience of this action has already begun to weld among the financial officials of all ten countries an identification of common interest in the functioning of the international monetary system. Together with the regular participation of all members in the work of the I.M.F., and the crucial role filled by the work of the Bank for International Settlements and the meet-

ings of central bankers held there, a flourishing climate of collaboration and confrontation has been created. This has also been systematized at the working level in the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development. Clearly, the experience gained through these joint labors in establishing new defenses—and in maintaining, criticizing and improving them—has greatly heightened the understanding and expertise essential for fruitful collaboration in appraising any further possible reform in the functioning of the monetary system.

## VII

The course of any further study among governments will no doubt move across, with much deeper penetration, many of the subjects already lightly sketched here. Much time will also probably be spent in dissecting the details of plan after plan that has been proposed and revised during the extended academic and popular discussions of these matters. But the main lines of inquiry can probably be summarized in four groupings:

(1) Continue the present gold-dollar-sterling-I.M.F. system as the means of providing reserves, but actively enlarge the coöperative credit arrangements that have been recently developed for making fuller use of existing reserves.

(2) Endorse (1) but also enlarge the resources of the I.M.F. and the drawing rights of its members, and increase its flexibility in using these resources as a further supplement to reserve availabilities.

(3) Endorse either (1) or (2) or both, but also establish a new grouping of some of the other leading currencies as a complement or alternative to the roles now performed by the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies.

(4) With or without (1) or (2) or (3), reconstitute the I.M.F. by endowing it with the capacity to create credit and the power to allocate such credit among members.

There is not, of course, any reason to presume that daring or revolutionary approaches will in fact emerge for the future. The process of evolution may very well take us where we want to go. But the needed preconditions have been established for wide-ranging governmental consideration of any possible needs, and of practical operating procedures for fulfilling them, without setting off speculative disturbances based on market apprehensions that there might be grave shortcomings in present arrangements. Nor need there now be any implication that the United States would itself be seeking only a short-run palliative for its present imbalance, under the guise of a full-scale reconsideration of the

monetary system as a whole. As President Kennedy stated, in his message of July 18, 1963, "We do not pretend that talk of long-range reform of the system is any substitute for the actions that we ourselves must take now."

The Bretton Woods system is nearing the end of its second decade, a decade of remarkable achievement. Particularly in recent years, it has shown an impressive capacity to evolve and develop in response to rapidly changing needs. And the European industrial nations have now nearly completed five eventful years of convertibility. It is therefore a matter of simple prudence to take stock—to make a systematic and searching appraisal of the international monetary system—asking whether a continuation of recent evolutionary changes, or more sweeping reforms, will be needed for the probable dimensions of future requirements. This is a matter not for the United States alone, but for review by many countries, singly and through the various international financial organizations in which they participate.

Such an examination should lead to an evaluation of a wide range of proposals and suggestions, from a truly international point of view. The issue in such an international review is whether the present mixture of gold, dollars, sterling and I.M.F. facilities can in the future provide the ample supply of reserves and credits that a healthy growing world economy should have, or whether major changes are going to be needed. The issue is also whether—if any particular change should be considered necessary—that change will be able to support added growth that is real, without contributing to monetary excesses and economic instability. The resolution of such a set of issues does not rest on the mere willingness of governments to vote yes or no on whether more international liquidity would be desirable. The primary task must be one of scrupulous preparation, within and among governments, looking toward a definitive appraisal by the governments themselves. Only in this way can these issues be resolved into a clear, reliable and workable consensus.

## NEAR EASTERN NATIONALISM YESTERDAY AND TODAY

*By Albert Hourani*

EARLY in the nineteenth century, there began in the Near East a change from one system of social thought to another. The old system started from the idea that there is some principle which stands above the state and society, guiding and judging the life of society and the actions of governments; it found this principle in the teachings of a revealed religion, Islam. The new system also believed that a principle existed, but it thought it could be found by human reason. From this idea it derived a program of action which could, in some circumstances, be one of revolution: if the institutions of society are not what reason says they should be, men are not obliged to obey them; rather, they should replace them by others more rational and remake the social world in the light of their image of perfection.

This is the obvious way of describing the change, but in fact it has gone deeper. In the Near East as elsewhere, men's minds have moved not only from the idea that the principles of social action are religious to the idea that they are rational, but also from the idea that there *are* such principles, standing above society, to the idea that society is its own judge and master, that the principles by which it should live are generated within itself, change as it changes, that its own interest is the supreme principle.

To put it crudely, the first change—the formation of the idea that there are eternal truths about society to be discovered by reason—was the work of the eighteenth century. The second was the work of the nineteenth, and was the product of many factors: the desire of thinkers to “close the revolutionary age,” to find a principle which would justify necessary change without establishing the tyranny of abstract ideas; the philosophy of Hegel and the great sciences and half-sciences which sprang from it—historiography, mythology, anthropology, sociology; the exploration of the world, revealing the variety of human beliefs and practices; the study of geology and biology; the effect of such changes on religious beliefs—the growth of a discipline of biblical criticism, the emergence of doubts about whether revelation could be literally accepted in the light of what science was thought to say about the origin and development of the world.

From such sources came the characteristic idea, almost the religion, of the nineteenth century—the belief in cosmic process or activity. The essence of the universe was thought to be change or process; this change tended in a certain direction—from less to more complex forms, unconsciousness to full self-consciousness, the externally determined to the self-determined—and it contained within itself its own efficient and final causes, was moved by an inner force toward a goal which was not beyond itself but its own highest stage. This belief could form the basis of a conservative theory of politics and society, and such indeed was its appeal to those who feared above all the revolutionary spirit released into the world in 1789. But it could also carry with it a program of revolutionary action, and inspire men to destroy those institutions which no longer expressed the spirit of the age and to replace them by others, in the conviction that they were helping the forward movement of the universe.

In Europe and America, of course, such ideas did not arise suddenly or erupt into a stable society organized on different principles. They came as companions of a vast social change which was already taking place, the growth of industry and the city. But when they first came to the Near East it was to a society not yet touched by the change and sheltered by a different system of thought. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, those in the Near East who thought about society and government believed for the most part in the primacy of revelation—in the existence of an ideal system of social morality derived from Islam. During the first Islamic centuries most Muslims had accepted the authority of the Caliph, the successor of Muhammad, not indeed as prophet but as ruler of the Muslim community, holding temporal authority with a religious sanction and ruling in accordance with revealed law. But Islam too had had its revolutionary age; the authority of the Caliph had weakened, the political unity of Islam had broken up, and orthodox beliefs and laws had been put in question by new ideas. This age had ended with the growth of a new social and political system. The Mamluke state of Egypt and Syria and its successor the Ottoman Empire were very different from the Caliphate of earlier days. They were based on force and the solidarity of a professional or ethnic group—in the Mamluke state a group of military freedmen from the Caucasus, in the Ottoman state a military and official class, of Turkish language but, in the great days, largely of slave origin.

The older political theories of Islam had grown up around the institution of the Caliphate; but with these new states came a new type of thought. From the revolutionary age, later Muslim thinkers derived a lasting horror of chaos. Anarchy and disorder must be avoided to preserve the fabric of Islamic society. All governments should therefore be obeyed, but that did not mean that all were alike. Some of them were just. But what did it mean to be a just government? Those who thought seriously about it knew that the universal Caliphate of earlier times had ended. But something else remained, the Shari'a, the system of social morality and law derived by rational process from the Quran and the Traditions of what Muhammad and his companions had done and said; and it was by their attitude toward the Shari'a that governments could be regarded as just or unjust. If the ruler upheld it, did nothing which went clearly against it, respected and consulted the *'ulama*, the men learned in religious sciences and law, his rule was just, no matter how it had begun, and Muslims should obey and coöperate actively with it. But if the ruler were unjust the devout should show their disapproval, by exhortation or silent withdrawal, although not so as to disturb the public peace.

Behind this doctrine lay a belief in an invisible order which would reverse the injustices of the world. By the eighteenth century most devout Muslims belonged to one or other of the brotherhoods of mystics, and the mystics believed in the existence of an invisible hierarchy of saints by whose intercession with God the order of the world was maintained. This belief in an invisible order of perfection might be interpreted in a revolutionary way, and there was in popular Islamic thought a revolutionary strain—the belief in a *mahdi*, a man sent by God to overturn the kingdoms of the world and open the final age of peace and justice. But in spite of occasional outbursts the political influence of the orders of mystics was in the direction of quietism and patient acceptance rather than revolt.

This was so because, while Muslims might disapprove of specific acts of Ottoman rulers, and even depose one Sultan and replace him by another, they did not doubt that the Ottoman state was a just Islamic state. The Sultans respected and consulted the *'ulama*, supported the courts where Islamic law was dispensed, organized the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities, protected the more orthodox of the orders of mystics. Under the Sultans, the ad-

herents of other religions, the Christians of various kinds and the Jews, had religious freedom under their own spiritual heads and a civil position which was usually bearable and sometimes favored. There was thus a certain harmony between the political system and the prevailing political ideas. This left no room for new ideas to penetrate from Europe.

These ideas did not begin to have influence until there took place a change in the position of the Ottoman Empire: its growing weakness in face of Europe's growing strength. That the Empire could not defend itself against the forces of a European power was shown during the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, when a Russo-Greek fleet sailed the eastern Mediterranean and carried out landings in Greece and at Beirut. A generation later a French force occupied Egypt at the heart of the Muslim world and was dislodged only with the help of another European power. A generation later still the Greek subjects of the Sultan revolted and, with the support of Europe, a Greek national state was established. Other subject peoples were encouraged by this to hope that what the Greeks had done they could do too, and the Ottoman government saw that, if it were to prevent this, it must reform itself. During the next century a not unsuccessful attempt at reform was made. A new army and administration were created; a new system of laws, derived from those of Europe, was set up beside the Shari'a, and implicit in it was a new principle—that all citizens, whether they were Muslims or not, had equal rights and were full members of the political community.

To administer the new laws and institutions a new class had to be created—of officials, officers and technicians. In Istanbul and in two Arab provincial centers, Cairo and Tunis, where practically autonomous governments carried out a similar policy, professional schools were set up and students were also sent to Europe to study. From those who acquired a European education there sprang the first groups of modern thinkers, Turks and Arabs, in the generation which flourished roughly from 1830 to 1870. A little apart from them stood another group, Arabic-speaking Christians of Lebanon and Syria educated in French and American mission schools.

To some extent the purpose of all these groups was one: they wanted to explain why Europe was strong and the East was weak. They tended to give the same explanation—one cast in terms of modern science and invention but also of moral factors,

of the political freedom and justice which Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans enjoyed. But when they asked how the Near East could become strong a certain difference appeared. The older thinkers were at heart Islamic conservatives and thought that the necessary reforms could be introduced from above by benevolent autocracy; but a little later there began a call for constitutional rule, and a short-lived constitution was granted in Tunisia in 1864 and an Ottoman constitution in 1876. There was a difference also between the Muslim thinkers and the Lebanese Christians. Christian writers tended to support secularization but Muslims on the whole did not; their aim was rather to show that the characteristic institutions of modern Europe—democratic government, patriotic loyalty, legal reform—were permitted by Islam, if only Islam were rightly understood.

The writers of this age thought of liberal Europe as an ally in the work of reform, but soon a time came when they had also to think of her as a danger. In the next generation, stretching roughly from 1870 to 1900, the position of the Ottoman countries grew worse. In the eastern crisis of the 1870s the center of the Empire was threatened by European power; at the fringes, France occupied Tunisia in 1881, Britain occupied Egypt the next year, the Russians advanced in central Asia. First the Bulgarians and then the Armenians revolted in the hope that Europe would intervene to help them, and the Bulgarians at least succeeded. Such events gave strength to the desire for reform.

By now there was a new generation of thinkers more European in their culture, and among them two new intellectual movements arose. The Young Turks, and those Arabs who thought like them, believed that what the Empire needed was political change: a revival of the constitution, the spread of real equality and Ottoman patriotism. But there were others who maintained that political reform by itself would do nothing, and what alone could save the Empire and the Muslim peoples was Islam itself. To some extent those who talked of Islamic revival and Pan-Islam were really talking about politics, and wanted to create a political movement of defense against the advance of Europe. But a few of them meant something different: a real revival of Islam as a religious system.

Here we come on a strange figure, that of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who in a life of incessant movement and activity left a deep mark on the Muslims of his generation. In his political ac-

tivity, his calls for unity against British aggression, he may seem like a modern nationalist, but there is something also which recalls an older type of political action. He was not a democrat or constitutionalist on principle; what he wanted was rather the typical Islamic combination of a religious reformer and a strong ruler. He was modern, however, in his thought about the direction of reform. Muslims should become part of the modern world, and the modern world had two bases, reason and worldly activity aiming at progress. In his view these were of the essence of the true Islam, which taught the primacy of reason and the duty of activity in pursuit of the goods of this world and the next. By returning to the truth of their religion Muslims would acquire the sources of strength in the modern world.

Such ideas were given a serious theological basis by his disciples: Muhammad 'Abduh and the Syrian Rashid Rida in Egypt, and others in other countries. Their work was intended to convince Muslims with a modern education that they could still be Muslims, and to save them from having to live in two worlds at once—one derived from the principles of Islam and the other from those of European thought. In some ways they changed the emphasis of Jamal al-Din's thought. Thus his idea that Islam meant activity was developed into a criticism of the mystical orders as causes of intellectual sloth and political quietism. More than a century earlier there had been a violent movement of protest against mysticism and return to the early faith—the Wahabi movement in Arabia, which exerted continuing influence.

But the weakening of the hold of the brotherhoods may have helped to weaken the link between the educated class and the people. Such thinkers as 'Abduh tried also to define the role of reason in religious law and the changes which should be made to adapt the Shari'a to the needs of modern life. Their aim was to create a modern unified Shari'a and prevent the growth of a gap between two parts of social life, one where religious law ruled and one where secular law ruled. But here again their work had an unforeseen effect. By reducing the dogmas of Islam to a simple system they also reduced the difference between Islam and other religions, or even between Islam and the high-minded agnosticism of Victorian Europe; and by justifying the idea of legal and social change, without being able to provide principles clear enough to control the change, they opened the way to new and more effective principles drawn from the advanced thought of Europe.

## II

This was the way taken by thinkers of the next generation which came to maturity in the years after 1900: Egyptians like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Turks like Ziya Gökalp. They were Muslims—in education to some extent, and certainly in tradition, feeling and intention. The Egyptian group at least would have called themselves disciples of ‘Abduh and said that their aim was his: to reform Muslim society in accordance with the true spirit of Islam. But they had had a different education and had a wider grasp of European thought; and they lived in an age when the inexorable development of law, of administration and of economic life was bringing about a *de facto* separation of the religious and secular spheres. What they thought they were doing was to take the principles of the true Islam as they conceived it and apply them to the problems of society—to improving the position of women, reforming the schools, laying the foundations of democratic government and creating national industries. But the basis of their thought had changed, whether they quite knew it or not. When they talked of the rights of women or the importance of democracy they could point to verses of the Quran or Traditions of the Prophet which justified the changes they suggested, but that was not the reason why they suggested them. They had all been influenced by the European idea that there is a sphere of religion and a sphere of secular life, and the principles they appealed to for the reform of secular life were human, rational ones—individual rights, civilization, social utility.

Among the principles which they appealed to were those of national unity and independence. They did not, of course, invent nationalism; as soon as Near Eastern statesmen and thinkers began to ask what was the secret of Europe’s power, they noticed the national unity of European states and the strength of national loyalties, and this factor became ever more important in their minds as the Balkan Christian subjects of the Empire obtained their national independence. But the idea did not become an important political force in the Muslim parts of the Empire until the first part of this century, with the rise of Egyptian opposition to British rule and Persian opposition to Russian influence, the growing division between Turks and Arabs after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the emergence from its ruins of the independent

state of Turkey, the establishment of British and French mandatory rule in the former Arab provinces, and the increase of Zionist immigration into Palestine.

Since the idea of nationalism came in from outside it was not always clear what it meant. In the years between 1900 and 1940 there were two different types of national idea (which could, however, live together in any particular national movement). On one side stood the territorial nationalism which is linked with a specific piece of land, and on the other that which is linked with a group possessing some kind of cultural, ethnic or racial unity. In general, the Persian, Turkish, Egyptian and Lebanese nationalisms of this period belonged to the first type, Arab nationalism to the second. But to say this is to simplify too much. It was only slowly that modern Turkish nationalism emerged from a movement of the second type, Pan-Turanism; and by 1940 Egyptian territorial patriotism was changing into Arab ethnic nationalism. Arab nationalism itself took its present form only gradually. Behind it, in the nineteenth century, lay a "Syrian" patriotic movement of the first type, and signs of this still existed in the 1930s. Few of the Arab nationalist writers of the time would have included in the Arab nation all who spoke Arabic—Egyptians, Sudanese, North Africans; with some exceptions, they identified the Arab nation with a specific territory—Syria in the geographical sense, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula.

Modern nationalism enshrines a secular principle, but in this generation the nationalism of the Near East was not wholly secular. To evoke a distant past is a way of revolting against the immediate past, and in most nationalist movements there was a tendency to go back beyond Islam to an earlier period: Turks looked back to the Hittites, Egyptians to the Pharaohs, Lebanese to the Phoenicians. But for the most part this was a passing phase. Even the violent secularism of Turkey in the time of Atatürk did not dissolve the link between the Turkish nation and Islam, and to be a Turk still meant to be a Muslim. In the apparently stable countries like Turkey, Egypt and Persia, based on territorial patriotism, there was a submerged religious feeling not coterminous with the nation, which could emerge at moments of crisis. In Turkey in the 1950s there was a burst of revolutionary activity expressing itself through a religious order, the Tijaniyya; and in Egypt there grew up a religious movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which, although not anti-nationalist,

maintained that beyond an Egyptian's duty to Egypt there lay his allegiance to Islam and his loyalty to the Muslim people.

The position of Arab nationalism was more complicated. The tendency to secularism was strong, all the more so because Arab Christians had played a part in the formation of modern ideas. They laid their emphasis on such factors as language, which united them with their Muslim neighbors; and Muslim Arab nationalists too wanted a national idea which could include the Christians. But the religious foundation of Arab nationalism was strong. The sense of the past which lies at the heart of any national movement could not, among the Arabs, be anything but a sense of the Islamic past. Few Arab Muslims would have made a separation between religion and nation so complete as that made by Atatürk, and even Arab Christians who became Arab nationalists often did so through identifying themselves with the Islamic past, in the sense that Islam was what the Arabs had done in history.<sup>1</sup>

In another sense, too, the nationalism of this period was not completely secular. In the Near East as in Europe, it had grown in a certain intellectual soil, as one of a number of ideas closely linked with each other. For most thinkers of the time, national independence was not the final aim; the nation was the servant of something universal. They might express it in different ways. Rashid Rida justified his nationalism in religious terms—an Arab revival was necessary for an Islamic revival; Atatürk would not have used such words, but he, too, saw Turkish independence as a step toward something else—the creation in Turkey of a modern civilization based on rational principles. The nationalist movements of this time had a content derived for the most part from the thought of liberal Europe: to be a nationalist meant to believe in constitutional government, universal education, the rights of women and intellectual freedom. At the heart of the national idea there lay an idea of individual virtue, as the foundation of the strength of states and the final cause of their existence.

### III

The years before 1939 seem in retrospect to belong to a different age of history. This is not only because of the end of Euro-

<sup>1</sup> By no means all Arabic-speaking Christians took this path, however. The Islamic basis of Arab nationalism made many of them uneasy, and led them to try to create a separate Lebanese state where Christians would not have to make the compromises all minorities must make.

pean domination of the world, although that by itself would be important enough to mark the passing of an age. There are other changes which have taken place all over the world and which are themselves in a sense the final product of European power. They can be described in many ways. We can point, for example, to the growth of population and of the industrial city, with its problems of people living close together and far from their roots; to the growth also of the educated population, claiming to take an active part in the political process and open to the power of abstract ideas; to the acquisition by Near Eastern states of real independence. Independence has often led to instability, and that for various reasons: because of the absence of a political tradition which encourages the army to take power as the only force standing above sectional interests; because, once independence is achieved, the relations of social forces with each other and with the government have to be redefined; because of the absence of the restraining and stabilizing power of an imperial government; and, in some Arab countries, because of a discrepancy between the frontiers of the state and those of the dominant national idea.

All this needs no further explanation, but what deserves analysis is the growth of a new type of political and social thought relevant to such problems of the new age. Its characteristic problem is no longer that of the difference between "east" and "west." The "west" may be thought of as technically more advanced, or as a political danger, but it is no longer thought of as having a "secret" which Asians and Africans must learn if they are to make progress; our new concepts of "developed" and "developing" peoples are different from the older concepts of "east" and "west," "progressive" and "stagnant," "civilized" and "barbaric." The tension between tradition and modernity, which underlay the thought of 'Abduh and his disciples, has either disappeared from the mind of educated men or changed its form. They may be conscious of their own national or religious tradition, anxious to preserve its culture or its social forms or what they regard as its private virtues; but they would not regard it as able to teach them how to organize a government or an army, an industry or a school. The idea of a specifically Islamic government is put forward more rarely. There have been and still are Islamic political movements, from the Pan-Islamic movement of the nineteenth century to its successors today; but in practice they are modern not traditional movements, and their aim is not so much to restore the rule of

virtue and religion as to mobilize feeling in order to defend or achieve a position of power. In our days we have seen an attempt to create an Islamic republic in Pakistan, but it has been no easier there than elsewhere to establish a form of government based on Islam and capable of meeting the needs of modern life.

The idea of an Islamic society, moreover, seems to have lost its hold on most educated people. They are no longer conscious of a tension between how modern thought says they should live and how the Shari'a says they should live. The hold of the Shari'a over society has grown weaker. Already in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries new civil, criminal and commercial codes were introduced in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, British India and elsewhere, and the hold of the Shari'a was confined to matters of personal status. In the last generation there have been inroads even in this sphere. Turkey abolished the Muslim law of personal status in the 1920s; Tunisia forbade polygamy a few years ago; Egypt has absorbed the religious courts into the general legal system.<sup>2</sup>

In these states and societies in process of modernization, the universal language is that of nationalism. But nationalism is not by itself a system of principles by which a state or a society can be organized; for that it must depend on the other ideas it can attract and absorb. Here too there has been a change in the last 20 years. When a man in the Near East says he is a nationalist today he does not necessarily mean, as he would probably have done a generation ago, that he believes in constitutional government and the rights of individuals. Not that he would positively disbelieve in them, but his attention has shifted to national aims which he would regard as more urgent. He might well describe them in terms of "socialism," "neutralism" and "unity," and know more or less clearly what he meant by them. By "socialism" (or some other term roughly equivalent to it) he would mean the extension of schools and social services, reform of land ownership, and the rapid development of industry under control of the government—for only the government, with its authority and its access to foreign capital, could industrialize the country

<sup>2</sup> But the change should not be exaggerated. There is a distinction in Muslim jurisprudence between acts of worship and social acts, and no government, however strong, could introduce changes in the first without meeting strong opposition. This was shown in 1960 when the Tunisian Government tried to discourage Muslims from fasting during Ramadan. The fast is one of the essential acts of devotion, and one in which the Muslim world becomes conscious of its unity and its links with the past, and the government's action aroused much criticism.

as quickly as he wishes.<sup>8</sup> By "neutralism" he would mean, essentially, that he would not wish his country, having achieved independence, to fall into a new sort of political or economic dependence; neutralism is an expression of the difference between the ways in which a weak state and a great power look at the world. By "unity" an Arab would mean not simply that a number of states if united would be stronger than any one of them by itself (which is indeed a doubtful proposition). He would be talking not about strength but about legitimacy: he would not regard the state as having an unconditional claim upon him unless it could call itself an Arab state.

Until a few years ago, most Near Eastern countries were the scene of a deep conflict between these ideas and another, older conception of nationalism: monarchic and hierarchic in political views, pro-Western in foreign policy, more cautious and traditional in social matters, more individualist in economic policy. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria have each had a national revolution, and although many changes may be expected it seems unlikely that any of them will return to the old political system. In Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller states of the Arabian peninsula the conflict continues, but it seems probable that it will end in the same way. In Israel and Turkey, faced with rather different problems, the ruling elements have each in their own way achieved a certain underlying unity, based on overriding common interests, the pressure of an enemy on the frontier, and the existence of a common concept of society. In Lebanon, a deep division between different parts of the population, in regard to relations with the West and to the internal structure of the country, is precariously bridged by a general will that the state should survive as an independent country, and by reluctance to push differences to the point where another civil war like that of 1958 might break out.

There remain Persia and Morocco, where the conflict is still raging and it is difficult to see how it will end. In both countries, the monarchs have shown some skill in keeping control of the government and leadership of part of the nationalist forces; but they have paid the price of being drawn into the heart of the conflict, so that any movement against the régime shakes the throne and the structure of the state. With these exceptions,

<sup>8</sup> A new and perhaps important development, however, is the establishment of a corporation to invest Kuwaiti funds in private enterprises in the Near East.

however, the Near East seems to be moving into a phase where the ruling and educated classes, in any one country, are reasonably united on fundamentals. This does not mean, of course, that there are no political differences; the conflict of views which has shown itself, for example, in recent discussions on Arab unity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq is far more than personal or regional. But it does not reach down to the most fundamental problems of the nature of society and the state.

Beneath the surface, however, there are grave weaknesses in the Near Eastern bodies politic. The new content of nationalism provides a program of action but not a moral ideal by which actions can be judged—an ideal of political virtue and its concomitant, an idea of individual rights. Partly this is due to the new and necessary emphasis on social and economic development. When it organizes a large part of economic life and wants to bring about very rapid economic change, the government is apt to regard the individual as a statistical unit and all forms of private association as obstacles to its plans. In an age of planning, there is a danger that the state will come to control everything, and the need is great for some principle on which individual rights can be securely based, or for some institution which can defend them. This can scarcely be found in the Near East today, partly because of the decline in the influence of the Shari'a, but also because of the absence of stable political institutions; for in an age which on the whole is not one of fervent, unquestioned religious faith, a system of old, tried, accepted institutions, of ways in which power is exercised and limited, is a school of political virtue and a shield for the individual.

There is another danger which in the end may be even greater. While there is broad agreement within a large section of the ruling and educated class, there is also perhaps a greater gap between them and the mass of the people than once there was—a gap in power and in education. In most countries of the Near East, although in some more than others, there is growing up a new ruling élite isolated by power and education from the mass of the people. In Turkey, for example, those who become government officials, officers or professional men seem to be absorbed into a special, consciously isolated class who call themselves the "enlightened." The movement of economic and social development, in its first stage at least, may strengthen the position of this limited class; it may improve their standard of living faster than

that of the people, and will certainly give them a vast power over the life of society. For their part, the mass of the people may find in the policy and nationalist ideas of this class neither a real profit nor an ideal which satisfies the human desire for justice. If this happens, there may rise to the surface a new type of revolutionary spirit; there were signs of it in Iraq after the *coup d'état* of 1958. Up to a point this new spirit may find old channels of expression. The idea of the Muslim community is still alive in the popular mind; the mystical orders are still alive, although not among the educated; and inherent in this popular Islam is an ideal of revolutionary justice and of human virtue. To some extent the new revolutionary governments try to appeal to this religious spirit and its ideals, and if they do so it is not only for purposes of propaganda but because of something still present in the minds of the rulers; but it is not certain that the kind of secular nationalist program which they offer will in the long run keep the allegiance of the masses.

Marxism, too, has its idea of revolutionary justice, of the nation and the state. Among the educated class Marxist ideas have had some success in the last few years. It is difficult to say how much, because to a great extent the process takes place underground; so far as open manifestations are concerned, Marxism seems to have spread mainly in the diluted form which has become part of the semi-official ideology of Egypt and other countries. This is compatible with nationalism and indeed gives it part of its present content. But between a full Marxist system and the new nationalist system of ideas there is conflict not only on principles but in regard to policy. This was seen in the Algerian war; it has been seen in Iraq in the last few years in regard to land reform and Kurdish policy. Wherever Marxism and nationalism have been in conflict, so far it is the latter which has proved to be the more successful. But its victory is fragile at best. In Iraq the balance of forces is still precarious; in Persia, should the present régime be overthrown, it is not certain that the nationalist groups would be able to lead and control the forces which revolution would unleash. Even in countries where the present régime seems stronger, it may be we have not seen the end of the matter. If the people no longer expect anything from their nationalist rulers, and if Marxist doctrines could penetrate the tradition of popular revolutionary Islam, what now seems stable might prove not to be so.


## SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

*By Carlton Skinner*

**W**HAT area of the world has given the Western nations the least trouble since World War II? What is the only large geographic area of the world without significant Communist penetration? What is the only underdeveloped area of the world in which the Western nations have the active sympathetic support of the native populations? What large area of the world having great strategic value for the weapons systems on which the Western nations now rely is under Western control and wants to remain so? What area of the world receives the least monetary aid from the United States in relation to size or American interest?

The answer to all these questions is the Pacific Ocean islands and surrounding waters which are represented internationally in the South Pacific Commission. Embracing 20 percent of the earth's surface and about one-ninth of 1 percent of its population, the area ranges from Norfolk Island just north of New Zealand to the Marianas, which extend to within 1,000 miles of Japan; and from Palau, about 500 miles from the Philippines, eastward across the international date line nearly 7,000 miles to the little island of Ducie, which has approximately the same longitude as San Francisco. These islands are in varying stages of economic and cultural development, from completely primitive life in the interior of Australian New Guinea to the sophisticated resort economy of Tahiti and the space-age military bases in Guam. The inhabitants include illiterate tribesmen who have not learned how to use the wheel and graduates of the best universities of France, England, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. They are intelligent, sincere and sensible. The majority of them have a lively appreciation of the complexities of the world in which they live, and perhaps because they dwell in an area accustomed to air and ocean travel of all types, they are generally alert to world developments.

The present auspicious political climate in Pacific Oceania is the more surprising because most of the mistakes that were made in Africa and Asia during the colonial era were duplicated in the Pacific Islands. Labor was recruited, transferred to strange lands



under indentures and used as property. Lands were seized. Europeans, particularly in the British, American and Dutch colonies, formed tight little communities of expatriates; the white planter in the white linen suit with gin and tonic in hand was not merely a stereotype of fiction. The colonial services told the "natives" what was good for them and facilitated exploitation of agricultural and commercial resources by absentee owners. Additionally, the missionaries considered this the most fertile and safest field for their ministries and they changed customs, habits and family life without regard for the consequences; they even established absolute theocracies. Yet, with all this upending of island living patterns there was enough good will on the part of Western peoples and enough understanding and appreciation by the islanders of Western standards and achievements that the peoples of the area are today sympathetic to the West and look to it alone for the help they need.

Here one finds little of the attitude so prevalent elsewhere that independence will miraculously build new houses for everyone and provide a clean water supply, electric lights and a big automobile. Instead, one finds a mixture of doubt and hope, and a questioning as to how they can get, keep and maintain the things they want, such as schools, good houses, electric lights and running water. Political development, while strongly influenced by tribal organization, is surprisingly sophisticated. Democratic institutions are well planted; elected councils, legislative bodies, courts of law, secret ballots and universal suffrage are well established in most areas. While these islands are almost all defined as "non-self-governing"—the criterion for the coverage of the South Pacific Commission—most of them manage their own affairs and have a degree of self-government substantially in excess of that of many countries in the United Nations.

Perhaps the earliest to come under Western influence were Guam and the Marianas, which received Catholic priests and Spanish soldiers in the 1600s. Others like New Caledonia were not under European influence until the late 1800s. Both the Germans and the Spanish were active for long periods but were driven out by war and purchase. The Japanese, who succeeded the Germans, were ousted in World War II. The present grouping of responsibility is roughly:

UNITED STATES—Guam, American Samoa and, as a trusteeship under agreement with the U.N. Security Council, the Marshall, Caroline and Northern Mariana Islands.

GREAT BRITAIN—Fiji, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Solomon Islands, Pitcairn Island, a condominium in the New Hebrides with the French, and a protective alliance with the independent Kingdom of Tonga.

FRANCE—New Caledonia, Tahiti, the Marquesas, Wallis and Futuna Islands.

AUSTRALIA—the eastern half of New Guinea, Nauru and Ocean Islands.

NEW ZEALAND—Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau Islands and some continuing economic responsibility for the now independent state of Western Samoa.

From 1900, when the international competitive acquisition of Pacific islands ended, until 1940, the area was of no moment in international affairs. True, during the late twenties and thirties, there were rumors that Japan was fortifying some of its mandated islands in the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas, and the development of trans-Pacific aviation led to final acquisition of some uninhabited islands by the United States and Britain. But with the bitter, costly battles to push the Japanese forces back through the islands it became generally recognized among the Western nations that the Pacific Islands were both strategically vital and a potential political, economic and social problem. The United States, France, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand then arrived at the conclusion that some instrument must be created to advance economic and social welfare and improve health conditions in the islands. Australian Prime Minister Menzies took the lead in 1947 and called a conference of these nations plus The Netherlands, which until last year administered West New Guinea.

This conference produced the Canberra Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission "to encourage and strengthen international coöperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific administered by them." In 1951, the area was extended to include Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, both of which lie north of the equator, and in 1963 it was automatically reduced to exclude the territory which The Netherlands transferred through the U.N. to Indonesia. The Commission is headquartered in Nouméa, New Caledonia, and has a full-time staff of 59. Its work is modest, practical, and supplements regionally the work that metropolitan governments are doing in their own territories. It operates particularly in fields of common interest, when more than one territory can benefit from the same professional advice or when an exchange of knowledge and skills between territories can have value.

The Commission has a health section which does unusual and excellent work in nutrition, environmental sanitation, toxicity of fish, and research in diseases such as elephantiasis. Of greatest importance is the health education program carried out at the village level. The economic development program of the Commission is largely based on agriculture, the mainstay of the Pacific economies. The islanders can get seedlings and cuttings and receive technical advice on plant and animal quarantine, eradication of plant pests, agricultural marketing, credit unions and capital formation. During the last two years, the Commission has operated two highly successful schools of boat building, one conducted in English and one in French.

The social development section gives technical advice on inexpensive methods of producing printed reading material, literacy campaigns, coöperatives, community education and on the organization of women's groups to help in community development. It conducts population studies and research in problems of growing urbanization, holds conferences on social and labor problems and this autumn is sponsoring the first South Pacific Games, in Fiji. In an area where there are few libraries, research facilities and institutions of higher learning, the South Pacific Commission acts as a channel for the flow of new ideas, techniques and practices into the area. All of these activities result in productive intellectual contact between administrative, technical and professional people in the different territories. There are conferences, seminars, study tours, etc., all of which broaden horizons, deepen knowledge and spread understanding of developments under similar conditions elsewhere.

The Commission has two auxiliary bodies. One is the South Pacific Conference, which consists of delegates from each of the territories meeting every three years to discuss common problems and recommend activities to the Commission. The other is the Research Council, composed of technical and scientific experts who review and suggest projects for the Commission.

The Commission itself comprises two commissioners appointed by each of the five participating governments. It meets once a year at commission headquarters to fix and approve a budget and to authorize programs in the three fields of economic development, social development and health. It appoints a secretary-general for a five-year term and approves the appointment of principal staff officers under him. In sharp contrast to most other

international organizations of which the United States is a member, the total annual expenditure of the Commission and its auxiliary bodies is about \$700,000. Of this, the United States currently pays 14.7 percent, or about \$88,000.<sup>1</sup>

This sum is probably the best investment the United States has made since it traded 50 old destroyers for bases. The strategic value of the vast Pacific in a day when our defense relies heavily on Polaris submarines is obvious. The Pacific missile range runs down the center of this area; tracking stations can easily be located here; and, prior to the test-ban agreement, high-altitude nuclear explosions could be conducted and monitored here.

Clearly, friendly political administrations in the area are indispensable. More subtle, but of perhaps greater importance and value to the United States and its allies, is the demonstration continuously conducted since 1947 that undeveloped and underdeveloped areas do not have to embrace a chimera of independence to gain self-government and economic and social advancement; that self-government without independence is better than independence without self-government; that colonial peoples can graduate to a political status which allows them to control their own destinies while retaining the economic and defense strength that comes from a close tie to a major power.

In Guam, the people have full United States citizenship and a legislature elected by secret ballot under universal suffrage and having full territorial legislative powers. American Samoa has an elected legislature with somewhat lesser powers. The people of French Polynesia and New Caledonia are French citizens who freely and secretly elect their own legislatures as well as representatives to the French Senate and Assembly. The Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens and also have an elected council. The situation in other islands and areas varies to meet local requirements and the state of educational, social and political development. All have personal freedom and the right of free political expression far beyond that of many ex-colonial areas

<sup>1</sup> It should be made clear that the principal part of the costs of local government and government aid come through the administrative channels of each of the five countries individually. Under both the Anglo-Saxon and the French governmental systems, offshore territories spend the revenues which are collected locally. Thus, for instance, Guam this year will spend some \$12,000,000 collected locally for all functions of government. However, Samoa and the Trust Territory of Micronesia will each get subventions from the U.S. Federal Government in the neighborhood of \$13,000,000. While total figures are obscured by differing currencies and differing systems of advances, it is probable that the five nations will, in the discharge of their regular obligations, allocate some \$35,000,000 to \$45,000,000 to supplement local revenues in the area.

which have taken on the status of independent nations. The people of the Pacific Islands are as eager for advancement, for education, for improved standards of living, for security, for opportunity as any other of the world's peoples. They have made great progress. But they have far to go before their personal and community income can support the kind of education and opportunity which they want and need.

## II

There is an obnoxious, insulting and inaccurate phrase which has in the past been used to justify neglect of economic, social and political advancement. It is "happy native people." Administrators in many cases imposed a do-nothing program, ostensibly so that the "happy native people" would not change. This is more properly known as the "zoo" theory of colonial administration. It was a theory which professed to guarantee that native cultures would not be blurred or extinguished. It required that native peoples should be kept exactly as they were when first discovered. It would have provided endless doctoral theses. It took no account of human desires and justified hopes and ambitions. It ignored the practical condition that once a land is entered by trade, traffic, exploration or naval or military bases, change is inevitable; the question is what kind and to what end. The peoples of the Pacific Islands rapidly acquired respect and desire for machines, roads, electric lights, medical care, schools, libraries, piers, motorboats, tractors, trucks and pumps. Equally they wanted the education and skills to operate them.

A variation of the "zoo" theory of island administration is to restrict social development to that which can be supported by the resources found on the islands when the Westerners came there. This is the attempt to limit islanders to the social and educational level of a banana, copra and taro-root economy. It is equally contrary to our ideals and principles. If we believe both in the equality of man and in the dignity of man, it follows that a man must be allowed and encouraged to develop to the limit of his own capacity. This does not mean that universities and centers for the performing arts should be built on remote islands. It does mean that the young men and women of these islands must have channels of growth, development and training open to them. If we of the Western nations see to it that there are means and opportunities for personal advancement, we will build in the enormous

Pacific Ocean area a stable political economy and society which will strengthen us both internally and externally. We will have demonstrated to the people of the non-aligned nations (as well as the unhappy peoples of the Eastern alliance) that they can fulfill their legitimate aspirations for freedom, self-government and a better life for their children without flirting with Communism or venturing on the tightrope of independence unsupported by economic, educational or national-defense viability.

As the few remaining colonies in Africa become independent and as the last trusteeships are terminated, there will be little for the United Nations Committee of 24 and for the Trusteeship Council to do. It is reasonable to expect that these bodies will take a more active interest in the island territories of the Pacific, and that the Communist countries will do everything possible to make trouble by painting us as a colonial power. The Soviet Union has for some time been critical of the one trusteeship which she can do nothing about—the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands—as it is a strategic trust area created by agreement with the Security Council; alteration or revocation of this trust assignment would be subject to a veto in that body. It is clear, then, that the quiet Pacific, in which we have been progressing slowly but surely, will soon be a major focus of international attention and potential trouble. In this situation, the Western powers must show increased concern for the development of economically, socially and politically self-reliant communities in the South Pacific. The case for this must rest not on the need to combat Communist activity in the area, which as yet is very slight, but on what we as partisans of democracy and believers in individual responsibility have determined is sound and proper.

Additionally, however, the provisions of Articles 73 and 74 of the United Nations Charter impose heavy obligations. Under Article 73, members of the U.N. responsible for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government accept as a “sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants,” ensuring political, economic, social and educational advancement, and to assist them in the progressive development of free political institutions. Under Article 74 members agree to base their policy for territories on the “general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.”

## III

Specifically, what fields of development and aid need to be stepped up to make the Pacific Ocean areas an effective part of the Western world? First, education. Every child born in a Pacific Island should have access to as good an education as he can absorb, even to advanced training for the exceptionally qualified on the same basis as their counterparts in the metropolitan country. There must be rooted out promptly and unmistakably the philosophy that second-rate is good enough for "native peoples." Elementary schooling must be maintained at metropolitan standards. The same quality of secondary schools and colleges should be available either in the islands or in the metropolitan country, and financial aid must be available for travel across the great distances of the Pacific.

There will be a substantial temporary cost for construction of school facilities, and qualified teachers will have to be brought in until higher academic standards produce enough teachers in the area. The foundation is already there, particularly with inter-territorial use of secondary schools and colleges. New Zealand and Australia have freely opened their schools and universities to island residents and many travel and tuition scholarships have been extended. The Philippine universities have been used, particularly by the Marshall and Caroline Islanders. The East-West Center in Hawaii can take many students from this, its own front yard. The French territories send students to metropolitan France for university and professional training. American Samoa has a teacher-training school. Guam has a college which is accredited by the United States Western Association of Schools and Colleges, and others are available in Fiji and Tahiti. Professional education can be provided in metropolitan countries.

Economic development projects can be simple and directly tailored to the resources and the facilities that are locally available. Moreover, the five Western powers can often make one dollar, one pound or one franc do the work of five through internationalizing their economic development work and allowing the territories of all five nations to benefit from the technical advice, demonstration and instruction provided by a central body—the South Pacific Commission.

A first-class economic development program can be created at modest cost. Instead of aid programs running to eight and nine figures for areas smaller in size and of less strategic importance,

the South Pacific islands could digest in international assistance something on the order of \$2,000,000 to \$3,000,000 a year. Even this amount could be used effectively only after several years of businesslike preparation. Still, it would represent a fourfold increase in the present expenditure of the South Pacific Commission. That is a modest enough sum for five nations to invest each year to strengthen the communities which sit astride 20 percent of the earth's surface. The United States, which now provides an equitable proportion of the Commission's budget, could increase its share to 30 or 35 percent of the new total, and it would still enjoy one of the greatest bargains in the international assistance field. Surely, it is worthwhile to demonstrate that an area of the world for which Western nations have direct responsibility can advance politically, economically and socially more rapidly than areas which attack, belittle, harass and even intimidate the West.

#### IV

The Canberra Agreement has become outdated and needs revision. One of the original members, The Netherlands, has withdrawn. Western Samoa has been granted independence by New Zealand and has applied for membership in the South Pacific Commission. The Kingdom of Tonga has participated in the Commission's activities, and may wish to become affiliated. Other territories may become independent and wish to affiliate. They should not be put to the expense or the sham of joining the United Nations when by neither population, wealth nor defense capability can they afford the burdens of that type of independence.

When the Canberra Agreement was written, a triennial conference of territorial representatives was enough. Now, discussion without action is frustrating, is degrading to them as qualified representatives of their people and, if continued much longer, is likely to induce political irresponsibility. It has been suggested that a device be written into a new agreement to allow the representatives of the various Pacific territories, elected or selected according to the laws of each territory, to determine the economic and social program to be administered by the South Pacific Commission within the cost limitations of the budget which the five member nations will support. This would in itself be another step in the direction of increased self-government.

What is the future for the three to four million people of this

vast region? The choice is between continued political and economic progress in association with the Western powers on one hand and, on the other, fragile, uncertain "independence" without the economic, military or political means of protecting it. If the Western powers do the necessary, both in their own territorial programs and internationally, the island territories will grow slowly closer together until they comprise a regional grouping of peoples with a common ecological pattern, but integrated politically with their separate metropolitan countries. No basis exists for a separate nation of Pacifica or for a Pacific Island Federation. There is every sign that the people are proud to be Americans, Britishers, Frenchmen, Australians and New Zealanders. What better way to demonstrate the superiority of Western freedom than to keep them feeling that way?

# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By Henry L. Roberts*

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## *General: Political and Legal*

POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. BY F. H. HINSLEY. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963, 416 p. \$6.95.

This quite impressive study by a lecturer in history at Cambridge University will be of great interest to the diplomatic historian, to the student of international relations and to those concerned with the problem of peace. After a historical critique of peace proposals since the seventeenth century, Mr. Hinsley examines the structure of the modern States' system and the progress of international relations in our century. In all these areas he offers many fresh and perceptive observations, including a most interesting discussion of the origins of the Second World War and the present balance of power.

EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL. BY HANNAH ARENDT. New York: Viking, 1963, 275 p. \$5.50.

When the articles on which this book is based appeared in *The New Yorker*, they occasioned a great deal of comment and controversy. This is not surprising, as the whole subject of Eichmann's trial for his role in the Nazi extermination of the Jews touches on the most painful political, legal and moral issues of our century. While one may question some of Miss Arendt's historical observations and some of her quite striking conclusions, this is clearly an important, original and valuable study that should be read carefully and thoughtfully.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONGO: A QUEST FOR PEACE. BY KING GORDON. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962, 184 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$1.95, paper.)

A thorough report on the U.N. operations in the Congo from July 1960 until September 1962, based largely on U.N. documents and on the author's personal observations in the Congo as the U.N.'s Chief Information Officer.

AGAINST THE COLD WAR. BY CHANAKYA SEN. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, 288 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$5.00.)

An Indian journalist discusses the significance of the "Afro-Asian emergence which has taken place in a world of the Cold War."

THE REVOLUTION IN WORLD POLITICS. EDITED BY MORTON A. KAPLAN. New York: Wiley, 1962, 477 p. \$7.95.

Twenty essays interpreting the meaning of the political revolution resulting from the great number of new aspiring nations, the Communist challenge, and the confusion of democratic powers in facing both the Communist bloc and the new nations. The papers are the outcome of a project sponsored by the Center of International Studies at Princeton.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND N.A.T.O. BY M. W. J. M. BROEKMEIJER. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1963, 208 p. Gldrs. 23.50.

A Dutch air force officer studies the strategic, economic and political importance of the developing nations to the Atlantic Community and NATO defense. The relationship is recognized as important but no very startling conclusions emerge.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES. BY IAN BROWNLIE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 532 p. \$12.00.

An ambitious, scholarly monograph in development of the author's starting observation that "the law is, very nearly, all that we possess by way of a common language for a community of states the co-existence of which would otherwise depend too much on the uncertainties arising from political competition." An important contribution.

THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS. BY C. WILFRED JENKS. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications, 1962, 282 p. \$7.95.

Dr. Jenks' purpose in this volume is to "explore the impact of contemporary developments in international organisation on the borderlands of public international law, private international law and administrative law."

INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN UND REGIONALPAKTE (OHNE EUROPA-ORGANISATIONEN). BY FRITZ MÜNCH AND GERT VON EYERN. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1962, 268 p. DM. 15.

A helpful introduction to the history of multilateral coöperation, with a well-selected group of texts of international agreements.

LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE ET EUROPÉENNE. BY ROGER BLOCH AND JACQUELINE LEFÈVRE. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1963, 219 p. Fr. 24.

A legal study of the regulations governing personnel serving in the rapidly proliferating number of international organizations.

INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION. BY RICHARD B. LILICH AND GORDON A. CHRISTENSON. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962, 173 p. \$7.50.

A practical guide for the lawyer and claimant—individual, corporation and others—in pressing an international claim; this is one volume in a series on this subject being written for the Syracuse University College of Law's International Legal Studies Program.

THE DIPLOMATIC CAREER. BY LORD STRANG. London: Deutsch, 1962, 160 p. 16/.

Eight papers on the profession of the diplomatist, written by a distinguished authority who appreciates the pitfalls and rewards of a diplomatic career.

VINGT ANNÉES D'HISTOIRE CONTEMPORAINE. BY JACQUES BLOCH-MORHANGE. Paris: Plon, 1963, 380 p. Fr. 13.90.

A French commentator's effort to bring the international events of the last two decades or so into some kind of pattern; we are still too close to the scene.

HISTOIRE PARALLÈLE. BY ANDRÉ MAUROIS AND ARAGON. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1962, 4 v.

In this unusual enterprise, the benefits of which are not wholly apparent, two French authors review the histories of the Soviet Union and the United States since 1917. M. Aragon, a distinguished Communist writer, devotes two volumes to the

U.S.S.R. ("Histoire de l'U.R.S.S. de 1917 à 1960"); M. Maurois, one to the United States ("Histoire des États-Unis de 1917 à 1961"). The fourth volume comprises "conversations" with and "aperçus" by some prominent citizens of the two countries.

MUNICH. BY KEITH EUBANK. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963, 322 p. \$5.00.

A serious and scholarly though not a path-breaking review of the Munich Agreement and of some of the mythology associated with it.

THE SUPREME CONTROL AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919. BY LORD HANKEY. London: Allen and Unwin, 1963, 206 p. 36/.

A valuable commentary on the organization and functioning of the Paris Peace Conference from the vantage point of the head of the secretaryship of the British Empire Delegation.

NEUTRALITÄT ODER ALLIANZ. BY W. M. CARLGREN. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1962, 276 p. Kr. 30.

A study, in diplomatic history, of German-Swedish relations in the first year of World War I and of the German efforts to achieve an alliance with Sweden.

### *General: Military, Technical and Scientific*

THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN FOREIGN POLICY. BY ARNOLD KRAMISH. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 276 p. \$5.50.

A physicist with wide experience in government here analyzes why the Atoms for Peace program has failed to live up to expectations. He examines American and Soviet policies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Euratom, and the problems arising from the military and political implications of even the most peaceful uses of atomic energy. The book provides a useful explanation for laymen of the technology of atomic energy and a survey of the range of its possible uses besides power.

DISARMAMENT AND THE ECONOMY. EDITED BY EMILE BENOIT AND KENNETH E. BOULDING. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 310 p. \$5.75.

These significant studies are based on the premise that: "The political problems of disarmament are the most difficult and the most important, and the economic problems will rise in importance only as the political problems are solved. It is essential, however, to know we *can* solve the economic problems concerned."

THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT: A STUDY IN SOVIET-AMERICAN GAMESMANSHIP. BY JOHN W. SPANIER AND JOSEPH L. NOGEE. New York: Praeger, 1962, 226 p. \$5.50. (Paper, \$1.95.)

The aim of the authors is to "analyze the political objectives sought by the United States and the Soviet Union" in the course of disarmament negotiations which started in 1946.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER. BY CHARLES E. OSGOOD. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962, 183 p. \$1.45 (paper).

A plea and a program for the West to take the initiative in ending the "spiral of terror" by developing a "strategy that would allow us to march deliberately toward a more peaceful world, yet always moving within acceptable limits of dignity and security."

PEACE AND OPINION. BY EVAN LUARD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 170 p. \$4.00.

A thoughtful essay on the forms of warlike behavior which create the demands for weapons and on the need for man to modify his behavioral patterns in order to decrease his dependence on arms.

**BREAKTHROUGH TO PEACE: TWELVE VIEWS ON THE THREAT OF THERMONUCLEAR EXTERMINATION.** New York: New Directions, 1962, 253 p. \$1.95 (paper).

Thomas Merton, in his introduction to these essays, says the 12 distinguished authors "approach the problems related to nuclear war with a freely questioning mind, in search of facts and principles which tend to upset the crude assumptions already too widely accepted by the majority, particularly in America."

**PEACE-KEEPING BY U.N. FORCES: FROM SUEZ TO THE CONGO.** By ARTHUR LEE BURNS AND NINA HEATHCOTE. New York: Praeger (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1963, 256 p. \$6.00.

A good study of the uses to which the U.N. has put military forces at its disposal in recent years: in Suez, Lebanon, Jordan and the Congo. A concluding chapter considers the limitations and possibilities of such forces.

**TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES.** By ROBERT ROSS SMITH. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963, 756 p. \$8.00.

This volume in the official history "United States Army in World War II" deals with the reconquest of the Philippine archipelago in the last eight months of hostilities.

**THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN.** By CHARLES B. MACDONALD. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963, 670 p. \$8.75.

This volume relates the experiences of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies in the assault on the Siegfried Line in the autumn of 1944.

**DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG IN BILDERN UND DOKUMENTEN.** EDITED BY HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN AND HANS DOLLINGER. Munich: Desch, 1962-63, 3 v. DM. 180.

A massive compilation of pictures, maps and documents, but no continued narrative.

### *General: Economic, Social and Cultural*

**UNESCO: ASSESSMENT AND PROMISE.** By GEORGE N. SHUSTER. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 130 p. \$2.95. (Paper, \$1.45.)

An American educator associated with UNESCO from its beginnings gives his considered views on the purposes and achievements of that organization and its role in world affairs. One of the Policy Books series of the Council on Foreign Relations, the book pays special attention to implications for U.S. foreign policy.

**UNITED NATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY.** By BENJAMIN HIGGINS. Homewood (Ill.): Irwin, 1962, 235 p. \$5.00. (Paper, \$3.50.)

A study confined almost entirely to recent foreign aid policies, with a series of recommendations including the suggestion that the United States and other large contributors give more capital assistance through the U.N. rather than through bilateral channels.

PUBLIC FINANCE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. BY A. R. PREST. New York: Praeger, 1963, 164 p. \$4.50.

An inquiry into the major aspects of financing government expenditures in underdeveloped countries and the harm to be done by unwise taxation programs. The author, Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, primarily uses as examples the experiences of underdeveloped areas within the British Commonwealth.

ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER UND ENTWICKLUNGSHILFEN AN DER WENDE DES KOLONIALZEITALTERS. BY KURT HESSE. Berlin: Duncker, 1962, 414 p. DM. 38.

A general survey of problems of the underdeveloped countries; the author envisages a continuing role for the former colonial powers and commends international companies for their contribution to economic growth.

DEMOCRACY SPEAKS MANY TONGUES. BY RICHARD WAVERLY POSTON. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 206 p. \$4.75.

The author's first-hand observations have convinced him that the United States' generous aid program to developing countries has failed to provide anything more than material assistance. With a feeling of urgency he pleads for community development programs in the underdeveloped countries "through which the growing restlessness of the masses may be channeled constructively toward nation-building ends by democratic means."

STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY TIBOR BARNA AND OTHERS. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 365 p. \$15.00.

These papers presented at an international conference on input-output techniques deal both with theoretical models and with their application to regional and national planning. For the lay reader the required input may be excessive.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIETY. EDITED BY BERT F. HOSELITZ AND WILBERT E. MOORE. Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1963, 437 p.

A substantial UNESCO symposium of 15 papers dealing with entrepreneurship, innovation, consumption and investment, public administration, urbanization and education.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS SINCE 1945. BY ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN. New York: Praeger, 1963, 176 p. \$6.00.

A brief review of postwar migrations, including refugee movements, throughout the world.

THE PEACEABLE REVOLUTION. BY BETTY SCHECHTER. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 243 p. \$3.75.

An account of non-violent resistance, based on the lines of Thoreau and Gandhi and the more recent activities of the American Negroes.

CHILDREN OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REPORT BY UNICEF. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. (for the United Nations Children's Fund), 1963, 130 p. \$3.95.

A report on the major needs of children in developing countries, the measures being taken or required and some of the policy questions involved.

HUMAN RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. EDITED BY MARIAN CRITES ALEXANDER-FRUTSCHI. Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1963, 398 p. \$3.50.

An extensive, annotated bibliography of the increasing body of literature dealing with education and training in support of economic and social development.

*The United States*

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC. BY ADOLF A. BERLE. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 247 p. \$4.50.

An effort to sketch "the theory and practice of the American economic system as it actually functions." Mr. Berle places considerable stress on the realities and feels that many of our conceptions and theories are no longer relevant.

NATIONAL SECURITY: POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC STRATEGIES IN THE DECADE AHEAD. EDITED BY DAVID M. ABSHIRE AND RICHARD V. ALLEN. New York: Praeger (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace), 1963, 1039 p. \$10.00.

A huge, lap-flattening but worthwhile symposium on a wide range of issues relating to our national security—Sino-Soviet strategy, political requirements for U.S. strategy, military and economic strategies. The papers are based on a conference at the Center for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University in January 1963.

SENATORIAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. BY MALCOLM E. JEWELL. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962, 214 p. \$6.00.

A study of the political process in the Senate on foreign policy issues from 1947 to 1960, of presidential and public influences on this process, and of the prospects for greater rationality in this vital area of policy-making.

DIPLOMATS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: STEPCHILDREN OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE. BY MICHAEL H. CARDOZO. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 142 p. \$3.50.

An interesting study of the uncertain status of a new breed of U.S. diplomats—those assigned to international organizations such as O.E.E.C., NATO and the European Communities.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY, AND OTHER ESSAYS. BY SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 423 p. \$10.00.

A selection of essays on American foreign policy written over the last half century by a leading diplomatic historian.

FRANK B. KELLOGG—HENRY L. STIMSON. BY ROBERT H. FERRELL. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963, 360 p. \$7.50.

This volume represents a continuation of a ten-volume set on American Secretaries of State from 1781 to 1925 that was published in 1927–29. Professor Ferrell, a historian at Indiana University, here reviews the diplomatic activities of Secretaries Kellogg (1925–29) and Stimson (1929–33). Further volumes are scheduled to follow.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1962. EDITED BY RICHARD P. STEBBINS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ELAINE P. ADAM. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 550 p. \$7.50.

Now in its twenty-fourth year, this standard publication presents a selection from the principal documentary materials relating to American foreign policy. Provides numerous cross references to the parallel Council on Foreign Relations volume "The United States in World Affairs."

*The Western Hemisphere*

THE WINE IS BITTER: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. BY MILTON S. EISENHOWER. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 342 p. \$4.95.

While centrally a report of his extensive activities and observations in Latin America during his brother's Administration, this is also a valuable and frank discussion of the mounting revolution in Latin America and of the United States' efforts and failures in this area. One chapter deals with Dr. Eisenhower's painful experiences in relation to the tractor-captive exchange after the abortive Cuban invasion.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN CANADA. EDITED BY J. H. AITCHISON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963, 193 p. \$5.00.

A symposium of essays, in honor of R. MacGregor Dawson, dealing with a variety of historical, political and regional topics.

THE CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 1957. BY JOHN MEISEL. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, 313 p. \$6.50.

The first of a projected series on Canadian elections, this deals thoroughly with the coming to power of Mr. Diefenbaker and the Conservatives in 1957.

LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OR EXPLOSION? EDITED BY MILDRED ADAMS. New York: Dodd (for the Council on World Tensions), 1963, 277 p. \$3.25.

A collection of papers by a distinguished group of participants in a conference at the University of Bahia, sponsored by the Council on World Tensions during the summer of 1962. Latin America's present crisis and future prospects are viewed with both optimism and pessimism, but always with intelligence and depth. The participants are leaders, specialists and scholars from academic, economic and political areas.

TEN KEYS TO LATIN AMERICA. BY FRANK TANNENBAUM. New York: Knopf, 1962, 237 p. \$4.95.

Valued reflections upon Latin America, its present institutional, social and economic climate, by a respected Latin American historian.

SYMPOSIUM ON LATIN AMERICA. Wellesley: Wellesley College, 1963, 223 p. \$2.50 (paper).

Drawn from the Symposium held at Wellesley in mid-February 1963, these full proceedings deal with the current Latin American scene—and the questioned future, be it an evolutionary or a revolutionary one. With such prominent figures of the democratic left as Alberto Lleras Camargo and José Figueres, along with representatives from governmental and international agencies such as Arturo Morales-Carrión, William D. Rogers, Galo Plaza Lasso, the panelists included scholars and authorities from diverse fields. Charles Wagley, Aaron Copland, Erwin D. Canham, John C. Dreier and Max L. Cetto figure among a most prominent group of specialists involved in this Symposium and help give the proceedings depth and value.

JOURNEYS TOWARD PROGRESS: STUDIES OF ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING IN LATIN AMERICA. BY ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN. Twentieth Century Fund, 1963, 308 p. \$4.00.

In this study Professor Hirschman analyzes the policy-making process in Latin America as it relates to economic reform and development; based on the experience of Brazil, Colombia and Chile.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEXICO: TWO STUDIES. BY WILLIAM P. GLADE, JR. AND CHARLES W. ANDERSON. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963, 242 p. \$5.00.

In these two studies Mr. Glade discusses the relation of the Mexican revolution to economic development. Mr. Anderson deals more narrowly with the development of public credit institutions.

PERU. BY R. J. OWENS. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 195 p. \$4.00.

This concise survey in the series of Chatham House books on Latin America deals with the land, people, history, politics and economics of Peru.

THE FOURTH FLOOR: AN ACCOUNT OF THE CASTRO COMMUNIST REVOLUTION. BY EARL E. T. SMITH. New York: Random House, 1963, 242 p. \$5.00.

A subjective but interesting first-hand account of the Castro revolution during its formative years, 1957-59, by the United States Ambassador to Cuba at the time.

JAMAICA: THE OLD AND THE NEW. BY MARY MANNING CARLEY. New York: Praeger, 1963, 212 p. \$6.00.

A brief survey, with bibliography, written in a somewhat stilted but sympathetic manner.

### *Western Europe*

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITY OF EUROPE. BY MAX BELOFF. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963, 124 p. \$3.50.

In this concise but perceptive essay Mr. Beloff discusses the "conscious, if intermittent" effort of the United States since 1945 to persuade the European countries of the advantages of integration.

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. BY ROY PRYCE. London: Marshbank (in association with the Federal Trust), 1962, 107 p. 15/.

A brief, competent examination of the political implications of membership in the European Community and suggestions for future developments "to ensure responsible and democratic government within the Community." The author, head of the London office of the joint Information Service of the European Communities, carefully weighs Britain's particular problems, as well as contributions, as a potential member of the Community.

UNITED EUROPE: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY. BY WALTER HALLSTEIN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 109 p. \$2.75.

These three lectures delivered in the United States in April 1962 constitute a valuable introduction to the history, economics and politics of European integration.

EUROPE WITHOUT BRITAIN. EDITED BY CORAL BELL. Melbourne: Cheshire (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 120 p. 27/6.

A group of six essays dealing chiefly with the diplomatic and political aspects of the breakdown of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market.

ALLIANCE BORN OF DANGER: AMERICA, THE COMMON MARKET, AND THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. BY CHARLES A. CERAMI. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 181 p. \$3.95.

A brief introduction to the European Common Market and the American stake in its success.

THE APPEASERS. BY MARTIN GILBERT AND RICHARD GOTT. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 444 p. \$6.50.

Although the two authors were born in the late 1930s and have no personal re-creations, this cool and able account of Britain's appeasers—"decayed serving men"—in the face of Hitler's mounting threat is altogether devastating.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE YEARS OF ACHIEVEMENT. BY LEWIS BROAD. New York: Hawthorn, 1963, 629 p. \$8.95.

The writer of a Churchill biography confronts a formidable task especially when, as with this volume, he deals with the war years about which the great man has written so powerfully himself. This is a conscientious, solid but not outstanding contribution.

ANEURIN BEVAN: A BIOGRAPHY. VOLUME ONE: 1897-1945. BY MICHAEL FOOT. New York: Atheneum, 1963, 536 p. \$7.50.

Mr. Foot's biography of the colorful public life of Aneurin Bevan and his forceful role in the Labor movement is an important and highly readable contribution to twentieth-century political literature. This volume—another is to follow—covers the years 1897-1945, from his birth in Wales to his appointment as Minister of Health in the Attlee Cabinet. The author is a leading left-wing political journalist and Member of Parliament.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF LLOYD GEORGE. BY LORD BEAVERBROOK. New York: Duell, 1963, 320 p. \$4.95.

This is an absorbing account of the political clashes and manœuvres that led to Lloyd George's extraordinary fall from power in the course of the years 1921-1922. Lord Beaverbrook is in a position to write intimately of these events, and he has appended a fascinating selection of documents, letters, diary entries from the key figures of the time.

THE MAGIC OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY. BY KINGSLEY MARTIN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1962, 192 p. \$4.75.

The former editor of the *New Statesman* has written a colorful story of the power and the troubles of the British monarchy over the past century and a half.

ARMED FORCES IN PEACETIME: BRITAIN, 1918-1940, A CASE STUDY. BY ROBIN HIGHAM. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1963, 332 p. \$10.75.

A critical examination of Britain's inter-war defense policy, marked, in the author's judgment, by a "reckless economizing upon defence in the names of disarmament by example and of orthodox finance."

THE BRITISH ECONOMY IN THE NINETEEN-FIFTIES. EDITED BY G. D. N. WORSWICK AND P. H. ADY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 564 p. \$8.00.

This volume of essays, an excellent sequel to a preceding volume on 1945-50, presents a rather dreary picture of British economy and economic policy in the 1950s. As the editors observe, "The man in the street would say we did well enough; it is the economist who is more likely to strike a critical note."

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH STEEL INDUSTRY. BY J. C. CARR AND W. TAPLIN ASSISTED BY A. E. G. WRIGHT. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 632 p. \$11.00.

A solid history of the British steel industry from Bessemer to 1939; not likely to keep the reader on the edge of his chair.

FRENCH POLITICS AND ALGERIA: THE PROCESS OF POLICY FORMATION, 1954-1962. BY WILLIAM G. ANDREWS. New York: Appleton, 1962, 217 p. \$2.35 (paper).

A comparative study of the impact of the Algerian insurrection on the politics and fortunes of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics.

THE MRP AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY. BY RUSSELL B. CAPELLE. New York: Praeger, 1963, 196 p. \$5.50.

A study of the role of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* in French foreign affairs during its heyday, 1946-1954, and the reason for its ultimate failure.

LAVAL: A BIOGRAPHY. BY HUBERT COLE. New York: Putnam, 1963, 314 p. \$5.95.

Less general than the title would suggest, this is chiefly an account, and a good one, of Pierre Laval's disastrous but not frivolous career during the Vichy years, 1940-1944.

LAVAL, VINGT ANS APRÈS. BY GUY BECHTEL. Paris: Laffont, 1963, 373 p. Fr. 13.50.

A young French journalist, who was only 14 at the time of Laval's execution, undertakes a reappraisal of the latter's career. A partial rehabilitation.

LA PLANIFICATION EN FRANCE ET LE IV<sup>e</sup> PLAN. BY BERNARD CAZES. Paris: Éditions de l'Épargne, 1962, 282 p. Fr. 9.

A concise but rewarding discussion of economic planning in France with particular attention to the instruments and objectives of the Fourth Plan.

DAS DEUTSCHE RISIKO: AUSSENPOLITISCHE PERSPEKTIVEN. BY RÜDIGER ALTMANN. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1962, 145 p. DM. 9.80.

A brief but quite critical appraisal of recent German foreign policy, a number of the goals of which are regarded as unachievable.

BERLIN AND THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE. EDITED BY DAVID S. COLLIER AND KURT GLASER. Chicago: Regnery (in coöperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs), 1963, 251 p. \$6.00.

A collection of conference papers dealing with a variety of issues: European unity, Berlin, the East-West conflict, Eastern Europe and German-Slav relations.

THE SURVIVORS. BY NORBERT MUHLEN. New York: Crowell, 1962, 228 p. \$3.95.

A close look at the 40,000 Jews living in Germany in 1961—a "story of a remarkable victory which faith and civilization seem to be winning today in their struggle against modern barbarism."

FARBIGE UNTER WEISSEN. BY PRODOSH AICH. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1962, 315 p. DM. 16.80.

A discussion of the condition of Asian and African students in West Germany, based on some 386 interviews in five university towns.

DEUTSCHLANDS ANNEXIONSPOLITIK IN POLEN UND IM BALTIKUM 1914-1918. BY WERNER BASLER. Berlin: Rütten, 1962, 457 p. DM-Ost. 17.50.

A Marxist-Leninist but quite substantial and serious study of Germany's expansionist policies in Poland and the Baltic in the First World War.

THE ANSCHLUSS. BY GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963, 222 p. \$4.95.

An able account, by a British journalist, of the fateful German takeover of Austria in March 1938.

THE PARLIAMENT OF SWITZERLAND. BY CHRISTOPHER HUGHES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 203 p. \$4.80.

A detailed treatise on the Swiss parliamentary system; a Hansard Society publication.

SPAIN: THE ROOT AND THE FLOWER. BY JOHN A. CROW. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 412 p. \$6.95.

A good general history of Spanish civilization, of which the last third is devoted to Spain in the twentieth century.

### *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

STALIN'S FOREIGN POLICY REAPPRAISED. BY MARSHALL D. SHULMAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 320 p. \$6.50.

In this interesting and scholarly work Professor Shulman argues the thesis that a major evolution in Soviet foreign policy occurred in the last three years of Stalin's life rather than, as is so often supposed, as an aftermath of his death. In developing this argument the author provides new insights into the Soviet peace movement, Soviet intentions in respect to the Korean War and the significance of the Nineteenth Party Congress.

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED. BY MERLE FAINSOD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 684 p. \$8.95.

This welcome revised edition of the best work on the Soviet government takes account of developments since the appearance of the first edition in 1953.

ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION. EDITED BY ABRAM BERGSON AND SIMON KUZNETS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 392 p. \$9.75.

A substantial assessment, by a number of leading students of the Soviet economy, of recent and likely future trends in the various sectors. The material was originally prepared for a conference held in the spring of 1961.

SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DOCTRINES AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. BY KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962, 285 p. \$7.50.

An examination "of Soviet reality in terms of the social functions of Soviet legal institutions." The author discerns a tendency toward greater rule of law; on the other hand, the individual is increasingly controlled by social discipline, collective action and the intervention of public authority.

THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: POST-STALIN DOCUMENTATION AND HISTORICAL COMMENTARY. BY JOHN N. HAZARD AND ISAAC SHAPIRO. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana Publications (for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law), 1962, 3 v. in 1, \$12.50.

A substantial collection of documents, with commentary, to illustrate the principles and quality of the Soviet legal system as it had evolved in the early 1960s.

ACCOUNTING IN SOVIET PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. BY ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 315 p. \$5.50.

An interesting and fruitful approach to an understanding of the Soviet economy by way of an analysis of Soviet cost accounting. It is the author's conclusion that Soviet accounting has important failings both in providing information and in exerting control.

BOLSHEVIKS IN THE UKRAINE. BY ARTHUR E. ADAMS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, 440 p. \$8.75.

In the confused history of the Russian Civil War, the events in the Ukraine are particularly tangled. Dr. Adams, Professor of Russian History at Michigan State University, has added much to our knowledge and enlightenment by this admirable study of the Bolsheviks' second, and temporarily abortive, effort to gain control of the area in the months immediately following the end of the First World War—November 1918 to June 1919.

J'AI VU VIVRE LA SIBÉRIE. BY ÉDOUARD CALIC. Paris: Fayard, 1962, 269 p. Fr. 12.50.

Informal reportage on a visit to Siberia and Soviet Central Asia and on their industrial expansion.

RED STAR IN SPACE. BY MARTIN CAIDIN. New York: Crowell-Collier, 1963, 280 p. \$4.95.

A somewhat staccato presentation of Soviet achievements in rockets and satellites with urgent admonitions that the United States must do better than it has.

### *The Middle East*

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. BY NADAV SAFRAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 341 p. \$5.95.

This volume in the American Foreign Policy Library deals quite extensively with domestic affairs in Israel as well as with its external relations.

THE PRICE OF MIDDLE EAST OIL. BY WAYNE A. LEEMAN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, 274 p. \$5.00.

A broadly conceived analysis of the political economy of Middle East oil: the structure of the market, costs, profits and prices, and governmental roles in the consuming and producing countries.

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF 1946. BY WILLIAM EAGLETON, JR. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1963, 142 p. \$4.80.

A monograph on the short-lived Republic of Mahabad, created in northwest Iran immediately after the war.

### *South and Southeast Asia*

ASIA IN THE BALANCE. BY MICHAEL EDWARDES. Baltimore: Penguin, 1962, 200 p. 95 cents (paper).

A gloomy report on the failure of Western methods and democracy to help the emerging Asian countries.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN. BY HUGH TINKER. New York: Praeger, 1962, 228 p. \$4.50. (Paper, \$1.75.)

A study of the difficult political developments in two new nations with "ancient cultures" infected by contact with the West.

ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA. Edited by RALPH BRAIBANTI AND JOSEPH J. SPENGLER. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1963, 312 p. \$7.50.

A series of essays treating various aspects of the relationship between administration and economic development—the training of leaders, village and district problems, the tax structure.

INDIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: ESTIMATES OF CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS FROM 1921–22 TO 1938–39. By ARUN KUMAR BANERJI. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, 255 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$11.75.)

An extensive study of the current and capital accounts of India's balance of payments during the inter-war years.

INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: A LEGAL STUDY. By J. S. BAINS. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, 219 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$5.25.)

Dr. Bains, Reader in Political Science at the University of Delhi, has made competent studies of eight international disputes, including the India-China border dispute, analyzing each in terms of international law.

L'INDE INDÉPENDANTE. By CHARLES BETTELHEIM. Paris: Colin, 1962, 524 p. Fr. 30.

A solid general survey, by a French specialist on the economics of underdeveloped countries, on the social and economic development of contemporary India.

MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS. By SAMPURNANAND. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, 188 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$6.75.)

A brief history of political activity in India in the years leading to and following independence, told by a member of the Congress Party who was very active throughout that period.

CASTE IN MODERN INDIA, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By M. N. SRINIVAS. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963, 171 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$6.00.)

Eleven thoughtful essays on the political and sociological impact of the Indian caste tradition on the new India, written between 1952 and 1960 by M. N. Srinivas, now Professor of Sociology at the University of Delhi.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By OLIVER E. CLUBB, JR. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1962, 173 p. \$3.00. (Paper, \$2.00.)

The author weighs alternative policies which the United States might adopt in Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on Viet Nam, Laos, Indonesia and Burma.

CEYLON: THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE. By SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES. New York: Praeger, 1963, 148 p. \$4.50.

A brief account of the relations between Britain and Ceylon with particular attention to the years since 1928.

PRIMER FOR REVOLT: THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN VIET-NAM. By TRUONG CHINH. New York: Praeger, 1963, 213 p. \$5.00.

A facsimile edition of two major theoretical and political works by a leading Communist of North Viet Nam.

INDONESIA AND THE DUTCH. BY LESLIE H. PALMIER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1962, 194 p. \$2.90.

A brief, informative book explaining the events and relationships responsible for the irreparable break between the Dutch and Indonesians.

*The Far East and Pacific Ocean*

CHINA ON THE EVE OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. BY A. DOAK BARNETT. New York: Praeger, 1963, 371 p. \$6.95.

In the two years 1947-1949 Mr. Barnett had the opportunity to travel widely through Nationalist-held China and in part of the area under Communist control. This interesting work is a selection of 23 field reports he wrote for the Institute of Current World Affairs during that period. A valuable first-hand source for this turning point in Chinese history.

AMERICA'S FAILURE IN CHINA, 1941-50. BY TANG TSOU. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, 614 p. \$12.50.

This review and critique of American policy toward China during the 1940s analyzes the various policy lines; for example, creating a great power, creating a united democratic China, intervention and withdrawal, with emphasis on discrepancies between ends and means. Extensively documented and marked by clear definitions of concepts. Of special value are the author's insights into Chinese domestic politics.

HOW THE FAR EAST WAS LOST. BY ANTHONY KUBEK. Chicago: Regnery, 1963, 480 p. \$8.75.

An extremely critical, "revisionist" review of U.S. policy in China in the 1940s. The late General George C. Marshall is seen as "perhaps the key figure in the China debacle."

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMY, 1949-1962: STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND CRISIS. BY CHENG CHU-YUAN. South Orange: Seton Hall University Press, 1963, 217 p. \$5.00.

Chiefly a study of the structural alterations of the Chinese economy since the Communists came to power. The author concludes that they would have done well to follow the Japanese rather than the Russian example as more relevant to China's problems.

LE MOUVEMENT OUVRIER CHINOIS DE 1919 À 1927. BY JEAN CHESNEAUX. Paris: Mouton, 1962, 652 p. Fr. 59.

A massive historical study, based on Chinese sources, of the Chinese working class at the end of the First World War, the beginning of the labor movement and its involvement in the tumultuous years 1924-1927.

TA TA, TAN TAN. "FIGHT FIGHT, TALK TALK . . ." BY VALENTIN CHU. New York: Norton, 1963, 320 p. \$4.95.

A very readable and informative analysis of Communist China, including two sprightly chapters on the bizarre quality of Chinese statistics and the vagaries of dragonology (the Chinese counterpart of Kremlinology).

LA RIVOLUZIONE ININTERROTTA. BY ENRICA COLLOTTI PISCHEL. Turin: Einaudi, 1962, 198 p. L. 1200.

An appraisal of internal developments in Communist China and their international implications.

JAPAN TODAY: RELUCTANT ALLY. BY JAMES CARY. New York: Praeger, 1962, 211 p. \$4.95.

This well-informed Associated Press correspondent, stationed in Tokyo for six years, analyzes present-day Japan, the sources of unrest there, ideological confusion, conditions which made possible the anti-Security Treaty riots of 1960, and the uncertainties of future United States-Japanese relations.

STUDIES IN FRONTIER HISTORY. BY OWEN LATTIMORE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 565 p. \$12.00.

A selection of Professor Lattimore's papers, written in the years 1928-1958, and dealing chiefly, as the title indicates, with frontiers and frontier peoples in Asia: Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and China.

AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC PRODUCT, INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN BORROWING, 1861-1938/39. BY N. G. BUTLIN. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 475 p. \$12.50.

A valuable work of reference for the development of the Australian economy.

### *Africa*

PAN-AFRICANISM: A SHORT POLITICAL GUIDE. BY COLIN LEGUM. New York: Praeger, 1962, 296 p. \$5.75.

A history, with documents and references, of the development and role of Pan-Africanism and its emotional and political impact.

NEW FORCES IN AFRICA. EDITED BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962, 132 p. \$3.25.

A series of papers presented in 1961 at a Georgetown University colloquium on modern Africa. Included are discussions of nationalism, decolonization, economic development, the Congo crisis and other current problems.

THE HANDBOOK OF AFRICA. EDITED BY VIOLAINE I. JUNOD, ASSISTED BY IDRIAN N. RESNICK. New York: New York University Press, 1963, 472 p. \$10.00.

A handbook of information, by country, of the 50-odd political units in Africa.

HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BY GUY BENYENISTE AND WILLIAM E. MORAN, JR. New York: Praeger (for the Stanford Research Institute), 1962, 178 p. \$5.50.

A study of external factors—aid, trade and investment—critically important to the development of Africa's economic growth, with suggestions on how the West can most effectively help Africa.

OPERATION CROSSROADS AFRICA. BY RUTH T. PLIMPTON. New York: Viking, 1962, 142 p. \$3.95.

A refreshing account of the contribution to international understanding made by Operation Crossroads, a private organization which has sent American and Canadian students to work and live in Africa since the late 1950s.

NORTH AFRICA'S FRENCH LEGACY, 1954-1962. BY DAVID C. GORDON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (distributed for Center for Middle Eastern Studies), 1962, 121 p. \$2.50 (paper).

A brief, very readable account of the dilemma of the *évolués*, the French-educated Africans of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, and the ambivalence of their position through the years of struggle for independence.

SAHARA STORY. BY EDWARD WARD. New York: Norton, 1962, 192 p. \$4.50.

A history of the Sahara which, largely through the discovery of oil, "is now another vast productive country added to the world."

THE NEW SOCIETIES OF TROPICAL AFRICA. BY GUY HUNTER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1962, 376 p. \$6.75.

An authoritative study of social and economic change in tropical Africa as that area and its people throw off the remnants of colonial rule and face the new rigors of independence. Europeans working with Africans in these new circumstances will find Mr. Hunter's book a valuable and practical guide.

MY LIFE. BY ALHAJI SIR AHMADU BELLO, SARDAUNA OF SOKOTO. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 245 p. \$5.50.

Basically an autobiography, this is also an important account of Nigeria's measured steps toward independence, told by the powerful Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria.

A HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA. BY KENNETH INGHAM. New York: Praeger, 1962, 456 p. \$6.50.

A solid history of East Africa, of traders and explorers who opened the area to European settlers and of recent colonial policy designed to prepare the natives for independence.

STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE FULL STORY OF MAU MAU. BY FRED MAJDALANY. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 239 p. \$4.50.

An account by an English journalist of the ferocious Mau Mau rising in Kenya, and its suppression and aftermath.

ZAMBIA SHALL BE FREE. BY KENNETH D. KAUNDA. New York: Praeger, 1963, 202 p. \$4.50.

An impressive autobiography by the leader of the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia (renamed Zambia by his party), an advocate of non-violence in the continuing struggle for independence.

IN THE FIERY CONTINENT. BY TOM HOPKINSON. Garden City: Doubleday, 1963, 367 p. \$4.95.

A lively, penetrating account of events in Africa, chiefly in South Africa, during the three and a half years from 1958 that Mr. Hopkinson was there as editor of *Drum*, an illustrated magazine for Africans.

# SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

## I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice*: United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2980 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office*: 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom*: 236 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 88th Congress, 1st Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

### AFRICA

THE UNITED Nations and Africa. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1961. 124 p. (Political Studies, 2.)

NEW nations in Africa: the British contribution. London, Central Office of Information, 1962. 58 p.

SOVIET training programs for Africa, by S. M. Rosen. Washington, Office of Education, 1963. 13 p. (Bulletin 1963, 9.) 15¢.

TRANSPORT problems in relation to economic development in West Africa. N.Y., 1962. 68 p. (62.I.L.K.2.) 75¢.

IMMEDIATE and future problems in the Congo. Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 14, 1963. Washington, 1963. 22 p.

THE ECONOMIC development of Kenya; report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the governments of Kenya and the United Kingdom. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press (for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1963. 380 p.

### AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL vocational training in Europe and North America. Paris, OECD, 1963. 2 v. (Documentation in Food and Agriculture, 52.) \$4.50.

INTELLECTUAL investment in agriculture for economic and social development. Paris, OECD, 1962. 151 p. (Documentation in Agriculture and Food, 60.) \$1.50.

THE 1963 Africa and West Asia agricultural situation. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, 1963. 76 p. (1963 World Agricultural Situation, Supplement, 5.)

COTTON programs. Hearings, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, on S. 608 and 1190, May 20-27, 1963. Washington, 1963. 311 p.

### ATOMIC ENERGY

INTER-AMERICAN Nuclear Energy Commission statute. Washington, Pan American Union, 1963. 6 p. 15¢.

DEVELOPMENTS in technical capabilities for detecting and identifying nuclear weapons tests. Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Mar. 5-12, 1963. Washington, 1963. 518 p.

### CULTURAL RELATIONS

A SPECIAL study on the effectiveness of the past educational and cultural exchange programs of the U.S. Department of State. First annual report, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational Affairs. Washington, 1963. 46 p. (H. Doc. 93.)

A BEACON of hope: the exchange of persons program. Report, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, April, 1963. Washington, 1963. 65 p.

WINNING the cold war: the U.S. ideological offensive. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 28-May 8, 1963. Washington, 1963. 2 pts.

U.S. information service activities in Africa. Hearing, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 5, 1963. Washington, 1963. 33 p.

### DISARMAMENT

TO AMEND the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 777, Apr. 10, 1963. Washington, 1963. 122 p.

— Report, Je. 6, 1963, Washington, 1963. 13 p. (S. Rept. 215.)

TEST ban negotiations and disarmament. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 11, 1963. Washington, 1963. 50 p.

PROGRESSIVE inspection for disarmament: the concept of progressive zonal inspection. Washington, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963. n.p. (Publications, 13.)

WHY a nuclear test ban treaty? Washington, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963. 46 p. (Publications, 15.) 25¢.

#### EASTERN EUROPE

CAPTIVE European nations. Report, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 29, 1963. Washington, 1963. 24 p. (H. Rept. 253.)

CONDITIONS behind the Iron Curtain and in selected countries of Western Europe. Report, Special Study Mission to Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 24, 1963. Washington, 1963. 19 p. (H. Rept. 234.)

THE GROSS national product in the Soviet Union: comparative growth rates, by S. H. Cohn. Washington, Dept. of Commerce, 1963. 21 p. 15¢.

THE SOVIET challenge to U.S. machine building; a study in production and technological policy, by Michael Boretsky. Washington, Dept. of Commerce, 1963. 73 p. 30¢.

THE SOVIET mineral-fuels industries, 1928-1958: a statistical survey, by D. B. Shimkin. Washington, Bureau of the Census, 1962. 183 p. (International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, 19.) \$1.00.

STAFFING procedures and problems in the Soviet Union. Study, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, May 15, 1963. Washington, 1963. 62 p. (Com. Print.)

HIGHER education in Poland. Part I: Organization and administration, by S. M. Rosen and N. Apanasewicz. Washington, Office of Education, 1963. 37 p. (Bulletin 1963, 19.) 20¢.

#### FAR EAST AND ASIA

INDUSTRIAL estates in Asia and the Far East. N.Y., 1962. 468 p. (62.II.B.5.) \$4.50.

STAFFING procedures and problems in Communist China. Study, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, May 15, 1963. Washington, 1963. 50 p.

CHINA disregards the Colombo proposals; attempt to retain gains of aggression against India. New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963. 19 p.

THE CHINESE threat. New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963. 77 p. R.1.00.

WAGE problems in Japan. Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor, 1962. 27 p.

REPORT of National Economic Accounting Research Committee. Tokyo, Economic Research Institute, 1962. 48 p. (Economic Bulletin, 12.)

MALAYSIA; report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962. London, 1963. 68 p. (Cmd. 1954.) 4s.6d.

AGRICULTURAL diversification and economic development in Thailand; a case study. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, 1963. 34 p. (Foreign Agricultural Economic Reports, 8.)

#### FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

FACTORS affecting the United States balance of payments. Compilation of studies, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Dec. 15, 1962. Washington, 1962. 561 p.

OUTLOOK for United States balance of payments. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 12-14, 1962. Washington, 1963. 264 p.

EXPORT-IMPORT Bank Act amendments of 1963. Hearing, Subcommittee, Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, on S. 775 and H.R. 3872, May 17, 1963. Washington, 1963. 34 p.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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